On splitting and merging categories: A regression account of subadditivity

Frequency judgments tend to be subadditive: A category’s frequency is judged to be lower than the summed frequency of its subcategories. Thus, by splitting or merging categories, subjective frequencies increase or decrease, respectively. We offer an account of this phenomenon that is based on the statistical principle of regression. Because empirical information is never noise-free, high frequencies are underestimated, and low frequencies are overestimated. The underlying regression principle explains available evidence on subadditivity and allows novel predictions. The findings from two experiments supported predictions derived from the regression account of frequency estimates for split and merged categories: Subadditivity varied systematically as a function of the two parameters determining regression (extremity and reliability). More extreme frequencies and reduced reliability led to increased regression effects. Theoretical implications for subadditive judgments (of frequency, probability, and/or value) are discussed. Although other factors may contribute to subadditivity, their influence needs to exceed the baseline expected from the regression model alone.     

Higher order influences on evaluative priming: Processing styles moderate congruity effects

A growing body of research challenges the automaticity of evaluative priming (EP). The present research adds to this literature by suggesting that EP is sensitive to processing styles. We relied on previous research showing that EP is determined by the extent to which the prime and the target events on a given trial are processed as a unified compound. Here, we further hypothesised that processing styles encouraging the inclusion of the prime to the target episode support congruity effects, whereas processing styles that enhance the exclusion of the prime from the target episode interrupt (or reverse) these effects. In Experiment 1, a preceding similarity search task produced a congruity effect, whereas a dissimilarity search task eliminated and (non-significantly) reversed this effect. In Experiments 2 and 3, we replicated and extended these findings using a global/local processing manipulation. Overall, these findings confirm that EP is flexible, open to top-down influences and strategic regulation.     

Inflation of conditional predictions

The authors report 7 experiments indicating that conditional predictions--the assessed probability that a certain outcome will occur given a certain condition--tend to be markedly inflated. The results suggest that this inflation derives in part from backward activation in which the target outcome highlights aspects of the condition that are consistent with that outcome, thus supporting the plausibility of that outcome. One consequence of this process is that alternative outcomes are not conceived to compete as fully as they should. Another consequence is that prediction inflation is resistant to manipulations that induce participants to consider alternative outcomes to the target outcome.     

Mood and judgments based on sequential sampling

Different adaptive styles characterize cognition and behavior in different affective states. Whereas negative affect supports accommodation (i.e., stimulus‐driven bottom‐up processing), positive affect supports assimilation (i.e., self‐determined top‐down processing). Applying this well‐established rule to binary choices after self‐truncated information sampling, we predicted that positive mood should render choices less dependent on large samples than negative mood. Consequently, the potential primacy advantage underlying Wald's ( 1947 ) sequential testing (i.e., quick and correct decisions from the first few items in a sample) was exploited more efficiently when participants were in positive rather than negative mood. This efficient utilization of small samples in positive mood was obtained under the very conditions derived on a priori ground from a statistical model, namely, when a response criterion or threshold was high and when the true difference between choice options was relatively small. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Metacognitive myopia and the overutilization of misleading advice

Previous research on advice taking has explained the failure to exploit collective wisdom in terms of the egocentric underweighting of advice provided by independent others. The present research is concerned with an opposite and more radical source of irrational advice taking, namely, the failure to critically assess the validity of advice due to metacognitive myopia. Participants could use the advice of one or two experts when estimating health risks. They read sketches of the study samples that experts had drawn to estimate conditional probabilities (e.g., of HIV‐given drug addiction). Whether samples were valid or seriously biased, subsequent judgments were strongly affected by any advice (Experiment 1). Uncritical reliance on any advice persisted when participants were sensitized to the contrast of valid and invalid advice in a repeated measures design (Experiment 2), when participants themselves believed advice not to be valid (Experiment 3), and even after full debriefing about invalid advice (Experiment 4). Lay advice exerted a similar influence as expert advice (Experiment 5). Although these provocative results are independent of numeracy and consensus (Experiment 6), they highlight the impact of metacognitive myopia as an impediment of social rationality.     

Influence of judges' behaviors on perceived procedural justice

The influence of judges' behaviors on procedural justice was analyzed in a field study, observing the judges' behaviors during n = 129 trials and assessing the defendants and the audiences' justice perceptions. The observed judicial behavior was unrelated to the defendants' justice perceptions. However, the more respectful the judge treated the defendants, the fairer the audience perceived the trial. In general, the effect size of the relationship between observational measures and subjective justice ratings was small in comparison to the relationship within defendants' or audiences' ratings. There were striking differences in the justice perception between the two data sources, namely defendants and audience. Thus, the source matters, and to avoid a same‐source bias, should be taken into account when analyzing justice perceptions.     

