Consistency,mechanicalness, and the logic of the mind

G. Priest's anti-consistency argument (Priest 1979, 1984, 1987) and J. R. Lucas's anti-mechanist argument (Lucas 1961, 1968, 1970, 1984) both appeal to Gödel incompleteness. By way of refuting them, this paper defends the thesis of quartet compatibility, viz., that the logic of the mind can simultaneously be Gödel incomplete, consistent, mechanical, and recursion complete (capable of all means of recursion). A representational approach is pursued, which owes its origin to works by, among others, J. Myhill (1964), P. Benacerraf (1967), J. Webb (1980, 1983) and M. Arbib (1987). It is shown that the fallacy shared by the two arguments under discussion lies in misidentifying two systems, the one for which the Gödel sentence is constructable and to be proved, and the other in which the Gödel sentence in question is indeed provable. It follows that the logic of the mind can surpass its own Gödelian limitation not by being inconsistent or non-mechanistic, but by being capable of representing stronger systems in itself; and so can a proper machine. The concepts of representational provability, representational maximality, formal system capacity, etc., are discussed.     

Do recognizable figures enjoy an advantage in binocular rivalry?

Five experiments examined whether recognizable stimuli predominate in binocular rivalry. It was found that a face predominated more than did a pattern equated for spatial frequency, luminance, and contrast; an objective reaction time procedure confirmed predominance of the face. The face was still liable to fragmentation as stimulus size increased. Observers tracked exclusive dominance of a picture of a camouflaged figure (a Dalmatian dog) prior to and then following discovery of the figure's presence; control observers received the same protocol with a scrambled version of the dog stimulus. Compared with control results, predominance of the dog picture was higher even before observers knew of the camouflaged figure. Inversion of the dog figure reduced its predominance. Binocular rivalry is sensitive to object-related, configural properties of a stimulus.     

4-5年级学生的空间表征与几何能力的相关性研究

本研究是“学生空间能力和几何能力关系”研究的一部分,以小学4、5年级学生为被试(共117人),以空问表征能力测验和几何能力测验为测验工具,初步探讨了学生空间表征与几何能力的关系。对数据结果的分析表明:①就总成绩而言,五年级学生的空间表在成绩明显高于四年级学生的成绩,但并不是空间表征的所有方面都存在着显著的年级差异;②就空间测验的总成绩而言,无论是四、五年级分别考察还是总起来考察,空间成绩与几何成绩之间的相关显著,但就各个分项而言,并不是空间测验的各项都与几何测验成绩有显著相关;学生的几何成绩在一定程度上可通过回归方程:Y_i=0.5736X_i+0.7635加以预测。     

A multi-relation approach of general systems and tests of applications

In this paper, under the assumption that ZFC axiom system is consistent, the following are proved: (a) there is no system whose object set consists of all systems; (b) any system is not an object of itself; (c) any system is constructed with basic elements (elements which are not systems). Based on these results, the following problems in epistemology are discussed: the feasibility of the definition of the theory so-called science of science; the existence of basic particles in the world; and the existence of absolute truths.This paper was partially supported by Auburn University, presented atThe 20th Annual Spring Topology Conference, entitled The ZFC Axiom System and Problems in Epistemology.     

人对红绿光栅的颜色视觉对比感受性

实验使用电子计算机控制彩色图象显示器的屏幕来呈现视觉目标彩色光栅,以对人的颜色视觉进行对比感受性的测定。被试可以通过终端键盘改变光栅的各种变量并进行反应,计算机对结果进行记录和处理。实验Ⅰ是对比感受性作为红-绿光栅和绿色单色光栅的空间频率的函数的测定。结果表明,在所有空间频率上,被试对绿色光栅的对比感受性都比对红-绿光栅要高。但随着空间频率的升高,对两种光栅的对比感受性也相应升高,并都在中间空间频率带达到高峰值。实验Ⅱ是对颜色视觉对比感受性作为红-绿亮度比率的函数的测定。结果表明,空间频率和红色在光栅中的比率对对比感受性都有重要的影响。本实验结果具有明显的实际应用价值。     

Correlates of Children's Usage of Videogames and Computers1

Fourth-, fifth-, and sixth-grade students responded to a questionnaire concerning their experiences with electronic videogames and computers. Teacher ratings of academic achievement, personality characteristics, and behavior patterns were also obtained for each student. These data were used to examine a number of hypotheses concerning potential harmful or beneficial effects of electronic videogames on school-age children, and to provide preliminary evidence concerning the correlates of computer usage by school-age children. Videogame usage showed significant positive correlations with teacher ratings of impulsivity, significant negative correlations with ratings of academic achievement, and little relationship to rated sociability. Videogame use also proved positively related to other social activities and to microcomputer use.     

A critique of Dennett

This essay is intended to be a systematic exposition and critique of Daniel Dennett's general views. It is divided into three main sections. In section 1 we raise the question of the nature of a plausible scientific psychology, and suggest that the question of whether folk psychology will serve as an adequate scientific psychology is of special relevance in a discussion of Dennett. We then characterize folk psychology briefly. We suggest that Dennett's views have undergone at least one major change, and proceed to discuss both his earlier and his later views.In section 2 we suggest that Dennett is correctly perceived as an instrumentalist in his earlier works. We think that Dennett later abandons this position because of general worries about instrumentalism and, more importantly, because Dennett became convinced that an instrumentalist conception of folk psychology will not enable us to vindicate the notions of personhood, moral agency, and responsibility. This left Dennett with a dilemma. On the one hand, he does not think that beliefs, etc., will turn out to be genuine scientific posits. On the other hand, he thinks that moral agency would be impossible if we could not treat beliefs, etc. as causally efficacious in some suitable sense.In section 3 we discuss Dennett's resolution of this dilemma. The key to his current view, we suggest, is the illata-abstracta distinction. Dennett holds that both illata and abstracta are real and have causal powers, even though only illata are genuine scientific posits. He suggests that beliefs etc. are abstracta, and are the subject matter of what he calls intentional system theory. The subject matter of another theory, what Dennett calls subpersonal cognitive psychology, are illata, which are subpersonal intentional states. The important point is that this distinction lets Dennett have it both ways: (i) Since beliefs are mere abstracta, we need not commit ourselves to the thesis that beliefs will turn out to be posits of an adequate scientific psychology. (ii) Since beliefs have causal power, we are assured of moral and rational agency. We shall argue that Dennett's current view is untenable. If we are right in our arguments, then Dennett's program to produce a scientifically plausible psychology, one that will turn out to vindicate folk psychology (in some suitable sense), is a failure. It fails in the following important ways: (i) What Dennett sketches — intentional system theory cum subpersonal cognitive psychology — is not a plausible scientific psychology. (ii) As a consequence, Dennett also fails to provide a satisfactory foundation for moral and rational agency.