Stability of anxious symptomatology in children

The stability of anxiety states and symptoms was assessed in a sample of 150 anxious and nonanxious children. A number of assessment methods including a semistructured interview, self-report instruments, psychophysiological measures, and parental reports were used initially and at intervals up to 6 months later. The majority of children with a diagnosed anxiety disorder at the initial assessment still manifested significant symptomatology at the 6 month follow-up. However, stability of specific anxiety symptoms when assessed by self- and parental reports was mixed. With respect to psychophysiological assessment, stability of responses was evident at 2 weeks but not after 6 months. Results are discussed in terms of the stability of diagnoses and symptomatology, and the need for thematically relevant self-reports and behavioral assessment tasks. Recommendations are made for the development of a reliable, multimethod strategy to assess the multiple domains of childhood anxiety.This study was supported in part by NIMH Grant MH43252.     

Dyadic association between aggressive pretend play and children’s anger expression

This study investigates the association between children’s peer-reported expression of anger and their pretend play with aggressive/negative themes observed during spontaneous play with classmates. Participants comprised 104 Chinese children (M_age = 8.98 years, SD = 0.97, 49% girls) and were filmed playing in peer dyads with toys. Aggressive and non-aggressive negative pretend themes were coded at five-second intervals for 10 minutes. Children’s expression of anger in real situations was reported by peers. Analysis using actor–partner interdependence modelling (APIM) revealed significant partner effects, indicating that children were more likely to engage in pretend play with aggressive themes when they were playing with a partner who was perceived by their peers as more easily angered. It was also found that boys were more likely to engage in pretend play with both aggressive and non-aggressive negative themes compared with girls.     

Temporal reproduction: further evidence for two processes

Some authors have suggested separate mechanisms for the processing of temporal intervals above versus below 2-3s. Given that the evidence is mixed, the present experiment was carried out as a critical test of the separate-mechanism hypothesis. Subjects reproduced five standard durations of 1-5s presented in the auditory and visual modalities. The Corsi-block test was used to assess effects of working-memory span on different interval lengths. Greater working-memory span was associated with longer reproductions of intervals of 3-5s. A factor analysis run on mean reproduced intervals revealed one modality-unspecific factor for durations of 1-2s and two modality-specific factors for longer intervals. These results are interpreted as further indications that two different processes underlie temporal reproductions of shorter and longer intervals.     

'The Doers of the Law Will Be Justified': The Exegetical Origins of Martin Bucer's Triplex Iustificatio

This essay seeks to sketch the profile of Martin Bucer's viewson the doctrine of justification as developed in his 1536 commentaryon Romans, focusing in particular on his idiosyncratic languageof ‘threefold justification’ in his comments onRom. 2:13. This text is taken as a vantage point from whichto survey the history of interpretation of the Pauline conceptof justification within the Augustinian tradition, giving extendedconsideration to exegesis by Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. Bucer'sinitial discussion of the Pauline usage of o in the praefatato his commentary is examined next, and it is concluded thathis understanding of justification falls more or less withinthe trajectory charted by previous medieval interpreters. Turningthen to Bucer's comments on Rom. 2:13, it is argued that thenotion of ‘threefold justification’ arises as anattempt to integrate the early evangelical appropriation ofthe Scotist language of ‘divine acceptation’ withina traditional Augustinian account of justification as both eventand process. The resulting formula collapses predestinationinto justification, making the latter the unifying concept inBucer's soteriology. It is hoped that this essay will contributeto deepening our understanding of an oft-neglected reformerwhile at the same time broadening our understanding of earlyevangelical teaching on a central doctrinal locus.     

Supervision, transference and countertransference

The author discusses supervision, transference and countertransference as seen in the context of the clinical case of a patient who had been first seen as a training analysis case and who later, in a fortuitous way, was treated by the supervisor of the training analysis. The supervisor, who in the first instance did not recognize the patient, discusses the reasons for this unusual experience in terms of the presence and absence of transference during the analysis of this patient as a training case and the problems inherent in the task of supervising. The patient's feelings towards the first and the second analyst and the vicissitudes of transference and countertransference during the supervision of the training analysis and its influence on the presentation of the analytical sessions by the student are also detailed and discussed. The question of recorded supervision presentations and their possible influence on the dynamics of supervision is raised.     

The Effects of a Verbal and a Figural Creativity Training on Different Facets of Creative Potential

This study investigated the effects of different types of creativity interventions on different facets of creative potential, also including more school-related creativity demands. In a sample of 77 fourth-graders in the age between 9 and 12 years, we administered a verbal and a figural creativity training, realized in two school lessons over two consecutive days each. As outcome measures, creative potential in both the verbal and the figural domain by means of two well-established divergent thinking tasks was assessed. As additional measures of creative potential, a story completion task and a picture painting task were administered to examine training effects on more school-related types of creative behavior. The verbal training was found to increase both verbal and figural divergent thinking ability, but not creative potential in the story completion and the picture painting task. The figural training yielded significant training effects only regarding the picture painting task. Findings suggest a specific training effect of the figural creativity training, and moreover indicate that the verbal creativity training, rather than stimulating “verbal” creative abilities per se, was more strongly concerned with domain-general creativity processes including ideational fluency, flexibility, and originality that are characteristics of divergent thinking tasks across different domains.     

The property of rationality: a guide to what rationality requires?

Can we employ the property of rationality in establishing what rationality requires? According to a central and formal thesis of John Broome’s work on rational requirements, the answer is ‘no’—at least if we expect a precise answer. In particular, Broome argues that (i) the property of full rationality (i.e. whether or not you are fully rational) is independent of whether we formulate conditional requirements of rationality as having a wide or a narrow logical scope. That is, (ii) by replacing a wide-scope requirement with a corresponding narrow-scope requirement (or vice versa), we do not alter the situations in which a person is fully rational. As a consequence, (iii) the property of full rationality is unable to guide us in determining whether a rational requirement has a wide or a narrow logical scope. We cannot resolve the wide/narrow scope debate by appealing to a theory of fully rational attitudes. This paper argues that (i), (ii) and (iii) are incorrect. Replacing a wide- with a corresponding narrow-scope requirement (or vice versa) can alter the set of circumstances in which a person is fully rational. The property of full rationality is therefore not independent of whether we formulate conditional requirements of rationality as having a wide or a narrow logical scope. As a consequence, the property of full rationality can guide us in determining what rationality requires—even in cases where we expect a precise answer.