When is a minority a minority? Active versus passive minority advocacy and social influence

Some conceptions of minority influence have stressed the impact of the mere existence of an unpopular, deviant position. Others (e.g. Moscovici, 1980 ) have emphasized the active opposition of a committed minority to a powerful majority. An active advocate is defined as one that is aware of the level of support for his/her position, expresses his/her position openly, and whose outcomes may depend on others' agreement/disagreement. In the present study, the potential moderating role of an advocates' active/passive status on opinion change was examined. When the issue was highly relevant to the target of influence, all that mattered was the quality of the source's arguments (i.e. majority≈ minority, active source = passive source). When the issue was not highly relevant to the target, though, active and passive sources had different impact: (1) active sources prompted attention to argument quality (for minorities) and heuristic compliance (for majorities); (2) passive sources prompted insensitivity to both the popularity of the position and to the quality of the source's arguments. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Movement control and maturation in elementary-grade children.

Serial tapping by 5-, 7- and 9-yr.-old boys and girls, as measured by Fitts' Law, was recorded. 60 Ss performed a reciprocal tapping task and were assessed developmentally via hand-wrist X-rays. No significant relationship was found between the fine motor task and skeletal age. The results of the motor task suggest an improvement in movement time, with age, due to an ability to plan subsequent movements rather than simply an increase in speed of arm movement.     

After-effects of reinforcement magnitude: Dependence upon context

On a fixed-interval schedule with rat subjects the duration of the post-reinforcement pause was found to be an increasing function of the magnitude of the preceding reinforcer. This relationship was observed when two magnitudes were contrasted closely in time, but not when the subjects were trained on each magnitude until the establishment of stable responding. After the behaviour was stable, the effect of the magnitude of reinforcement re-emerged when 50% of the scheduled reinforcers were omitted. Thus, the positive relationship between the magnitude of reinforcement and the duration of the post-reinforcement pause depended on the context of presentation of a given magnitude.     

Visual signal detection and the locus of foreperiod effects

The effect of alertness on S's sensitivity to external signals was determined by varying the foreperiod in a visual signal detection task. Discriminability increased with increasing foreperiods up to an optimal foreperiod, beyond which it decreased slightly. This pattern of results parallels closely that of many foreperiod studies in which reaction time was the dependent variable. Because no speeded response was required in this signal detection task, it was concluded that alertness must be affecting an information processing stage prior to those associated with responding. Other evidence indicates that alertness does not affect sensory stages either. Alertness, by elimination, must be affecting the operation of a central stage, Posner's view of alertness which implicates the central stages is discussed.     

AGE DIFFERENCES IN CUMULATIVE LEARNING OF MEANINGFUL AND MEANINGLESS MATERIAL

Age differences in cumulative learning were explored using a technique developed by Hebb. In the first experiment Finnish subjects recalled messages of English digits and in two subsequent experiments English subjects recalled messages of Finnish and of English digits. The finding from the first experiment was that young subjects exhibited cumulative learning while old subjects did not but it was concluded on the basis of the two further experiments that both age groups could show cumulative learning under the conditions used. An age difference in immediate memory for meaningful and meaningless material is noted and the possibility of increasing vulnerability with age to different forms of interference is discussed.     

Addressing Psychometric Limitations of the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale Through Item Modification

Through its frequent use, a pattern has emerged showing psychometric limitations of the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz &; Roemer, 2004 Gratz, K. L., &; Roemer, L. (2004). Multidimensional assessment of emotion regulation and dysregulation: Development, factor structure, and initial validation of the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale. Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 26, 41–54.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). This 3-part study sought to (a) determine whether these limitations are due to a method effect by rewording all reverse-coded items in a straightforward manner and submitting them to exploratory factor analysis (EFA), and (b) examine the tenability of an adaptation of the original measure. EFA results from Study 1 (N = 743) supported retention of 29 modified items across 5 factors. Consistent with the original theoretical underpinnings of the DERS, Awareness and Clarity items loaded on the same factor. In Study 2 (N = 738), confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to examine the factor structure of the pool of items identified in Study 1. All of the modified subscales clustered strongly with one another and evidenced large loadings on a higher-order emotion regulation construct. These results were replicated in Study 3 (N = 918). Results from Study 3 also provided support for the reliability and validity of scores on the modified version of the DERS (i.e., internal consistency, convergent and criterion-related validity). These findings provide psychometric support for a modified version of the DERS.     

Who needs ‘just plain’ goodness: a reply to Almotahari and Hosein

I address an argument in value theory which threatens to render nonsensical many debates in modern ethics. Almotahari and Hosein’s (Philos Stud 172(6):1485–1508, 2015) argument against the property of goodness simpliciter is presented. I criticise the linguistic tests they use in their argument, suggesting they do not provide much support for their conclusion. I draw a weaker conclusion from their argument, and argue that defenders of goodness simpliciter have not responded adequately to this milder conclusion. I go on to argue that moral philosophers ought to abandon the property of goodness simpliciter and focus their attention on the property of being a good state of affairs. I defend this property against Almotahari and Hosein’s criticism, and give reasons to think it (rather than goodness simpliciter) is at the heart of moral theory.