Variation in perceptions of physical dominance and trustworthiness predicts individual differences in the effect of relationship context on women's preferences for masculine pitch in men's voices

Several studies have found that women tend to demonstrate stronger preferences for masculine men as short-term partners than as long-term partners, though there is considerable variation among women in the magnitude of this effect. One possible source of this variation is individual differences in the extent to which women perceive masculine men to possess antisocial traits that are less costly in short-term relationships than in long-term relationships. Consistent with this proposal, here we show that the extent to which women report stronger preferences for men with low (i.e., masculine) voice pitch as short-term partners than as long-term partners is associated with the extent to which they attribute physical dominance and low trustworthiness to these masculine voices. Thus, our findings suggest that variation in the extent to which women attribute negative personality characteristics to masculine men predicts individual differences in the magnitude of the effect of relationship context on women's masculinity preferences, highlighting the importance of perceived personality attributions for individual differences in women's judgments of men's vocal attractiveness and, potentially, their mate preferences.     

Oughts and ends

This paper advances a reductive semantics for ‘ought’ and a naturalistic theory of normativity. It gives a unified analysis of predictive, instrumental, and categorical uses of ‘ought’: the predictive ‘ought’ is basic, and is interpreted in terms of probability. Instrumental ‘oughts’ are analyzed as predictive ‘oughts’ occurring under an ‘in order that’ modifer (the end-relational theory). The theory is then extended to categorical uses of ‘ought’: it is argued that they are special rhetorical uses of the instrumental ‘ought’. Plausible conversational principles explain how this end-relational ‘ought’ can perform the expressive functions of the moral ‘ought’. The notion of an ‘ought-simpliciter’ is also discussed.

Motion thresholds in infants to sinusoidal gratings.

Motion thresholds were determined at 9 degrees eccentricity in infants (mean = 14 weeks old). The stimuli used were computer-generated sinusoidal gratings presented through a 7.45 degrees aperture at a contrast ratio of .83. The range of velocities (.5, 1, 2, 4, and 6 degrees per s) was examined at only one spatial frequency (1 cycle per degree). At low velocities (less than 2 degrees per s), the infants showed no clear preference for the moving stimulus over the stationary stimulus. At faster velocities (2-6 degrees per s), the infants exhibited a clear preference for the moving stimulus. The results were interpreted as indicating that infants at 3 months of age are relatively insensitive to slow motions for low spatial frequency stimuli.     

Group membership, strength of group identification and perceptions of violence for locations in Northern Ireland

118 undergraduate students, all of Northern Irish origin, were asked to rate 60 locations in Northern Ireland for violence and denominational composition. As expected from Social Identity Theory, subjects perceived ingroup locations as less violent than outgroup ones. Contrary to expectations, however, there was no increased differentiation of violence judgements with increasing strength of identity, for which two possible explanations were considered.     

Spatio-temporal interaction and brightness judgments in sequentially presented,partially overlapping rectangles

Ss made magnitude estimates of brightness to three areas within a display consisting of two sequentially presented partially overlapping rectangles of light. The three areas were the singly stimulated region of the rectangle presented first (the trailing flank), the doubly stimulated overlap region, and the singly stimulated region of the rectangle presented second (the leading flank). The stimuli were presented in right-left or left-right order with stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) of 0, 25, 50, 75, 100, and 125 msec. A further condition was flank width. The results indicated that the apparent brightness of the overlap region decreased with increasing SOA. The leading flank was judged to increase in apparent brightness, while the trailing flank remained constant.     

The role of affect in determining the attributional weight of immoral behaviors

Theories about why immoral behaviors carry a large amount of attributional weight tend to emphasize traditional cognitive variables. In contrast, the authors propose that the degree of negative affect that these behaviors induce in observers is largely responsible for their attributional weight. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate an association between the amount of negative affect induced by immoral behaviors and their attributional weight. Studies 3 and 4 provide causal evidence for this idea by either "adding in" or "taking away" the negative affect associated with immoral behaviors to influence their attributional weight. Finally, Study 5 demonstrates that negative affect can be induced through a variety of negative emotions (disgust, sadness, and fear), with similar results. It is argued that it is difficult to account for these data solely on the basis of traditional cognitive variables, and so a theory that includes an emphasis on affect as a causal variable is desirable.     

Individual differences in responses of untrained observers to stroboscopic apparent motion

Two large groups of inexperienced subjects (n = 208 and n = 50) and a small group of experienced subjects (n = 5) were tested using time-till-breakdown as a measure of long-range apparent motion across a range of temporal frequencies. One group of inexperienced subjects was retested after one week and demonstrated quite stable patterns of response. Large intersubject variability was observed in terms of the amount of motion seen, with most inexperienced subjects reporting very little apparent motion. A raster display produced a peak frequency 1 Hz higher than a standard tachistoscope display. The role of experience was also examined with a small group of inexperienced subjects (n = 8) tested once daily over five consecutive days. There was high intersubject variability and intrasubject consistency, demonstrating little influence of learning and experience. The results are discussed in terms of current ideas on the breakdown effect.     

Individual differences in women's perceptions of other women's dominance

Recent research on men's dominance perception suggests that the extent to which men perceive masculine men to be more dominant than relatively feminine men is negatively correlated with measures of their own dominance. In the current studies, we investigated the relationship between indices of women's own dominance and their perceptions of other women's facial dominance. Women's own height and scores on a dominance questionnaire were negatively correlated with the extent to which they perceived masculine women to be more dominant than relatively feminine women. In follow‐up studies, we observed similar individual differences when (i) women separately judged other women's social and physical dominance, suggesting that individual differences in women's dominance perceptions generalize across two different types of dominance judgment and (ii) we assessed the perceivers' dominance indirectly by using a questionnaire that measures the extent to which women view interactions with other women in competitive terms. These findings present new evidence that the extent to which people perceive masculine individuals to be more dominant than relatively feminine individuals is negatively correlated with measures of their own dominance and suggest that competition and conflict among women may have shaped individual differences in women's dominance perception. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The error in the error theory

Moral error theory of the kind defended by J. L. Mackie and Richard Joyce is premised on two claims: (1) that moral judgements essentially presuppose that moral value has absolute authority, and (2) that this presupposition is false, because nothing has absolute authority. This paper accepts (2) but rejects (1). It is argued first that (1) is not the best explanation of the evidence from moral practice, and second that even if it were, the error theory would still be mistaken, because the assumption does not contaminate the meaning or truth-conditions of moral claims. These are determined by the essential application conditions for moral concepts, which are relational rather than absolute. An analogy is drawn between moral judgements and motion judgements.