The uninheritable state and the post-public sphere

In The Politics of Postsecular Religion (2008), Ananda Abeysekara contends that justice has to be predicated on the forgetting of systems of commensuration and calculation for an im-possibility – i.e., an ethical excess – that cannot be circumscribed by repeatable and calculable law. This ethical excess defines a space of politics that would similarly abandon the legacies of codified public memory. However, many of the elements that he identifies with uninheriting and active forgetting coincide with the ‘post-public’ sphere of Sri Lankan political culture, which undermines Habermasian assumptions of a rational and transparent public sphere. The structural forgetfulness that Abeysekara identifies with justice can be discerned in the artifacts and artifices of the Sri Lankan securitized state that is an unjust apparatus of extra-legal violence, moral indifference and orchestrated deniability.     

Existentialism and Humanism: Humanity—Know Thyself!

At times, an individual in modernity can feel dehumanised by work, by administration, by technology, and by political power. This experience of being dehumanised can take the individual to an existential awareness of the priority of existence over essence. But what does this existential experience mean? Are there ways in which this experience can reconnect the individual to her being human, or to her being part of humanity? Any such reconnection is further complicated by the suspicion that universal presuppositions concerning ‘humanity’ or ‘human being’ or ‘humanism’ carry pretensions of imperialist grandeur that must be challenged. How, then, might one proceed to connect existential vertigo with a culture of humanism that, while resisting such pretensions, nevertheless can find meaning for the dehumanised individual? In what follows I argue that a concept of modern metaphysics, with an aporetic (Hegelian) logic of subjective experience, can carry this reconnection of the I and the We, offering meaning not in the resolution of their opposition, but in learning that the meaning of their opposition, and the meaning of humanity, is learning, is our education. I argue that it is only within modern educational metaphysics that humanity and the individual Know Thyself.     

The Concept of Experience by John Dewey Revisited: Conceiving, Feeling and ��Enliving��

The concept of experience by John Dewey revisited: conceiving, feeling and ??enliving??. Dewey takes a few steps towards a differentiation of the concept of experience, such as the distinction between primary and secondary experience, or between ordinary (partial, raw, primitive) experience and complete, aesthetic experience. However, he does not provide a systematic elaboration of these distinctions. In the present text, a differentiation of Dewey??s concept of experience is proposed in terms of feeling, ??enliving?? (a neologism proposed in this paper) and conceiving. Feeling refers to the basic mode of experience where action, emotion, cognition and communication constitute an original unity. Enliving, aesthetic experience, constitutes the lifeworld, as a person-in-world experience. Even though enliving is holistic and relational, a certain distance emerges between action, emotion and cognition which allows contemplation and choice. Conceiving, on the other hand, refers to the isolating and abstracting understanding of the world with even greater distance between action, emotion and cognition. Such a differentiation provides a clearer understanding of the scope of education. It avoids the risks of regressive tendencies in the concept of experience, and it helps to include conceiving within the realm of experience.     

Knowing whether A or B

The paper examines the logic and semantics of knowledge attributions of the form “s knows whether A or B”. We analyze these constructions in an epistemic logic with alternative questions, and propose an account of the context-sensitivity of the corresponding sentences and of their presuppositions.     

Killing the dead: evolution of melancholic identifications underlying suicide attempts in adolescence

Psychic processes underlying suicidal behaviours during adolescence and their evolution are explored. A longitudinal study was conducted of thirty adolescent patients hospitalised following a suicide attempt. Clinical interviews were used combined with the Rorschach Test and the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) a few days after the suicide attempt and one year later. Results initially showed common forms of psychic adjustment: melancholic identifications were linked to an excessive dependence on objects. One year later, these forms of psychic adjustment changed: for many adolescents, the melancholic identifications shifted and self-image improved. The emergence of representations of murder fantasies immediately after the suicidal behaviour allowed a possible transformation of violence into symbolisation. A case study illustrates these psychic changes.     

Guilt as a Source of Narcissistic Gratification

This article takes as its starting point a paper by Hugo Bleichmar presented at the 2003 Joseph Sandler Research Conference on Depression. The author argues in favour of viewing depression in a broad perspective. The Freudian prototype of “guilty depression” represents only one of many pathways leading to depressive states. Psychoanalytic understanding of depression should represent a multidimensional approach, characterised by interacting determinants, both internal and external. In clinical practice, this would imply an attitude of greater freedom and flexibility in the analyst. The paper compares the psychoanalytic account of depression with that given by the cognitive approach. It is argued that within a diverse research field, where depression is studied from different angles—as a disorder of the brain and in terms of cognitive deficits—the contribution of psychoanalysis is that depression is most usefully studied at the level of psychological causation. The psychoanalytic understanding of depressive states in terms of unconscious interpretation and meaning of experience represents a distinct contribution. Implications of viewing depression as an “illness” are discussed.     

Little Jeremy's Struggle with Autism,Schizophrenia and Parano a

Since its formulation by Bleuler in 1911, the generalisation of the term ''autism'', mainly due to its use by Kanner in 1943 and its remake by authors of Kleinian inspiration, implies problems which mislead us, blurring our perception and understanding of clinical realities. Our psychoanalytical possibilities can be enlarged by a clear knowledge of the history of psychoanalysis, a dynamic approach to psychiatric classification and to problems related to our conception of the setting. On the basis of a case history the author shows how a child and its family worked through major autistic symptoms and proposes new approaches to some psychoanalytical concepts.     

Double trouble: restrained eaters do not eat less and feel worse

Objective: While high levels of dietary restraint do not appear to reflect actual caloric restraint, it has been found to be a risk factor for a wide array of maladaptive eating patterns. These findings raise the question what, if not caloric restriction, dietary restraint entails. We propose that the very finding that restrained eaters do not eat less than they intend to do can provide an answer. Based on this disparity between the intention to restrain oneself and actual behaviour, we therefore hypothesised that high levels of restraint are associated with eating-related guilt.

Method: Three studies (N?=?148) using unobtrusive measures of food intake; different restraint scales; and different measures of guilt tested whether restraint is related to eating-related guilt.

Results: Results indicated that restraint was not associated with food intake, but instead was associated with increased levels of guilt after eating. Guilt was explicitly related to food intake. Moreover, the observed guilt could not be attributed to a general increase in negative affect.

Conclusion: The results of these studies suggest that restraint is not an indicator of actual restricted food intake, but rather a reflection concerns about food and eating manifested in eating-related guilt.