Naming and categorization in young children: v. manual sign training

Following pre-training with everyday objects, 8 children aged from 2 to 4 years learned to produce one manual sign (fists placed one above the other, in front of body) to one stimulus and an alternative manual sign (shoulders touched with ipsilateral hands) to the other stimulus, with each of three pairs of different arbitrary wooden shapes (Set 1). The six stimuli then were presented in category match-to-sample tests, which all subjects passed. Three of the children were next trained to produce the manual signs (denoted as fist/shoulder) for an additional six arbitrary stimuli, Set 2. All 3 children went on to pass category match-to-sample tests for Set 2, and for Set 1 and Set 2 combined. In the final experimental phase, 2 of the children were trained, for one of the six stimulus pairs, to produce the vocal tact "zag" to one stimulus and "vek" to the other. Both children showed category transfer of these vocalizations in test trials with each of the remaining five stimulus pairs, and all the stimuli combined in a 12-stimulus array. In line with Horne and Lowe's (1996) naming account, manual sign naming was found to be as effective as vocal naming in establishing arbitrary stimulus categorization, measured in terms of category sorting and transfer of function. The findings also have implications for the training of verbal repertoires in people with learning disabilities.     

Schellenberg on the epistemic force of experience

According to Schellenberg, our perceptual experiences have the epistemic force they do because they are exercises of certain sorts of capacity, namely capacities to discriminate particulars—objects, property-instances and events—in a sensory mode. She calls her account the “capacity view.” In this paper, I will raise three concerns about Schellenberg’s capacity view. The first is whether we might do better to leave capacities out of our epistemology and take content properties as the fundamental epistemically relevant features of experiences. I argue we would. The second is whether Schellenberg’s appeal to factive and phenomenal evidence accommodates the intuitive verdicts about the bad case that she claims it does. I argue it does not. The third is whether Schellenberg’s account of factive evidence is adequate to capture nuances concerning the justification for singular but nondemonstrative perceptual beliefs, such as the belief that’s NN, where NN is a proper name. I argue it is not. If I am right, these points suggest a mental-state-first account of perceptual justification, rather than a capacity-first account, and one which treats the good and bad cases alike in respect of justification and complicates the relation between perceptual content and what one is justified in believing.     

Cohen on ‘Epistemic’

Stewart Cohen offers a critique of much contemporary epistemology. Epistemologies use the term ‘epistemic’ in order to specify the issues they investigate and about which they disagree. Cohen sees widespread confusion about these issues. The problem, he argues, is that ‘epistemic’ is functioning as an inadequately defined technical term. I will argue, rather, that the troubles come more from non-technical vocabulary, in particular with ‘justification’ and ‘ought’, and generally from the difficulty of explaining normativity. Overall, the message of this paper is that normativity is what’s hard to understand, not the term ‘epistemic.’     

Culture and the distinctiveness motive: constructing identity in individualistic and collectivistic contexts

The motive to attain a distinctive identity is sometimes thought to be stronger in, or even specific to, those socialized into individualistic cultures. Using data from 4,751 participants in 21 cultural groups (18 nations and 3 regions), we tested this prediction against our alternative view that culture would moderate the ways in which people achieve feelings of distinctiveness, rather than influence the strength of their motivation to do so. We measured the distinctiveness motive using an indirect technique to avoid cultural response biases. Analyses showed that the distinctiveness motive was not weaker-and, if anything, was stronger-in more collectivistic nations. However, individualism-collectivism was found to moderate the ways in which feelings of distinctiveness were constructed: Distinctiveness was associated more closely with difference and separateness in more individualistic cultures and was associated more closely with social position in more collectivistic cultures. Multilevel analysis confirmed that it is the prevailing beliefs and values in an individual's context, rather than the individual's own beliefs and values, that account for these differences.     

Short forms of the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale and the Social Phobia Scale

Mattick and Clarke's (1998) Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS) and Social Phobia Scale (SPS) are commonly used self-report measures that assess 2 dimensions of social anxiety. Given the need for short, readable measures, this research proposes short forms of both scales. Item-level analyses of readability characteristics of the SIAS and SPS items led to the selection of 6 items from each scale for use in the short forms. The SIAS and SPS short forms had reading levels at approximately the 6th and 5th grade level, respectively. Results using nonclinical (Study 1: N = 469) and clinical (Study 2: N = 145) samples identified these short forms as being factorially sound, possessing adequate internal consistency, and having strong convergence with their full-length counterparts. Moreover, these short forms showed convergence with other measures of social anxiety, showed divergence from measures assessing related constructs, and predicted concurrent interpersonal functioning. Recommendations for the use of these short forms are discussed.     

A processing approach to the working memory/long-term memory distinction: evidence from the levels-of-processing span task

Recent theories suggest that performance on working memory (WM) tasks involves retrieval from long-term memory (LTM). To examine whether WM and LTM tests have common principles, Craik and Tulving's (1975) levels-of-processing paradigm, which is known to affect LTM, was administered as a WM task: Participants made uppercase, rhyme, or category-membership judgments about words, and immediate recall of the words was required after every 3 or 8 processing judgments. In Experiment 1, immediate recall did not demonstrate a levels-of-processing effect, but a subsequent LTM test (delayed recognition) of the same words did show a benefit of deeper processing. Experiment 2 showed that surprise immediate recall of 8-item lists did demonstrate a levels-of-processing effect, however. A processing account of the conditions in which levels-of-processing effects are and are not found in WM tasks was advanced, suggesting that the extent to which levels-of-processing effects are similar between WM and LTM tests largely depends on the amount of disruption to active maintenance processes.     

Going Gaga: Investigating,Creating, and Manipulating the Song Stuck in My Head

Summary: Having a song stuck in your head is a commonly experienced intrusive thought. We explored the intrusive song phenomenon through a survey, an experimental diary study, and three laboratory experiments. Contrary to the belief that only obnoxious songs get stuck, we found that songs people know and like frequently became intrusive. We also found that intrusive songs followed environmental cues. In addition, if a song continued to play in someone's head immediately after listening to it, the song was likely to return as an intrusive song within the next 24 hours. Similar to mind wandering, the return of intrusive songs depended on cognitive resources: people reported that intrusive songs returned during low cognitive load activities, and we found that overloading the cognitive systems with challenging activities increased intrusive song frequency. Throughout our studies, we easily created and manipulated intrusive song experiences. Songs provide a valuable method to investigate intrusive thoughts. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.