The story of some: everyday pragmatic inference by children and adults.

The statement, some elephants have trunks, is logically true but pragmatically infelicitous. Whilst some is logically consistent with all, it is often pragmatically interpreted as precluding all. In Experiments 1 and 2, we show that with pragmatically impoverished materials, sensitivity to the pragmatic implicature associated with some is apparent earlier in development than has previously been found. Amongst 8-year-old children, we observed much greater sensitivity to the implicature in pragmatically enriched contexts. Finally, in Experiment 3, we found that amongst adults, logical responses to infelicitous some statements take longer to produce than do logical responses to felicitous some statements, and that working memory capacity predicts the tendency to give logical responses to the former kind of statement. These results suggest that some adults develop the ability to inhibit a pragmatic response in favour of a logical answer. We discuss the implications of these findings for theories of pragmatic inference.     

Mechanisms of what-where-when memory in black-capped chickadees (Poecile atricapillus): do chickadees remember "when"?

Integrated what-where-when memory, sometimes called 'episodic-like' memory, has been shown to occur in a number of animals, including food-storing birds and rodents. It is not always clear in these studies, however, what aspect of "when" is remembered. We examined memory for what, where, and when in black-capped chickadees Poecile atricapillus in a procedure designed to dissociate memory for elapsed time (how long ago) from memory for a point in time, the sense of "when" implied in most discussions of episodic or episodic-like memory. Chickadees searched for food in multiple trials that each involved a two-phase procedure. In Phase 1, birds found preferred mealworms in half the sites on one side of an aviary and less preferred sunflower seeds in half the sites on the other side of the aviary. In Phase 2, following a retention interval, birds searched in the aviary with fresh sunflower seeds placed in the sites that held seeds in Phase 1 but either fresh or degraded mealworms in the sites that held mealworms in Phase 1. Whether a site held fresh or degraded worms depended on either when during the day Phase 1 had occurred (Group When), how long ago Phase 1 had occurred (Group HLA), or both (Group When + HLA). Chickadees in all three groups were able to discriminate where and when palatable worms were to be found, but there were temporal limitations on the use of HLA and When + HLA cues that were not found for the use of When cues.     

Assessing preference in elders with dementia using multimedia and verbal pleasant events schedules

The current study compared an abbreviated oral interview version of the Pleasant Events Schedule – Alzheimer's Disease (PES‐AD) to a multimedia‐supplemented version. Both measures identified multiple preferred items and their scores were moderately correlated (r = .481). Direct observations were conducted to determine whether either of the two measures predicted subsequent engagement. For all nine individuals with dementia, items endorsed as preferred by both versions of the PES‐AD resulted in high levels of engagement and items endorsed as non‐preferred items on both measures resulted in low to moderate levels of engagement. Individuals with MMSE scores of 10 or higher had more stable and differentiated patterns of engagement than individuals with scores below 10. For individuals with higher MMSE scores, items endorsed only by the multimedia version resulted in high engagement levels (i.e., true positive) while items endorsed only on the verbal presentation resulted in low levels (i.e., false positive). Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When some is actually all: Scalar inferences in face-threatening contexts

Accounts of the scalar inference from ‘some X-ed’ to ‘not all X-ed’ are central to the debate between contemporary theories of conversational pragmatics. An important contribution to this debate is to identify contexts that decrease the endorsement rate of the inference. We suggest that the inference is endorsed less often in face-threatening contexts, i.e., when X implies a loss of face for the listener. This claim is successfully tested in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 rules out a possible confound between face-threatening contexts and lower-bound contexts. Experiment 3 shows that whilst saying ‘some X-ed’ when one knew for a fact that all X-ed is always perceived as an underinformative utterance, it is also seen as a nice and polite thing to do when X threatens the face of the listener. These findings are considered from the perspective of Relevance Theory as well as that of the Generalized Conversational Inference approach.     

