Explicit syllable and phoneme segmentation in the young child

To write a language, one must first abstract the unit to be used from the acoustic stream of speech. Writing systems based on the meaningless units, syllables and phonemes, were late developments in the history of written language. The alphabetic system, which requires abstraction of the phonemic unit of speech, was the last to appear, evolved from a syllabary and, unlike the other systems, was apparently invented only once. It might therefore be supposed that phoneme segmentation is particularly difficult and more difficult, indeed, than syllable segmentation. Speech research suggests reasons why this may be so. The present study provides direct evidence of a similar developmental ordering of syllable and phoneme segmentation abilities in the young child. By means of a task which required preschool, kindergarten, and first-grade children to tap out the number of segments in spoken utterances, it was found that, though ability in both syllable and phoneme segmentation increased with grade level, analysis into phonemes was significantly harder and perfected later than analysis into syllables. The relative difficulties of the different units of segmentation are discussed in relation to reading acquisition.     

Perceived distributions of the characteristics of in-group and out-group members: empirical evidence and a computer simulation

This research studied 2 properties of perceived distributions of the characteristics of social category members: the probability of differentiating (making distinctions) among category members and the perceived variability (variance) of category members. The results of 4 experiments supported the hypothesis that greater familiarity with a social group leads to greater perceived differentiation and variability regarding that group. In-group members formed more differentiated and variable distributions for groups defined by age and more differentiated distributions for groups defined by nationality. For gender (where students were roughly equally familiar with people of both genders), no in-group--out-group differences occurred. Also, students perceived greater differentiation and variability among classmates over the course of a semester. To explain these results, we developed PDIST, a multiple exemplar model that assumes that people form perceived distributions by activating a set of category exemplars and then judging the relative likelihoods of different feature values on the basis of the relative activation strengths of these feature values. The results of a computer simulation experiment indicated that PDIST is sufficient to explain the results of our 4 experiments. According to the perceived distributions formed by PDIST, increasing familiarity leads to greater differentiation and variability, has a concave impact, and has greater impact on differentiation than on variability.     

The anal personality: self-disclosure, negativism, self-esteem, and superego severity

Psychoanalytic implications of anal characterology were operationalized, and an experimental situation devised to test hypotheses of various aspects of interpersonal behavior. Subjects selected for the study had been found to score either high or low on Kline's (Ai3) Anality Scale. Self-disclosure and disclosure reciprocity were shown to be negative functions of anality: productivity and superego measures were also shown to be functions of anality. Self-esteem and socio-economic status did not relate to anality levels, while the hypothesis linking anality with negativism was only partially confirmed. Implications for psychoanalytic and social psychology research are discussed.     

Functionalism and propositions

Conclusion Some have argued, following Stalnaker, that a plausible functionalist account of belief requires coarse-grained propositions. I have explored a class of functionalist accounts, and my argument has been that, in this class, there is no account which meetsall of the following conditions: it is plausible, noncircular, and allows for the validity of the argument to coarse-grained propositions. In producing this argument, I believe that I have shown that it might be open to a functionalist to adopt fine-grained propositions; thus, one might be a functionalist without holding that all mathematical beliefs are about strings of symbols (and that the belief that all bachelors are unmarried men is a belief about words).My project in this paper has been minimal in the following sense. I havenot argued thatno functionalist account of belief which meets the three conditions can be produced; rather, I have simply explored the inadequacies of certain sorts of accounts. I think that this is useful insofar as it makes clear the challenges to be met by an account of belief which can play the required role in the argument to coarse-grained propositions. It is compatible with my position that such an account is forthcoming, insofar as I have not produced a functionalist theory of belief which is clearly non-circular, plausible, and which yields fine-grained propositions. Of course, it is also compatible with my position that no plausible, non-circular functionalist account of belief of any sort can be produced. My argument has been that,if one construes such mental states as belief as functional states, no convincing argument has yet been produced that they require coarse-grained objects.     

Social Motives,Emotional Feelings,and Smiling

Previous research has established that the facial displays of those who listen to stories are influenced by the social context in which this happens. H owever, experienced affect was not measured in these studies, and the story stimuli were not systematically manipulated. We report a study in which participants listened to stories that varied in rated funniness, and that were told by either a friend or a stranger via one of the following channels: Tape recorder, telephone, or face-to-face. D ependent measures included facial activity, subjective feelings, and social motives. We anticipated that facial displays would be influenced by story type and by social context, and that the former effects would be mediated by experienced affect, whereas the latter effects would be mediated by social motives. The funnier story elicited more smiling, but this was not mediated by experienced affect. Social context also influenced smiling, and this effect appeared to be mediated by social motives.