Emotions affects moral judgements, and controlled cognitive processes regulate those emotional responses during moral decision making. However, the neurobiological basis of this interaction is unclear. We used a graph theory measurement called participation coefficient (‘PC’) to quantify the resting-state functional connectivity within and between four meta-analytic groupings (MAGs) associated with emotion generation and regulation, to test whether that measurement predicts individual differences in moral foundations-based values. We found that the PC of one of the MAGs (MAG2) was positively correlated with one of the five recognized moral foundations–the one based on harm avoidance. We also found that increased inter-module connectivity between the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and middle temporal gyrus with other nodes in the four MAGs was likewise associated with higher endorsement of the Harm foundation. These results suggest that individuals' sensitivity to harm is associated with functional integration of large-scale brain networks of emotional regulation. These findings add to our knowledge of how individual variations in our moral values could be reflected by intrinsic brain network organization and deepen our understanding of the relationship between emotion and cognition during evaluations of moral values. 相似文献
Previous research has shown that 6‐month‐old infants extrapolate object motion on linear paths when they act predictively on fully visible moving objects but not when they observe partly occluded moving objects. The present research probed whether differences in the tasks presented to infants or in the visibility of the objects account for these findings, by investigating infants’ predictive head tracking of a visible object that moves behind a small occluder. Six‐month‐old infants were presented with an object that moved repeatedly on linear or nonlinear paths, with an occluder covering the place where all the paths intersected. The first time infants viewed an object’s motion, their head movements did not anticipate either linear or nonlinear motion, but they quickly learned to anticipate linear motion on successive trials. Infants also learned to anticipate nonlinear motion, but this learning was slower and less consistent. Learning in all cases concerned the trajectory of the object, not the specific locations at which the object appeared. These findings suggest that infants form object representations that are weakly biased toward inertial motion and that are influenced by learning. The findings accord with the thesis that a single system of representation underlies both predictive action and perception of object motion, and that occlusion reduces the precision of object representations. 相似文献
It’s widely accepted that higher-order defeaters, i.e., evidence that one’s belief is formed in an epistemically defective way, can defeat doxastic justification. However, it’s yet unclear how exactly such kind of defeat happens. Given that many theories of doxastic justification can be understood as fitting the schema of proper basing on propositional justifiers, we might attempt to explain the defeat either by arguing that a higher-order defeater defeats propositional justification or by arguing that it defeats proper basing. It has been argued that the first attempt is unpromising because a variety of prominent theories of propositional justification don’t imply that we lose propositional justification when gaining higher-order defeaters. This leads some scholars to take the second attempt. In this paper, I criticize this second attempt, and I defend the first attempt by arguing that a theory of propositional justification that requires intellectual responsibility can nicely account for higher-order defeat. My proposal is that we lose doxastic justification when we gain higher-order defeaters because there is no intellectually responsible way for us to maintain our original beliefs due to the defeaters.
