Philosophical Methodology and Conceptions of Evil Action

There is considerable philosophical dispute about what it takes for an action to be evil. The methodological assumption underlying this dispute is that there is a single, shared folk conception of evil action deployed amongst culturally similar people. Employing empirical research the authors undertook, this article suggests that this assumption is false. There exist, amongst the folk, numerous conceptions of evil action. Hence, the authors argue, philosophical research is most profitably spent in two endeavours. First, in determining which (if any) conception of evil action we have prudential or moral (or both) reason to deploy and, second, in determining whether we could feasibly come to adopt that conception as the single shared conception given our psychological make‐up and the content of the conceptions currently deployed.     

Grounding: it’s (probably) all in the head

In this paper we provide a psychological explanation for ‘grounding observations’—observations that are thought to provide evidence that there exists a relation of ground. Our explanation does not appeal to the presence of any such relation. Instead, it appeals to certain evolved cognitive mechanisms, along with the traditional modal relations of supervenience, necessitation and entailment. We then consider what, if any, metaphysical conclusions we can draw from the obtaining of such an explanation, and, in particular, if it tells us anything about whether we ought to posit a relation of ground.     

Social Dominance Theory: Its Agenda and Method

The theory has been misconstrued in four primary ways, which are often expressed as the claims of psychological reductionism, conceptual redundancy, biological reductionism, and hierarchy justification. This paper addresses these claims and suggests how social dominance theory builds on and moves beyond social identity theory and system justification theory.     

A combined fMRI and DTI examination of functional language lateralization and arcuate fasciculus structure: Effects of degree versus direction of hand preference

The present study examined the relationship between hand preference degree and direction, functional language lateralization in Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas, and structural measures of the arcuate fasciculus. Results revealed an effect of degree of hand preference on arcuate fasciculus structure, such that consistently-handed individuals, regardless of the direction of hand preference, demonstrated the most asymmetric arcuate fasciculus, with larger left versus right arcuate, as measured by DTI. Functional language lateralization in Wernicke’s area, measured via fMRI, was related to arcuate fasciculus volume in consistent-left-handers only, and only in people who were not right hemisphere lateralized for language; given the small sample size for this finding, future investigation is warranted. Results suggest handedness degree may be an important variable to investigate in the context of neuroanatomical asymmetries.     

Beyond contact: intergroup contact in the context of power relations

This work investigated how group-based power affects the motivations and preferences that members of advantaged and disadvantaged groups bring to situations of contact. To measure the preferred content of interactions, desires to address particular topics in intergroup contact were assessed for both experimental groups (Study 1) and real groups (Study 2). As predicted, across both studies, the desire to talk about power was greater among members of disadvantaged than of advantaged groups. This difference was mediated by motivation for change in group-based power. Study 2 further demonstrated that more highly identified members of disadvantaged groups wanted to talk about power more. Members of advantaged groups generally preferred to talk about commonalities between the groups more than about group-based power, and this desire was greater with higher levels of identification. However, perceiving that their group's advantage was illegitimate increased the desire of advantaged group members to address power in intergroup interactions.     

Ethnocentrism and Sexism: How Stereotypes Legitimize Six Types of Power

We review evidence of inequality associated with gender and social categories like ethnicity with respect to six types of power: control of resources, force, legitimacy, obligations, knowledge, and sexuality. Presuming that stereotypes are one means of legitimizing power differentials between groups, we review research on stereotype contents for both ethnicity and gender with respect to the six forms of power. The review reveals a number of rhetorical means by which stereotypes legitimize ethnic dominants and men having particular forms of power, such as disguising the exercise of power by describing it in individualistic rather than relational terms, and also how stereotypes de‐legitimize women and ethnic subordinates from obtaining particular forms of power, such as by stating that what they desire and their virtues preclude exercising power. A new research agenda regarding stereotypes and how they legitimize group power differences is outlined.