Task complexity and age differences in working memory

This study investigated age-related differences in working memory using a modified version of the Daneman and Carpenter (1980) working memory task. The subjects were required to verify a series of sentences, and then at the end of each series recall the final word of each sentence. Each series varied in length from one to five sentences. Performance on this task was compared with performance in a word-alone condition, in which the subject had to remember an equivalent list of single words but without sentence verification. When sentences of positive grammatical form were used in the sentence-span condition, age differences were no greater than in the word alone condition; however, the age decrement increased when sentences of negative grammatical form were used. There were no interactions between age and pacing or between age and the number of sentences in each set. These results are discussed in relation to theories of age differences in working memory.     

Age differences in recognition memory

It is generally believed that short-term memory (STM) performance decreases from maturity to old age, but the present paper questions the generality of this conclusion. The first experiment reported is a short-term recognition probe study—no significant age differences were found in either acquisition or the rate of forgetting. It is suggested that age decrements in STM are limited to situations where attention is divided at input or where the material must be manipulated during storage. Experiment II confirmed previous findings of minimal age losses in secondary memory word recognition. The results of this second study support the conclusion that there is poorer accessibility to stored verbal material with advancing age.     

Emotional Distress Intolerance,Experiential Avoidance,and Anxiety Sensitivity: The Buffering Effect of Attentional Control on Associations with Posttraumatic Stress Symptoms

A number of individual difference factors, including emotional distress intolerance (EDI), experiential avoidance (EA), and anxiety sensitivity (ASI), have been implicated in the development and maintenance of posttraumatic stress (PTS) symptomatology. Attentional control (AC) has been shown to serve as a protective factor against the development of maladaptive psychological outcomes across a number of studies, even among those with outcome-specific vulnerabilities. The purpose of the present study was to examine AC as a moderator of the relations between three constructs pertaining to the way that people relate to their internal experiences (i.e., EDI, EA, AS) and PTS symptoms among a trauma exposed community sample (N?=?903). As predicted, AC moderated the relations between each individual difference factor and PTS symptoms, such that as attentional control decreased, the strength of the association between each individual difference factor and PTS symptoms increased. Study results suggest that AC abilities may be one factor that differentiates those who recover from trauma from those who do not, even among those who may be vulnerable for developing PTS symptomatology. Clinical implications and results of a PTS cluster level analysis will be discussed.     

Interacting effects of age and time of day on verbal fluency performance and intraindividual variability

We explored the effects of age and time of day (TOD) on verbal fluency ability with respect to performance level and intraindividual variability (IIV). Verbal fluency, which involves complex cognitive operations, was examined in 20 older (mean age = 72.8 years) and 20 younger (mean age = 24.2 years) adults with test start time alternating between morning and evening across four days. Older adults generated more words in the morning and younger adults more in the evening, corresponding with self-report peak TOD. Age by TOD interactions were also observed across fluency tasks on the number of switches among subcategory exemplars during word generation and on the IIV observed in switching behavior. Older adults exhibited greater variability in switching in the evening than in the morning, whereas younger adults showed the opposite pattern. These findings demonstrate that processes involving energization (initiating and sustaining) and attentional control may be particularly sensitive to age differences in TOD influences on cognition.     

Bilingualism,executive control,and age at diagnosis among people with early‐stage Alzheimer's disease in Wales

The observation of a bilingual advantage in executive control tasks involving inhibition and management of response conflict suggests that being bilingual might contribute to increased cognitive reserve. In support of this, recent evidence indicates that bilinguals develop Alzheimer's disease (AD) later than monolinguals, and may retain an advantage in performance on executive control tasks. We compared age at the time of receiving an AD diagnosis in bilingual Welsh/English speakers (n = 37) and monolingual English speakers (n = 49), and assessed the performance of bilinguals (n = 24) and monolinguals (n = 49) on a range of executive control tasks. There was a non‐significant difference in age at the time of diagnosis, with bilinguals being on average 3 years older than monolinguals, but bilinguals were also significantly more cognitively impaired at the time of diagnosis. There were no significant differences between monolinguals and bilinguals in performance on executive function tests, but bilinguals appeared to show relative strengths in the domain of inhibition and response conflict. Bilingual Welsh/English speakers with AD do not show a clear advantage in executive function over monolingual English speakers, but may retain some benefits in inhibition and management of response conflict. There may be a delay in onset of AD in Welsh/English bilinguals, but if so, it is smaller than that found in some other clinical populations. In this Welsh sample, bilinguals with AD came to the attention of services later than monolinguals, and reasons for this pattern could be explored further.     

A social identity model of riot diffusion: From injustice to empowerment in the 2011 London riots

Previous research has shown that riots spread across multiple locations, but has not explained underlying psychological processes. We examined rioting in three locations during the August 2011 disorders in England to test a social identity model of riot diffusion. We triangulated multiple sources to construct a narrative of events; and we analysed interviews with 68 participants to examine experiences. In line with the model, we found evidence for two pathways of influence: “cognitive” and “strategic”. For some participants, previous rioting was highly self-relevant, and shared identity was the basis of their subsequent involvement. For others, previous rioting was empowering because it demonstrated the vulnerability of a common enemy (the police). In each location, interaction dynamics mediated the link between initial perceptions and collective action. The utility of this social identity approach is that it is able to account for both the boundaries and the sequence of urban riot diffusion.     

Advice for fallibilists: put knowledge to work

We begin by asking what fallibilism about knowledge is, distinguishing several conceptions of fallibilism and giving reason to accept what we call strong epistemic fallibilism, the view that one can know that something is the case even if there remains an epistemic chance, for one, that it is not the case. The task of the paper, then, concerns how best to defend this sort of fallibilism from the objection that it is “mad,” that it licenses absurd claims such as “I know that p but there’s a chance that not p” and “p but it there’s a chance that not p.” We argue that the best defense of fallibilism against this objection—a “pragmatist” defense—makes the following claims. First, while knowledge that p is compatible with an epistemic chance that not-p, it is compatible only with an insignificant such chance. Second, the insignificance of the chance that not-p is plausibly understood in terms of the irrelevance of that chance to p’s serving as a ‘justifier’, for action as well as belief. In other words, if you know that p, then any chance for you that not p doesn’t stand in the way of p’s being properly put to work as a basis for action and belief.

Causation and the Making/Allowing Distinction

Philosophical Studies -