Mapping the Connections between Politics and Morality: The Multiple Sociopolitical Orientations Involved in Moral Intuition

According to moral foundations theory (Haidt & Joseph, 2004), five foundations are central to moral intuition. The two individualizing foundations—harm/care and fairness/reciprocity—hinge on the rights of the individual, whereas the three binding foundations—in‐group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity—focus on communal bonds. Recent work suggests that reliance on the various foundations varies as a function of sociopolitical orientation: liberals consistently rely on the individualizing foundations, whereas conservatives rely on both the individualizing and binding foundations. In an effort to further explore the relationship between sociopolitical orientation and morality, we argue that only certain types of sociopolitical attitudes and beliefs should relate to each cluster of foundations. Drawing on dual‐process models of social and political attitudes, we demonstrate that the individualizing foundations are aligned with attitudes and beliefs relevant to preferences for equality versus inequality (i.e., SDO and competitive‐jungle beliefs), whereas the binding foundations are aligned with attitudes and beliefs relevant to preferences for openness versus social conformity (i.e., RWA and dangerous‐world beliefs). We conclude by discussing the consequences of these findings for our understanding of the relationship between sociopolitical and moral orientations.     

Route and survey processing of topographical memory during navigation

We investigated the characteristics of route and survey processing of a unique complex virtual environment both at the behavioral and brain levels. Prior to fMRI scanning, participants were trained to follow a route and to learn the spatial relationships between several places, acquiring both route and survey knowledge from a ground-level perspective. During scanning, snapshots of the environment were presented, and participants were required to either indicate the direction to take to follow the route (route task), or to locate unseen targets (survey task). Data suggest that route and survey processing are mainly supported by a common occipito-fronto-parieto-temporal neural network. Our results are consistent with those gathered in studies concerning the neural bases of route versus survey knowledge acquired either from different perspectives or in different environments. However, rather than arguing for a clear distinction between route and survey processing, “mixed” strategies are likely to be involved when both types of encoding take place in the same environment.     

Hypnotic susceptibility, baseline attentional functioning, and the Stroop task

According to the theoretical framework relating hypnosis to attention, baseline attentional functioning in highly hypnotizable individuals should be more efficient than in low hypnotizable individuals. However, previous studies did not find differences in Stroop-like tasks in which the measure indicative of the Stroop interference effect was based on response latencies. This study was designed to determine whether subjects with different levels of hypnotic susceptibility show differences in baseline attentional functioning. To assess this hypothesis, high, medium, and low hypnotizable subjects performed a Stroop task designed to evaluate accuracy performance, before being subjected to hypnotic induction. Results showed that the Stroop interference effect was smaller in high hypnotizable subjects than in low hypnotizable subjects, whereas it was not different between high, and medium hypnotizable subjects. This outcome supports the notion that baseline attentional functioning is related to hypnotic susceptibility.     

Co‐Hyperintensionality

Co‐hyperintensionality, or hyperintensional equivalence, is a relation holding between two or more contents that can be substituted in a hyperintensional context salva veritate. I argue that two strategies used to provide criteria for co‐hyperintensionality (appeal to some form of impossible worlds, or to structural or procedural equivalence of propositions) fail. I argue that there is no generalized notion of co‐hyperintensionality that meets plausible desiderata, by showing that the opposite thesis leads to falsity. As a conclusion, I suggest to take co‐hyperintensionality as a primitive and I provide a general criterion of co‐hyperintensionality whose content depends on each hyperintensional notion we aim to formalize.     

Accurate step-hold tracking of smoothly varying periodic and aperiodic probability

Subjects observing many samples from a Bernoulli distribution are able to perceive an estimate of the generating parameter. A question of fundamental importance is how the current percept—what we think the probability now is—depends on the sequence of observed samples. Answers to this question are strongly constrained by the manner in which the current percept changes in response to changes in the hidden parameter. Subjects do not update their percept trial-by-trial when the hidden probability undergoes unpredictable and unsignaled step changes; instead, they update it only intermittently in a step-hold pattern. It could be that the step-hold pattern is not essential to the perception of probability and is only an artifact of step changes in the hidden parameter. However, we now report that the step-hold pattern obtains even when the parameter varies slowly and smoothly. It obtains even when the smooth variation is periodic (sinusoidal) and perceived as such. We elaborate on a previously published theory that accounts for: (i) the quantitative properties of the step-hold update pattern; (ii) subjects’ quick and accurate reporting of changes; (iii) subjects’ second thoughts about previously reported changes; (iv) subjects’ detection of higher-order structure in patterns of change. We also call attention to the challenges these results pose for trial-by-trial updating theories.     

Cholinergic dependence of taste memory formation: evidence of two distinct processes

Learning the aversive or positive consequences associated with novel taste solutions has a strong significance for an animal's survival. A lack of recognition of a taste's consequences could prevent ingestion of potential edibles or encounter death. We used conditioned taste aversion (CTA) and attenuation of neophobia (AN) to study aversive and safe taste memory formation. To determine if muscarinic receptors in the insular cortex participate differentially in both tasks, we infused the muscarinic antagonists scopolamine at distinct times before or after the presentation of a strong concentration of saccharin, followed by either an i.p. injection of a malaise-inducing agent or no injection. Our results showed that blockade of muscarinic receptors before taste presentation disrupts both learning tasks. However, the same treatment after the taste prevents AN but not CTA. These results clearly demonstrate that cortical cholinergic activity participates in the acquisition of both safe and aversive memory formation, and that cortical muscarinic receptors seem to be necessary for safe but not for aversive taste memory consolidation. These results suggest that the taste memory trace is processed in the insular cortex simultaneously by at least two independent mechanisms, and that their interaction would determine the degree of aversion or preference learned to a novel taste.     

The evil eye: Eye gaze and competitiveness in social decision making

We demonstrate that a person's eye gaze and his/her competitiveness are closely intertwined in social decision making. In an exploratory examination of this relationship, Study 1 uses field data from a high‐stakes TV game show to demonstrate that the frequency by which contestants gaze at their opponent's eyes predicts their defection in a variant on the prisoner's dilemma. Studies 2 and 3 use experiments to examine the underlying causality and demonstrate that the relationship between gazing and competitive behavior is bi‐directional. In Study 2, fixation on the eyes, compared to the face, increases competitive behavior toward the target in an ultimatum game. In Study 3, we manipulate the framing of a negotiation (cooperative vs. competitive) and use an eye tracker to measure fixation number and time spent fixating on the counterpart's eyes. We find that a competitive negotiation elicits more gazing, which in turn leads to more competitive behavior.     

Epistemic Motivation and the Structure of Moral Intuition: Dispositional Need for Closure as a Predictor of Individualizing and Binding Morality

Moral foundations theory argues that morality encompasses both group‐preserving binding concerns about in‐group loyalty, authority and purity and individualizing concerns about harm avoidance and fairness. Although studies have examined the relationship between sociopolitical attitudes and the moral foundations, the relationship between individual differences in epistemic motivation—as indexed by need for cognitive closure—and moral intuition remains unexplored. Given the role of groups in providing epistemic security, we hypothesized that the need for closure would be most strongly related to support for the foundations most central to the regulation of group ties, that is, the binding foundations as opposed to the individualizing ones. Data from three samples provided evidence for this. Unpacking this pattern, we also found that those high in need for closure endorsed all foundations, whereas those low in need for closure emphasized only the individualizing ones. Finally, we found that the relationship between need for closure and the binding foundations was mediated by right‐wing authoritarianism, an orientation closely linked to a desire for the preservation of conventional in‐group morality. Copyright © 2016 European Association of Personality Psychology