A Public Religion and Biomedical Ethics

This article describes the exclusion of public expressions of religion from the history of bioethics during recent decades. It offers a proposal to include public religion for the purpose of gaining donations of vital organs for transplantation, more appreciation for the gift of aging, and more concern for universal access to health care. I also include a brief discussion of theological support and practical suggestions for such a program.     

Nature vs. nurture is nonsense: On the necessity of an integrated genetic,social, developmental,and personality psychology

The field of behavioural genetics unambiguously demonstrates that heritable individual differences exist and are important in explaining human behaviour. Despite this, some psychological perspectives ignore this research. If we wish to comprehensively understand the impact of parenting, the environment, or any social factor, however, we must engage with genetics. In this article, I review research that reveals that genes affect not only our personalities, but the way that we understand and react to the social world. Studies further reveal that notable life events are in part explained by genetic variance. I detail how this could be the case through active, evocative, and passive genetic correlations, and go on to argue that all complex psychological traits are likely the result of multifaceted gene by environment interactions. A mistaken belief that genetic influence implies genetic essentialism, and is therefore tantamount to prejudice, is raised as possible reason why heritability is often ignored in the social sciences. The article concludes with practical suggestions for how we can embrace behavioural genetics as our methods struggle to match the divine complexity of human existence.     

Minima sensibilia: Against the dynamic snapshot model of temporal experience

In our wakeful conscious lives, the experience of time and dynamic temporal phenomena—such as continuous motion and change—appears to be ubiquitous. How is it that temporality is woven into our conscious experience? Is it through perceptual experience presenting a series of instantaneous states of the world, which combine together—in a sense which would need to be specified—to give us experience of dynamic temporal phenomena? In this paper, I argue that this is not the case. Several authors have recently proposed dynamic snapshot models of temporal experience—such as Prosser and Arstila, building upon Le Poidevin—according to which, perceptual experience has no temporal content of a non‐zero extent. I argue that there is an absence of motivation for such a view; I develop and defend the claim that perceptual experience minimally presents something of some non‐zero temporal extent as such.     

Comparing cognitive fusion and cognitive reappraisal as predictors of college student mental health

Transdiagnostic cognitive behavioral interventions target different cognitive processes to promote mental health, including cognitive fusion and cognitive reappraisal. Determining the relative impact of cognitive fusion and reappraisal on a range of student mental health concerns could help interventions target psychopathological cognitive processes more effectively. Therefore, this study examined the longitudinal impact of cognitive fusion and reappraisal on mental health and functioning outcomes. A series of hierarchical regression models tested the effects of cognitive fusion and reappraisal in a sample of college students (n = 339). When controlling for reappraisal and baseline symptoms, fusion predicted distress, depression, generalized anxiety, social anxiety, hostility, academic distress, and student role problems 1 month later. Reappraisal predicted only student role problems longitudinally when controlling for fusion. These results suggest that cognitive fusion is a stronger predictor than reappraisal for a range of student mental health concerns and may be a particularly important target for improving student mental health.     

Merleau-Ponty’s Gordian knot: Transcendental phenomenology,science, and naturalism

In this paper I explore a series of fertile ambiguities that Merleau-Ponty’s work is premised upon. These ambiguities concern some of the central methodological commitments of his work, in particular his commitment (or otherwise) to transcendental phenomenology and how he transforms that tradition, and his relationship to science and philosophical naturalism and what they suggest about his philosophical methodology. Many engagements with Merleau-Ponty’s work that are more ‘analytic’ in orientation either deflate it of its transcendental heritage, or offer a “modest” rendering of its transcendental dimensions. This is also true, albeit perhaps to a lesser extent, of the work of the more empirically-minded phenomenological philosophers who engage very seriously with Merleau-Ponty—e.g. Hubert Dreyfus, Shaun Gallagher, Evan Thompson, Alva Noë, and others. At the same time, many other scholars contest these proto-scientific and more naturalistic uses of Merleau-Ponty’s work on hermeneutical and exegetical grounds, and they likewise criticise the deflated reading of his transcendental phenomenology that tends to support them. By working through some of the key passages and ideas, this paper establishes that the former view captures something pivotal to Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. I also extend these interpretations by arguing that, at least around the time of Phenomenology of Perception, his philosophy might be reasonably regarded as a form of minimal methodological naturalism.     

Validation of a reflective thinking instrument for third-year undergraduate nursing students participating in high-fidelity simulation

Background: nursing students are required to think reflectively in both real and simulated clinical practice. Although the Reflective Thinking instrument is reliable in its measurement of reflective thinking, its validity is unknown. Method: confirmatory factor analysis was undertaken in an iterative manner within a non-equivalent control-group study to measure nursing students’ reflective thinking and satisfaction with high-fidelity simulation. The validity and reliability of the Reflective Thinking instrument was tested. Results: the resulting instrument consisted of 15 items across four factors. The final model was plausible as it demonstrated ‘goodness of fit’; however, it had neither convergent or discriminatory validity, nor reliability. Internal consistency was fair to reasonable for the four subscales. Conclusion: the testing of the Reflective Thinking instrument using confirmatory factor analysis is a vital initial step in the modification of this instrument. Further development using exploratory factor analysis will enhance the instrument’s relevance within high-fidelity simulation.     

Visuospatial and verbal memory in mental arithmetic

Working memory allows complex information to be remembered and manipulated over short periods of time. Correlations between working memory and mathematics achievement have been shown across the lifespan. However, only a few studies have examined the potentially distinct contributions of domain-specific visuospatial and verbal working memory resources in mental arithmetic computation. Here we aimed to fill this gap in a series of six experiments pairing addition and subtraction tasks with verbal and visuospatial working memory and interference tasks. In general, we found higher levels of interference between mental arithmetic and visuospatial working memory tasks than between mental arithmetic and verbal working memory tasks. Additionally, we found that interference that matched the working memory domain of the task (e.g., verbal task with verbal interference) lowered working memory performance more than mismatched interference (verbal task with visuospatial interference). Findings suggest that mental arithmetic relies on domain-specific working memory resources.     

No evidence for a role of reconsolidation in updating of paired associates

Reconsolidation theory states that memories are labilized through reactivation, making them prone to change, before being re-consolidated. When information in memory requires updating, reconsolidation theory therefore predicts that reminders of previously learned information should facilitate updating of that information and should thus improve memory for the updated information. In two experiments, we tested this prediction by investigating memory for word pairs over a short time-scale. Participants studied word pairs (A–B), some of which were subsequently updated with word pairs that shared the first word (A–C). Half of the A–C pairs received a pre-study reminder of the first word in the pair so as to reactivate and labilize A–B memory. In a recognition memory test targeting the A–C list, reminders by and large had no effect on memory. Results thus failed to support the predictions of reconsolidation theory.