Reasoning about conditional sentences: development of understanding of cues to quantification

The previous literature has reported that when children are asked to judge the truth or falsity of universally quantified conditional sentences of the form If a thing is P then it is Q they typically give responses, e.g., responding "true" whenever there is a case of P and Q even if there are also cases of P and not-Q. Three experiments are reported that address possible sources of this error. Experiment 1 shows that the error survives on sentences that refer to particular things as well as to things of a particular kind, and further shows that articulating the necessity of the consequent (... then it has to be Q) eliminates the error for adults and reduces it for fifth graders, although it does not affect second grade performance. Experiment 2 shows that for second and fifth graders the error survives to problems that are not universally quantified and for second graders to problems that are not conditionals although are otherwise structurally similar. Experiment 3 compares various verbal formulations of such universally quantified conditionals: Second and fifth graders do not make the error when the quantification is expressed with the surface structure that makes its universality most explicit (all things ...); the error tendency is greatest when the indefinite article is used (if a thing ...); and formulations using any fall in between. We argue that such erroneous evaluations of universally quantified conditionals have more to do with the quantificational aspect than the conditional aspect of the problems; children interpret the indefinite article as existential, although they resist the error when the cue to universal quantification is completely clear. The error appears to result more from the surface-structure form of the stimuli than from an inability of children to appreciate the logic of universally quantified conditionals.     

Attraktivitätsänderung der Aufgabe nach Mißerfolg. Kognitive Dissonanztheorie versus Leistungsmotivationstheorie

Zusammenfassung Nach der kognitiven Dissonanztheorie steigt die Attraktivität einer Aufgabe nach Mißerfolg, wenn die Vp die Aufgabe zuvor selbst gewählt und nicht zugewiesen bekommen hatte. Nach der Leistungsmotivationstheorie ist die Attraktivitätsänderung abhängig von einer durch den Mißerfolg verursachten Verringerung der erlebten Erfolgswahrscheinlichkeit in Wechselwirkung mit der Ausprägung des überdauernden Leistungsmotivs der Vp. Ändert sich die Erfolgswahrscheinlichkeit in Richtung auf eine Höhe von 30–40%, so steigt die Attraktivität der Aufgabe für erfolgszuversichtlich motivierte Vpn und fällt ab für mißerfolgsängstlich motivierte Vpn.In einem 2×2-Versuchsplan wurde Wahl oder Zuweisung der Aufgabe mit vorwiegendem Erfolgsmotiv der Vp kombiniert. Aus einer selbsthergestellten Attraktivitätsrangfolge von 9 verschiedenen Aufgaben wählt die Vp zwischen der 5. und 6. Aufgabe eine zur Bearbeitung aus oder erhält eine der beiden fest zugewiesen. Nach Mißerfolg stellt die Vp eine erneute Attraktivitätsrangfolge der Aufgaben her.Die innerhalb und zwischen den vier Bedingungskombinationen erhaltenen Ergebnisse entsprechen zu einem größeren Teil der Leistungsmotivationstheorie als der Dissonanztheorie. In der Bedingungskombination, für die beide Theorien gegensätzliche Voraussagen machen (Wahl-Mißerfolgsmotivierte), fallen die Befunde zugunsten der Leistungsmotivationstheorie aus. Diese Theorie zeigt jedoch Schwächen in der Voraussage von Attraktivitätsänderungen unter Zuweisungsbedingungen. Die Dissonanztheorie versagt bei den Mißerfolgsmotivierten. Verbesserungen der Theoriebildung und der experimentellen Prüfung werden erörtert.

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Change in attractiveness of task after failure. Cognitive dissonance theory versus achievement motivation theory

Summary According to cognitive dissonance theory, the attractiveness of a task increases after failure only when the S has chosen the task but not when it is assigned to him. Achievement motivation theory, on the other hand, states that change in attractiveness depends on a reduction in perceived probability of success, caused by failure. In addition, probabilitiy of success also interacts with the dispositional characteristics of the S's achievement motive. If probability of success increases toward a value of 30–40 per cent, then the attractiveness of the task increases for hope of success Ss but decreases for fear of failure Ss.Choice or assignment of task was combined with predominantely hope of success or fear of failure Ss in a 2×2 experimental design. The S first ranked nine different tasks in their order of attractiveness. While some Ss could further choose to work on either the fifth or sixth ranking task, other Ss were assigned either one of these tasks. A second ranking of attractiveness was obtained after a failure experience.The results, both within and between the four experimental conditions, support mainly the predictions of achievement motivation theory rather than cognitive dissonance theory. In the condition in which opposing predictions can be derived from the two theories (i.e., when choice is offered to fear of failure Ss), the results clearly favor achievement motivation theory. However, this theory is less adequate in predicting changes in task attractiveness under task assignment conditions. Dissonance theory appears to be unable to predict the behavior of the fear of failure Ss. Implications for changes in the theories and further empirial tests are discussed.

     

Psychological androgyny and college students' judgments of mental health

College students' perceptions of the mental health of men and women were examined in comparison to an adult health standard. Two hundred forty male and female undergraduates were asked to describe a socially competent healthy adult man, healthy adult woman, or a healthy adult (sex unspecified) using the Bem Sex-Role Inventory, which provides a measurement of androgyny as well as masculinity and femininity. In accordance with the Broverman, Broverman, Clarkson, Rosenkrantz, and Vogel (1970) study of clinicians' perceptions, the healthy man was described as similar to the adult standard, while the healthy woman was not. Unlike the Broverman et al. (1970) study, the male but not the female subjects perceived the healthy woman as different, suggesting that college women may be less likely to endorse sex-linked conceptions of mental health than their male counterparts.