We are what we eat: How food is represented in our mind/brain

Despite the essential role of food in our lives, we have little understanding of the way our knowledge about food is organized in the brain. At birth, human infants exhibit very few food preferences, and do not yet know much about what is edible and what is not. A multisensory learning development will eventually turn young infants into omnivore adults, for whom deciding what to eat becomes an effortful task. Recognizing food constitutes an essential step in this decisional process. In this paper we examine how concepts about food are represented in the human brain. More specifically, we first analyze how brain-damaged patients recognize natural and manufactured food, and then examine these patterns in the light of the sensory-functional hypothesis and the domain-specific hypothesis. Secondly, we discuss how concepts of food are represented depending on whether we embrace the embodied view or the disembodied view. We conclude that research on food recognition and on the organization of knowledge about food must also take into account some aspects specific to food category, the relevance of which has not been sufficiently recognized and investigated to date.     

On the (dis-)confirmability of stereotypic attributes

Two experiments investigated the linguistic abstractness and confirmability of elements contained in ingroup and outgroup stereotypes. The first experiment shows that positive elements of the ingroup stereotype (Italians) and negative elements of the outgroup stereotype (Jews, Germans) tended to be particularly abstract. Also, negative elements contained in the outgroup stereotypes required relatively little evidence to be considered ‘true’ but much disconfirming evidence to be rejected as ‘false’. No such bias emerged for ingroup stereotypes. The second experiment compared the abstraction of four outgroup stereotypes (Jews, Blacks, homosexuals, career women) finding the greatest abstraction for the oldest stereotype (Jews), and least abstraction for the most recent stereotype (career women) with the remaining two groups (Blacks, homosexuals) occupying an intermediate position. Results are interpreted as suggesting that stereotypes may become more abstract over time as they lose the concrete elements that are easier to disconfirm while maintaining the abstract elements that are more resistant to change. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Selective reaching in macaques: evidence for action-centred attention

Animal Cognition - When a monkey selects a piece of food lying on the ground from among other viable objects in the near vicinity, only the desired item governs the particular pattern and direction...     

The attribution of intentionality: the role of skill and morality

The present study contributes to the discussion on the different components which constitute the intentionality concept about an undesired side effect, focusing on the morality and the skill. Two hundred and forty participants were asked to read a brief story about a car accident, in which it was explained the motivation of the high speed and objective and subjective skill of the agent to drive the car, and to fill in six questions about intentionality, objective risk, mental representation of risk, risk acceptance and blameworthiness for the outcome. The principal results showed that when the motivation is morally negative, people judge the side effect more intentional, also because they make more severe judgments about risk and blameworthiness. Moreover, when people are objectively proficient to perform the action (objective skill) the side effect is considered less risky and intentional and, in the case of a negative outcome, they are judged less severely than if they have a poor ability. Finally, a self-assessment of low skill to make the action (subjective skill) leads people to assess higher risks and, consequently, more intentionality for the side effect. The results are discussed on the basis of the literature about some specific components that make up the intentionality concept.     

PRINZ'S PROBLEMATIC PROXYTYPES

Jesse Prinz has argued that a proxy type theory of concepts provides what he calls the 'intentionality' and 'cognitive content' desiderata better than any current competitor, and that the hybrid nature of proxytypes allows his theory to combine the informational component of informational atomism with the view that concepts are semantically structured entities. In response, I argue that the hybrid character of proxytypes, far from delivering the advantages Prinz claims, generates a threatening dilemma: either his theory is novel but fails to deliver the intentionality and cognitive content desiderata, or it delivers these desiderata but is not novel.     

My word! Interference from reading object names implies a role for competition during picture name retrieval

A related word prime has been found to interfere with picture naming after unrelated intervening trials (word-to-picture interference). Recently, Stroop-type picture-word interference effects have been interpreted in terms of a postlexical response exclusion process rather than a competitive lexical selection process. An experiment is reported that examines whether word-to-picture effects could reflect response exclusion mechanisms and, more generally, strategic processing of the word prime. Forty-eight volunteer university students named aloud sequences of semantically related (and unrelated) word primes and picture targets, separated by two unrelated filler stimuli. On half of the trials, participants were asked to count backwards in threes from a random number presented immediately after naming the prime word. They were also given a surprise recall test at the end of the naming block. Results for naming times and errors indicated a main effect of relatedness; semantic interference effects were not dependent on the unfilled gap following the word prime trial and were also not tied to episodic recall of prime words. The data indicate that slowed picture naming times are more likely to emerge from processes intrinsic to word prime naming rather than controlled processing and do not readily fit the postlexical response exclusion account. The results are considered in relation to two recent accounts of interference over unrelated trials, which refer to some form of competition at, or prior to, lexical access.     

Representational neglect for words as revealed by bisection tasks

In the present study, we showed that a representational disorder for words can dissociate from both representational neglect for objects and neglect dyslexia. This study involved 14 brain-damaged patients with left unilateral spatial neglect and a group of normal subjects. Patients were divided into four groups based on presence of left neglect dyslexia and representational neglect for non-verbal material, as evaluated by the Clock Drawing test. The patients were presented with bisection tasks for words and lines. The word bisection tasks (with words of five and seven letters) comprised the following: (1) representational bisection: the experimenter pronounced a word and then asked the patient to name the letter in the middle position; (2) visual bisection: same as (1) with stimuli presented visually; and (3) motor bisection: the patient was asked to cross out the letter in the middle position. The standard line bisection task was presented using lines of different length. Consistent with the literature, long lines were bisected to the right and short lines, rendered comparable in length to the words of the word bisection test, deviated to the left (crossover effect). Both patients and controls showed the same leftward bias on words in the visual and motor bisection conditions. A significant difference emerged between the groups only in the case of the representational bisection task, whereas the group exhibiting neglect dyslexia associated with representational neglect for objects showed a significant rightward bias, while the other three patient groups and the controls showed a leftward bisection bias. Neither the presence of neglect alone nor the presence of visual neglect dyslexia was sufficient to produce a specific disorder in mental imagery. These results demonstrate a specific representational neglect for words independent of both representational neglect and neglect dyslexia.     

Interference in visual perception by verbal and spatial cognitive activity

In two experiments we tested the hypothesis that cognitive processing based on spatial imagery produces more deterioration of visual perception than cognitive processing based on verbal codes. So, we studied the effect on visual perception of two cognitive tasks, one of spatial imagery and the other a verbal task. In the first one, with 30 participants, we analyzed the mental load and ocular behaviors in both cognitive tasks. In the second experiment, with 29 participants, we studied the effect of both tasks on a visual search task, using a dual-task experimental paradigm. The verbal task presented higher mental load than the imagery task when both tasks were carried out with visual search task, and there was more deterioration in stimulus detection with the verbal task. We can conclude that: (1) cognitive tasks produce important deterioration in the capacities of visual search and identification of stimuli; (2) this deterioration has two components: (a) an inefficient search, associated with alterations of the gaze patterns while performing cognitive tasks, and (b) a general interference, nonspecific to spatial codes, in the process of identification of looked-at stimuli; (3) this cognitive interference is related to the mental load or effort required by the cognitive task.