Perceptual interference and facilitation with auditory imagery

It has been claimed both that (1) imagery selectivelyinterferes with perception (because images can be confused with similar stimuli) and that (2) imagery selectivelyfacilitates perception (because images recruit attention for similar stimuli). However, the evidence for these claims can be accounted for without postulating either image-caused confusions or attentional set. Interference could be caused by general and modality-specific capacity demands of imaging, and facilitation, by image-caused eye fixations. The experiment reported here simultaneously tested these two apparently conflicting claims about the effect of imagery on perception in a way that rules out these alternative explanations. Subjects participated in a two-alternative forced-choice auditory signal detection task in which the target signal was either the same frequency as an auditory image or a different frequency. The possible effects of confusion and attention were separated by varying the temporal relationship between the image and the observation intervals, since an image can only be confused with a simultaneous signal. We found selective facilitation (lower thresholds) for signals of the same frequency as the image relative to signals of a different frequency, implying attention recruitment; we found no selective interference, implying the absence of confusion. These results also imply that frequency information is represented in images in a form that can interact with perceptual representations.     

A computational model of semantic memory impairment: modality specificity and emergent category specificity.

It is demonstrated how a modality-specific semantic memory system can account for category-specific impairments after brain damage. In Experiment 1, the hypothesis that visual and functional knowledge play different roles in the representation of living things and nonliving things is tested and confirmed. A parallel distributed processing model of semantic memory in which knowledge is subdivided by modality into visual and functional components is described. In Experiment 2, the model is lesioned, and it is confirmed that damage to visual semantics primarily impairs knowledge of living things, and damage to functional semantics primarily impairs knowledge of nonliving things. In Experiment 3, it is demonstrated that the model accounts naturally for a finding that had appeared problematic for a modality-specific architecture, namely, impaired retrieval of functional knowledge about living things. Finally, in Experiment 4, it is shown how the model can account for a recent observation of impaired knowledge of living things only when knowledge is probed verbally.     

Electrophysiological evidence for a shared representational medium for visual images and visual percepts

Does mental imagery involve the activation of representations in the visual system? Systematic effects of imagery on visual signal detection performance have been used to argue that imagery and the perceptual processing of stimuli interact at some common locus of activity (Farah, 1985). However, such a result is neutral with respect to the question of whether the interaction occurs during modality-specific visual processing of the stimulus. If imagery affects stimulus processing at early, modality-specific stages of stimulus representation, this implies that the shared stimulus representations are visual, whereas if imagery affects stimulus processing only at later, amodal stages of stimulus representation, this implies that imagery involves more abstract, postvisual stimulus representations. To distinguish between these two possibilities, we repeated the earlier imagery-perception interaction experiment while recording event-related potentials (ERPs) to stimuli from 16 scalp electrodes. By observing the time course and scalp distribution of the effect of imagery on the ERP to stimuli, we can put constraints on the locus of the shared representations for imagery and perception. An effect of imagery was seen within 200 ms following stimulus presentation, at the latency of the first negative component of the visual ERP, localized at the occipital and posterior temporal regions of the scalp, that is, directly over visual cortex. This finding provides support for the claim that mental images interact with percepts in the visual system proper and hence that mental images are themselves visual representations.     

Neuroethics: the practical and the philosophical

In comparison with the ethical issues surrounding molecular genetics, there has been little public awareness of the ethical implications of neuroscience. Yet recent progress in cognitive neuroscience raises a host of ethical issues of at least comparable importance. Some are of a practical nature, concerning the applications of neurotechnology and their likely implications for individuals and society. Others are more philosophical, concerning the way we think about ourselves as persons, moral agents and spiritual beings. This article reviews key examples of each type of issue, including the relevant advances in science and technology and their accompanying social and philosophical problems.     

Socioeconomic gradients predict individual differences in neurocognitive abilities

Socioeconomic status (SES) is associated with childhood cognitive achievement. In previous research we found that this association shows neural specificity; specifically we found that groups of low and middle SES children differed disproportionately in perisylvian/language and prefrontal/executive abilities relative to other neurocognitive abilities. Here we address several new questions: To what extent does this disparity between groups reflect a gradient of SES‐related individual differences in neurocognitive development, as opposed to a more categorical difference? What other neurocognitive systems differ across individuals as a function of SES? Does linguistic ability mediate SES differences in other systems? And how do specific prefrontal/executive subsystems vary with SES? One hundred and fifty healthy, socioeconomically diverse first‐graders were administered tasks tapping language, visuospatial skills, memory, working memory, cognitive control, and reward processing. SES explained over 30% of the variance in language, and a smaller but highly significant portion of the variance in most other systems. Statistically mediating factors and possible interventional approaches are discussed.     

Computer-Based Learning: Graphical Integration of Whole and Sectional Neuroanatomy Improves Long-Term Retention

A study was conducted to test the hypothesis that instruction with graphically integrated representations of whole and sectional neuroanatomy is especially effective for learning to recognize neural structures in sectional imagery (such as magnetic resonance imaging [MRI]). Neuroanatomy was taught to two groups of participants using computer graphical models of the human brain. Both groups learned whole anatomy first with a three-dimensional model of the brain. One group then learned sectional anatomy using two-dimensional sectional representations, with the expectation that there would be transfer of learning from whole to sectional anatomy. The second group learned sectional anatomy by moving a virtual cutting plane through the three-dimensional model. In tests of long-term retention of sectional neuroanatomy, the group with graphically integrated representation recognized more neural structures that were known to be challenging to learn. This study demonstrates the use of graphical representation to facilitate a more elaborated (deeper) understanding of complex spatial relations.