False memories for script actions in a mugging account

Abstract

A number of cross-language priming experiments are reported that evaluate whether word meanings in the first and second language are represented in common or separate systems. A masked priming procedure was used on the assumption that when prime awareness is limited, any priming effects directly reveal the underlying structure of the semantic system. Primes were presented in the subjects' first language, while targets were in their second language. Priming effects were obtained for word pairs that were semantically highly similar but not translation equivalents, for example fence-haie (= hedge in French), suggesting that words in the two languages share common elements of semantic code. Priming was also obtained between translation equivalents which, in conjunction with the results for semantically similar pairs, is most naturally interpreted in terms of partially shared semantic representations. However, no masked priming effects were obtained between associated pairs of relatively low semantic similarity, for example shoe-pied (= foot in French), whereas such pairs did produce an effect when primes were unmasked. The results are discussed in terms of limitations on the semantic activation produced by masked words, and the role of collocational relationships in priming between associated words in the same language.     

Congruence or coherence? Emotional and physiological responses to colours in synaesthesia

Lexical–chromatic synaesthesia is a condition in which letters and/or words elicit percepts of synaesthetic colours, termed photisms. Anecdotal data suggest that synaesthetes are particularly sensitive to inconsistencies between their synaesthetic percepts and the real world, e.g., it can be annoying and unpleasant for them to see a letter printed in a colour different than the respective photism colour. For R, a synaesthete subject who participated in the present study, the photisms possess specific emotional values (a red photism is pleasing and attractive, green is repulsive and unpleasant, etc.). In contrast to the anecdotal data, R does not always find the colour–photism incongruence to be disturbing. More importantly, he states that it is the emotional coherence between the stimulus and the corresponding photism that matters. In a series of experiments, we studied this new concept of emotional coherence on three levels—subjective (self-report), behavioural, and physiological, corroborating R's introspective statements. Besides the implications of the concept of coherence itself, the results presented here suggest that even highly subjective cognitive constructs can be approached and measured experimentally, uncovering the workings of the underlying psychophysiological mechanisms.     

Predictive model for early math skills based on structural equations

Early math skills are determined by higher cognitive processes that are particularly important for acquiring and developing skills during a child's early education. Such processes could be a critical target for identifying students at risk for math learning difficulties. Few studies have considered the use of a structural equation method to rationalize these relations. Participating in this study were 207 preschool students ages 59 to 72 months, 108 boys and 99 girls. Performance with respect to early math skills, early literacy, general intelligence, working memory, and short‐term memory was assessed. A structural equation model explaining 64.3% of the variance in early math skills was applied. Early literacy exhibited the highest statistical significance (β = 0.443, p < 0.05), followed by intelligence (β = 0.286, p < 0.05), working memory (β = 0.220, p < 0.05), and short‐term memory (β = 0.213, p < 0.05). Correlations between the independent variables were also significant (p < 0.05). According to the results, cognitive variables should be included in remedial intervention programs.     

Accommodating Presuppositions

In this paper I elaborate on previous criticisms of the influential Stalnakerian account of presuppositions, pointing out that the well-known practice of informative presupposition puts heavy strain on Stalnaker’s pragmatic characterization of the phenomenon of presupposition, in particular of the triggering of presuppositions. Stalnaker has replied to previous criticisms by relying on the well-taken point that we should take into account the time at which presupposition-requirements are to be computed. In defense of a different, ‘semantic’ (in a sense) account of the phenomenon of presupposition, I argue that that point does not suffice to rescue the Stalnakerian proposal, and I portray Lewisian ‘accommodation’ as one way in which speakers adjust themselves to one another in the course of conversation.     

Initial Testing Does Not Necessarily Affect Eyewitness Recall Assessed by Specific Questioning

In eyewitness situations, open recall is followed by specific questioning about the witnessed event. We examined whether initial testing affects later recall of actions and specific details. After watching a video of a bank robbery, participants completed an initial testing phase that involved free recall, specific questions about the actions or details of the event or a control condition with no initial testing. In the final test, correct and incorrect answers, accuracy and response confidence for actions and details were analysed. Initial testing affected neither recall nor confidence. The participants were more accurate for actions than details. Response confidence was higher for correct than incorrect answers and higher for details than actions in correct answers. The results showed that specific questioning affects differently the recall of event actions and details and that remembering details increased confidence. Investigative interviewers can use this evidence when questioning information not reported in initial testing.Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.