Habituation of exploratory activity to new stimuli, to the absence of a previously presented stimulus and to new contexts, in rats

Rats trained to run a shuttle-alleyway for food exhibited exploratory behaviour to a novel visual/tactual stimulus presented in a specific place of the alley. Intermittent presentation of the same stimulus in the same place resulted in reduction of the exploratory activity (habituation), both within and between sessions. The animals also directed exploratory activity to the absence of the previously presented stimulus at the place where the stimulus had been presented before; this latter response also habituated. The presentation (1) of the same stimulus to which the animals had already habituated in another place in the alleyway or when the animals were running in an opposite direction to the previous trials of stimulus presentation, or (2) of another stimulus, resulted, again, in the appearance of exploratory activity. These results lead to the conclusion that the animals code external events, store this information, and use it to detect spatial- and directional-contextual changes and to generate predictions about that specific environment.     

Pragmatic Concerns and Images of the World

I defend a pragmatist reinterpretation of Sellars’s famous manifest-scientific distinction. I claim that in order to do justice to this important distinction we must first recognize, despite what philosophers—including, arguably, Sellars—often make of it, that the distinction does not draw an epistemological or metaphysical boundary between different kinds of objects and events, but a pragmatic boundary between different ways in which we interact with objects and events. Put differently, I argue that the manifest-scientific distinction, in my view, can be best understood, not as a metaphysical distinction between apparent and real objects and events, or an epistemological distinction between perceptible and imperceptible objects and events, but rather as a distinction, which is not necessarily rigid over time, between distinct ways in which we collectively deal, in practice, with objects and events.     

Positive Masculinity Among Latino Men and the Direct and Indirect Effects on Well‐Being

Counselors are learning ways to promote well‐being among Latinas/os. This study tested the hypothesis that caballerismo, a prosocial form of masculinity, would predict subjective well‐being among a sample of predominantly Mexican/Mexican American men. The moderating role of religious involvement was also tested and hypothesized as having a bolstering effect. Results supported the main hypotheses. Implications are discussed as they concern counseling, training, and future research. Los consejeros están aprendiendo formas de promover el bienestar entre la comunidad latina. Este estudio examinó la hipótesis de que el caballerismo, una forma de masculinidad de orientación social, podría predecir el bienestar subjetivo en una muestra de hombres predominantemente mexicanos o méxico‐americanos. También se examinó el efecto moderador de la participación religiosa y se formuló la hipótesis de que tendría un efecto de impulso. Los resultados apoyaron las hipótesis principales. Se discuten implicaciones en cuanto a la consejería, capacitación e investigaciones futuras.     

Luck as Risk and the Lack of Control Account of Luck

This essay explains the notion of luck in terms of risk. It starts by distinguishing two senses of risk, the risk that an event has of occurring and the risk at which an agent is with respect to an event. It cashes out the former in modal terms (rather than probabilistic) and the latter in terms of lack of control. It then argues that the presence or absence of event‐relative risk marks a distinction between two types of luck or fortune commonly overlooked in ordinary usage of the terms “luck” and “fortune.” After offering a detailed account of the notion of control, the essay advances a new version of the so‐called lack of control account of luck: lucky events are events with respect to which one is at risk and hence events over which one lacks control in the specified way. Finally, it argues that its account steers clear of counterexamples to the lack of control account of luck.     

The allocation of valenced concepts onto 3D space

The valence–space metaphor research area investigates the metaphorical mapping of valenced concepts onto space. Research findings from this area indicate that positive, neutral, and negative concepts are associated with upward, midward, and downward locations, respectively, in the vertical plane. The same research area has also indicated that such concepts seem to have no preferential location on the horizontal plane. The approach–avoidance effect consists in decreasing the distance between positive stimuli and the body (i.e. approach) and increasing the distance between negative stimuli and the body (i.e. avoid). Thus, the valence–space metaphor accounts for the mapping of valenced concepts onto the vertical and horizontal planes, and the approach–avoidance effect accounts for the mapping of valenced concepts onto the “depth” plane. By using a cube conceived for the study of allocation of valenced concepts onto 3D space, we show in three studies that positive concepts are placed in upward locations and near the participants’ body, negative concepts are placed in downward locations and far from the participants’ body, and neutral concepts are placed in between these concepts in both planes.