Decade breaks in the mental number line? Putting the tens and units back in different bins.

Most models of number recognition agree that among other number representations there is a central semantic magnitude representation which may be conceptualized as a logarithmically compressed mental number line. Whether or not this number line is decomposed into different representations for tens and units is, however, controversial. We investigated this issue in German participants in a magnitude comparison (selection) task in which the larger of two visually presented Arabic two-digit numbers had to be selected. Most importantly, we varied unit-decade-compatibility: a number pair was defined as compatible if the decade magnitude comparison and the unit magnitude comparison of the two numbers would lead to the same response (e.g. 52 and 67) and as incompatible if this was not the case (e.g. 47 and 62). While controlling for overall numerical distance, size and other variables, we consistently found compatibility effects. A control experiment showed that this compatibility effect was not due to perceptual presentation characteristics. We conclude that the idea of one single number line representation that does not additionally assume different magnitude representations for tens and units is not sufficient to account for the data. Finally, we discuss why decade effects were not found in other experimental settings.     

Facsimiles of Flesh

Ed Gein was a serial killer, grave robber, and body snatcher who made a lampshade from human skin. Now consider the detective who found that lampshade. Let's suppose that he would never want to own it; however, he does find that he wants a synthetic one just like it – a perfect replica. We assume that there is something morally problematic about the detective having such a replica. We then argue that, given as much, we can reach the surprising conclusion that it's morally problematic to consume realistic fake‐meat products. After explaining why we might the detective's replica lampshade morally problematic, we clarify the analogy between the replica and fake meat products. Then, we defend it against a number of objections, the most notable one being we can sever any association between fake meat and the real stuff without moral cost. We conclude by pointing out that our argument generalises: if it works, then there is something morally problematic about many fake animal products, including fake leather and fur.