How many processes underlie category-based induction? Effects of conclusion specificity and cognitive ability

Two studies investigated participants' sensitivity to the amount and diversity of the evidence when reasoning inductively about categories. Both showed that participants are more sensitive to characteristics of the evidence for arguments with general rather than specific conclusions. Both showed an association between cognitive ability and sensitivity to these evidence characteristics, particularly when the conclusion category was general. These results suggest that a simple associative process may not be sufficient to capture somekey phenomena of category-based induction. They also support the claim that the need to generate a superordinate category is a complicating factor in category-based reasoning and that adults' tendency to generate such categories while reasoning has been overestimated.     

A secure base: responsive support of goal strivings and exploration in adult intimate relationships

A theoretical framework is proposed for examining the interpersonal processes involved in the support of a relationship partner's goal strivings, personal growth, and exploratory behavior, and for examining consequences of receiving either responsive or unresponsive support in this domain. These processes were examined using both observational and experimental methods. In Phase 1, couples were videotaped as they discussed personal goals for the future. In Phase 2, support behavior was experimentally manipulated to examine immediate effects on the recipient. Results indicated that responsive (nonintrusive) support of a relationship partner's goal strivings and explorations have important implications for the recipient's happiness, self-esteem, and perceived likelihood of achieving specific goals. The importance of research examining this type of support is discussed.     

Working models of attachment shape perceptions of social support: evidence from experimental and observational studies

Two studies examined the association between attachment style and perceptions of social support. Study 1 (N = 95 couples) used an experimental paradigm to manipulate social support in the context of a stressful task. Insecure participants (anxious and avoidant) who received low-support messages appraised these messages more negatively, rated a prior behavioral interaction with their partner as having been less supportive, and performed significantly worse at their task compared with secure participants. Study 2 (N = 153 couples) used a similar paradigm except that partners were allowed to send genuine support messages. Insecure participants (especially fearful) perceived their partners' messages as less supportive, even after controlling for independent ratings of the messages and relationship-specific expectations. These studies provide evidence that individuals are predisposed to appraise their support experiences in ways that are consistent with their chronic working models of attachment, especially when the support message is ambiguous.     

Relations between premise similarity and inductive strength

According to the diversity principle, diverse evidence is strong evidence. There has been considerable evidence that people respect this principle in inductive reasoning. However, exceptions may be particularly informative. Medin, Coley, Storms, and Hayes (2003) introduced a relevance theory of inductive reasoning and used this theory to predict exceptions, including the nondiversity-by-propertyreinforcement effect. A new experiment in which this phenomenon was investigated is reported here. Subjects made inductive strength judgments and similarity judgments for stimuli from Medin et al. (2003). The inductive strength judgments showed the same pattern as that in Medin et al. (2003); however, the similarity judgments suggested that the pattern should be interpreted as a diversity effect, rather than as a nondiversity effect. It is concluded that the evidence regarding the predicted nondiversity-byproperty-reinforcement effect does not give distinctive support for relevance theory, although this theory does address other results.     

Comparisons, mental models, and the action effect in judgments of regret

People tend to attribute more regret to a character who has decided to take action and experienced a negative outcome than to one who has decided not to act and experienced a negative outcome. For some decisions, however, this finding is not observed in a between-participants design and thus appears to rely on comparisons between people's representations of action and their representations of inaction. In this article, we outline a mental models account that explains findings from studies that have used within- and between-participants designs, and we suggest that, for decisions with uncertain counterfactual outcomes, information about the consequences of a decision to act causes people to flesh out their representation of the counterfactual states of affairs for inaction. In three experiments, we confirm our predictions about participants' fleshing out of representations, demonstrating that an action effect occurs only when information about the consequences of action is available to participants as they rate the nonactor and when this information about action is informative with respect to judgments about inaction. It is important to note that the action effect always occurs when the decision scenario specifies certain counterfactual outcomes. These results suggest that people sometimes base their attributions of regret on comparisons among different sets of mental models.