Higher order influences on evaluative priming: Processing styles moderate congruity effects

A growing body of research challenges the automaticity of evaluative priming (EP). The present research adds to this literature by suggesting that EP is sensitive to processing styles. We relied on previous research showing that EP is determined by the extent to which the prime and the target events on a given trial are processed as a unified compound. Here, we further hypothesised that processing styles encouraging the inclusion of the prime to the target episode support congruity effects, whereas processing styles that enhance the exclusion of the prime from the target episode interrupt (or reverse) these effects. In Experiment 1, a preceding similarity search task produced a congruity effect, whereas a dissimilarity search task eliminated and (non-significantly) reversed this effect. In Experiments 2 and 3, we replicated and extended these findings using a global/local processing manipulation. Overall, these findings confirm that EP is flexible, open to top-down influences and strategic regulation.     

On splitting and merging categories: A regression account of subadditivity

Frequency judgments tend to be subadditive: A category’s frequency is judged to be lower than the summed frequency of its subcategories. Thus, by splitting or merging categories, subjective frequencies increase or decrease, respectively. We offer an account of this phenomenon that is based on the statistical principle of regression. Because empirical information is never noise-free, high frequencies are underestimated, and low frequencies are overestimated. The underlying regression principle explains available evidence on subadditivity and allows novel predictions. The findings from two experiments supported predictions derived from the regression account of frequency estimates for split and merged categories: Subadditivity varied systematically as a function of the two parameters determining regression (extremity and reliability). More extreme frequencies and reduced reliability led to increased regression effects. Theoretical implications for subadditive judgments (of frequency, probability, and/or value) are discussed. Although other factors may contribute to subadditivity, their influence needs to exceed the baseline expected from the regression model alone.     

The ultimate sampling dilemma in experience-based decision making

Computer simulations and 2 experiments demonstrate the ultimate sampling dilemma, which constitutes a serious obstacle to inductive inferences in a probabilistic world. Participants were asked to take the role of a manager who is to make purchasing decisions based on positive versus negative feedback about 3 providers in 2 different product domains. When information sampling (from a computerized database) was over, they had to make inferences about actual differences in the database from which the sample was drawn (e.g., about the actual superiority of different providers, or about the most likely origins of negatively valenced products). The ultimate sampling dilemma consists in a forced choice between 2 search strategies that both have their advantages and their drawbacks: natural sampling and deliberate sampling of information relevant to the inference task. Both strategies leave the sample unbiased for specific inferences but create errors or biases for other inferences.     

Metacognitive myopia and the overutilization of misleading advice

Previous research on advice taking has explained the failure to exploit collective wisdom in terms of the egocentric underweighting of advice provided by independent others. The present research is concerned with an opposite and more radical source of irrational advice taking, namely, the failure to critically assess the validity of advice due to metacognitive myopia. Participants could use the advice of one or two experts when estimating health risks. They read sketches of the study samples that experts had drawn to estimate conditional probabilities (e.g., of HIV‐given drug addiction). Whether samples were valid or seriously biased, subsequent judgments were strongly affected by any advice (Experiment 1). Uncritical reliance on any advice persisted when participants were sensitized to the contrast of valid and invalid advice in a repeated measures design (Experiment 2), when participants themselves believed advice not to be valid (Experiment 3), and even after full debriefing about invalid advice (Experiment 4). Lay advice exerted a similar influence as expert advice (Experiment 5). Although these provocative results are independent of numeracy and consensus (Experiment 6), they highlight the impact of metacognitive myopia as an impediment of social rationality.     

Inflation of conditional predictions

The authors report 7 experiments indicating that conditional predictions--the assessed probability that a certain outcome will occur given a certain condition--tend to be markedly inflated. The results suggest that this inflation derives in part from backward activation in which the target outcome highlights aspects of the condition that are consistent with that outcome, thus supporting the plausibility of that outcome. One consequence of this process is that alternative outcomes are not conceived to compete as fully as they should. Another consequence is that prediction inflation is resistant to manipulations that induce participants to consider alternative outcomes to the target outcome.     

The effects of routine strength on adaptation and information search in recurrent decision making

The strength of decision routines was manipulated within a computer-controlled micro world simulation involving recurrent decision making. During a learning phase, participants were led to prefer a certain brand of an industrial good either about 15 times in a weak routine or about 30 times in a strong routine condition. In the test phase of Experiment 1, participants were confronted with changes in the microworld that rendered the routine obsolete. Routine maintenance over a series of repeated acquisition decisions was assessed as the major dependent variable. Although new information clearly suggested that a deviation from the routine would be beneficial, strong routine participants were more likely to maintain the routine compared to weak routine participants and a control group in which a comparable option (same outcome probabilities as the routine) carried an unfamiliar brand label. Experiment 2 investigated the effects of routine strength on information search. After having learned the routine, participants were asked to make one final decision involving the routine. The task was either framed as being similar to the learning task or as being novel. Before making the final decision, participants were asked to consider new information about the alternatives. Strong routine participants in the familiar task condition preferred information that favored the routine and avoided unfavorable information. If the task was framed as being novel, such confirmation biases disappeared completely. In contrast, weak routine participants exhibited a moderate confirmation bias in their searches independent from task framing.     

An adaptive-learning approach to affect regulation: Strategic influences on evaluative priming

An adaptive cognition approach to evaluative priming is not compatible with the view that the entire process is automatically determined by prime stimulus valence alone. In addition to the evaluative congruity of individual prime–target pairs, an adaptive regulation function should be sensitive to the base rates of positive and negative stimuli as well as to the perceived contingency between prime and target valence. The present study was particularly concerned with pseudocontingent inferences that offer a proxy for the assessment of contingencies from degraded or incomplete stimulus input. As expected, response latencies were shorter for the more prevalent target valence and for evaluatively congruent trials. However, crucially, the congruity effect was eliminated and overridden by pseudocontingencies inferred from the stimulus environment. These strategic inferences were further enhanced when the task called for the evaluation of both prime stimuli and target stimuli.     

Redundancy gain for semantic features

In a go/no-go experiment, semantic redundancy gain was assessed for responses to single written words. Specifically, we asked participants to respond only to words whose meaning matched at least one semantic target feature—that is, the target category (e.g., animal), the target color (e.g., gray), or both. On redundant-target trials, the word (e.g., elephant) matched both semantic target features (i.e., gray and animal). On single-target trials, the word (e.g., beaver) matched one target feature (i.e., animal) and a nontarget feature (i.e., brown). We observed shorter reaction times in the redundant-target condition than in the faster single-target condition. Hence, the present study provides the first evidence that redundancy gain is not limited to responses to redundant proximal stimulus features but can also be observed for responses to semantic feature information.     

Recommendations for Increasing Replicability in Psychology

Replicability of findings is at the heart of any empirical science. The aim of this article is to move the current replicability debate in psychology towards concrete recommendations for improvement. We focus on research practices but also offer guidelines for reviewers, editors, journal management, teachers, granting institutions, and university promotion committees, highlighting some of the emerging and existing practical solutions that can facilitate implementation of these recommendations. The challenges for improving replicability in psychological science are systemic. Improvement can occur only if changes are made at many levels of practice, evaluation, and reward. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.