From intrapsychic to ecological theories in social psychology: Outlines of a functional theory approach

Social psychology is facing a major developmental task, which is not primarily one of achieving larger data samples and stricter significance testing. What is needed, rather, is an improvement in logic of science and powerful theorizing. The starting point of this article is a critical appraisal that the intrapsychic concepts (motives, attitudes, and explicit and implicit goals) that are the major focus of social–psychological theories lack in explanatory power because they are too close to the effects (actions, judgments, and decisions) they are intended to explain. To overcome this apparent weakness (compared with neuroscience or genetics), it is proposed that more powerful theories should relate social cognition and behavior to more distant variables in the environment. A functional analysis reveals that intrapsychic processes are multiply predetermined by extrapsychic, environmental constraints. The theoretical value and fertility of the proposed ecological functionalism are illustrated with reference to three areas of empirical research: sampling approaches to understanding biases in judgment and decision making; strategic influences on priming effects within a functional analysis of adaptive behavior; and the impact of verbal and symbolic communication constraints on the construction of attributions, stereotypes, and culture. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Regression Trap and Other Pitfalls of Replication Science—Illustrated by the Report of the Open Science Collaboration

The Open Science Collaboration’s 2015 Open Science Collaboration. (2015). Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science. Science, 349, aac4716. doi:10.1126/science.aac4716[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] report suggests that replication effect sizes in psychology are modest. However, closer inspection reveals serious problems. When plotting replication effects are against original effects, the regression trap is lurking: Expecting replication effects to be equally strong as original effects is logically unwarranted; they are inevitably subject to regressive shrinkage. To control for regression, the reliability of original and replication studies must be taken into account. Further problems arise from missing manipulation checks and sampling biases. Our critical comment highlights the need for replication science to live up to the same methodological scrutiny as other research.     

Cognitive Resources and Leadership Performance

Le rôle et la fonction des ressources cognitives que sont les aptitudes intellectuelles, l'expérience et les connaissances spécialisées ont longtemps été une énigme tacitement ignorée dans la théorie du leadership. En pratique, tout protocole de sélection ou de promotion d'un manager ou d'un leader évalue soigneusement les aptitudes intellectuelles du candidat, ses connaissances et son expérience professionnelle. Pourtant, rien de tout cela n'est en forte corrélation, voire tout simplement en corrélation, avec les performances de leader. Cet article, qui s'appuie sur la théorie des ressources cognitives (CRT), fait la synthèse aussi bien des recherches récentes que de nouveaux travaux qui éclairent le rôle des ressources cognitives dans le phénomène de leadership, et en tire des indications permettant d'améliorer les performances des leaders.
The role and function of such cognitive resources as intellectual abilities, experience, and expertise, have presented a long-standing but tacitly ignored enigma in leadership theory. Practically all managerial and leadership selection and promotion processes carefully weigh the leader's intellectual abilities, expertise, and job-related experience. However, none of these correlates highly, if at all, with leadership performance. This paper, based on Cognitive Resource Theory (CRT), summarises recent research, as well as new findings, that clarifies the role of cognitive resources in the leadership process, and spells out implications for more effective leadership performance.     

Anomalies in the detection of change: When changes in sample size are mistaken for changes in proportions

Detecting changes, in performance, sales, markets, risks, social relations, or public opinions, constitutes an important adaptive function. In a sequential paradigm devised to investigate detection of change, every trial provides a sample of binary outcomes (e.g., correct vs. incorrect student responses). Participants have to decide whether the proportion of a focal feature (e.g., correct responses) in the population from which the sample is drawn has decreased, remained constant, or increased. Strong and persistent anomalies in change detection arise when changes in proportional quantities vary orthogonally to changes in absolute sample size. Proportional increases are readily detected and nonchanges are erroneously perceived as increases when absolute sample size increases. Conversely, decreasing sample size facilitates the correct detection of proportional decreases and the erroneous perception of nonchanges as decreases. These anomalies are however confined to experienced samples of elementary raw events from which proportions have to be inferred inductively. They disappear when sample proportions are described as percentages in a normalized probability format. To explain these challenging findings, it is essential to understand the inductive-learning constraints imposed on decisions from experience.