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321.
Jochen Apel 《Synthese》2011,182(1):23-38
In this paper I offer an appraisal of James Bogen and James Woodward’s distinction between data and phenomena which pursues
two objectives. First, I aim to clarify the notion of a scientific phenomenon. Such a clarification is required because despite
its intuitive plausibility it is not exactly clear how Bogen and Woodward’s distinction has to be understood. I reject one
common interpretation of the distinction, endorsed for example by James McAllister and Bruce Glymour, which identifies phenomena
with patterns in data sets. Furthermore, I point out that other interpretations of Bogen and Woodward’s distinction do not
specify the relationship between phenomena and theories in a satisfying manner. In order to avoid this problem I propose a
contextual understanding of scientific phenomena according to which phenomena are states of affairs which play specific roles
in scientific practice and to which we adopt a special epistemic attitude. Second, I evaluate the epistemological significance
of Bogen and Woodward’s distinction with respect to the debate between scientific realists and constructive empiricists. Contrary
to what Bogen and Woodward claim, I argue that the distinction does not provide a convincing argument against constructive
empiricism. 相似文献
322.
Benjamin C. Jantzen 《Synthese》2011,181(3):433-450
In a naïve realist approach to reading an ontology off the models of a physical theory, the invariance of a given theory under permutations of its property-bearing objects entails the existence of distinct possible worlds from amongst which the theory cannot choose. A brand of Ontic Structural Realism (OSR) attempts to avoid this consequence by denying that objects possess primitive identity, and thus worlds with property values permuted amongst those objects are really one and the same world. Assuming that any successful ontology of objects is able to describe a universe containing a determinate number of them, I argue that no version of OSR which both retains objects and understands ‘structure’ in terms of relations can be successful. This follows from the fact that no set of relational facts is sufficient to fix the cardinality of the collection of objects implied by those facts. More broadly, I offer reasons to believe that no version of OSR is compatible with the existence of objects, no matter how ontologically derivative they are taken to be. Any such account would have to attribute a definite cardinality to a collection of objects while denying that those objects are possessed of a primitive identity. With no compelling reason to abandon the classical conception of cardinality, such an attribution is incoherent. 相似文献
323.
James F. Woodward 《Synthese》2011,182(1):165-179
This paper provides a restatement and defense of the data/ phenomena distinction introduced by Jim Bogen and me several decades
ago (e.g., Bogen and Woodward, The Philosophical Review, 303–352, 1988). Additional motivation for the distinction is introduced,
ideas surrounding the distinction are clarified, and an attempt is made to respond to several criticisms. 相似文献
324.
We describe an ontology of philosophy that is designed to aid navigation through philosophical literature, including literature
in the form of encyclopedia articles and textbooks and in both printed and digital forms. The ontology is designed also to
serve integration and structuring of data pertaining to the philosophical literature, and in the long term also to support
reasoning about the provenance and contents of such literature, by providing a representation of the philosophical domain
that is oriented around what philosophical literature is about. 相似文献
325.
Jaakko Hintikka 《Synthese》2011,183(1):69-85
The modern notion of the axiomatic method developed as a part of the conceptualization of mathematics starting in the nineteenth
century. The basic idea of the method is the capture of a class of structures as the models of an axiomatic system. The mathematical
study of such classes of structures is not exhausted by the derivation of theorems from the axioms but includes normally the
metatheory of the axiom system. This conception of axiomatization satisfies the crucial requirement that the derivation of
theorems from axioms does not produce new information in the usual sense of the term called depth information. It can produce
new information in a different sense of information called surface information. It is argued in this paper that the derivation
should be based on a model-theoretical relation of logical consequence rather than derivability by means of mechanical (recursive)
rules. Likewise completeness must be understood by reference to a model-theoretical consequence relation. A correctly understood
notion of axiomatization does not apply to purely logical theories. In the latter the only relevant kind of axiomatization
amounts to recursive enumeration of logical truths. First-order “axiomatic” set theories are not genuine axiomatizations.
The main reason is that their models are structures of particulars, not of sets. Axiomatization cannot usually be motivated
epistemologically, but it is related to the idea of explanation. 相似文献
326.
The distinction between data and phenomena introduced by Bogen and Woodward (Philosophical Review 97(3):303–352, 1988) was
meant to help accounting for scientific practice, especially in relation with scientific theory testing. Their article and
the subsequent discussion is primarily viewed as internal to philosophy of science. We shall argue that the data/phenomena
distinction can be used much more broadly in modelling processes in philosophy. 相似文献
327.
Over the past 20 years or so, a small but growing literature has emerged with the aim of modeling agents who are unaware of certain things. In this paper we compare two different approaches to modeling unawareness: the object-based approach of Board and Chung (Object-based unawareness: theory and applications. University of Minnesota, Mimeo, 2008) and the subjective-state-space approach of Heifetz et al. (J Econ Theory 130:78–94, 2006). In particular, we show that subjective-state-space models (henceforth HMS structures) can be embedded within object-based models (henceforth OBU structures), demonstrating that the latter are at least as expressive. As long as certain restrictions are imposed on the form of the OBU structure, the embedding can also go the other way. A generalization of HMS structures (relaxing the partitional properties of knowledge) gives us a full converse. 相似文献
328.
Information protocols (IP’s) were developed to describe players who learn their social situation by their experiences. Although IP’s look similar to colored multi-graphs (MG’s), the two objects are constructed in fundamentally different ways. IP’s are constructed using the global concept of history, whereas graphs are constructed using the local concept of edges. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for each theory to be captured by the other. We find that the necessary and sufficient condition for IP theory to be captured by MG theory, which we call SE, excludes relevant game situations. Hence, we conclude that IP theory remains a vital tool and cannot be replaced by MG theory. 相似文献
329.
Charlie Pelling 《Synthese》2011,178(3):437-459
According to the epistemic theory of hallucination, the fundamental psychological nature of a hallucinatory experience is constituted by its being ‘introspectively indiscriminable’, in some sense, from a veridical experience of a corresponding type. How is the notion of introspective indiscriminability to which the epistemic theory appeals best construed? Following M. G. F. Martin, the standard assumption is that the notion should be construed in terms of negative epistemics: in particular, it is assumed that the notion should be explained in terms of the impossibility that a hallucinator might possess a certain type of knowledge on a certain basis. I argue that the standard assumption is mistaken. I argue that the relevant notion of introspective indiscriminability is better construed in terms of positive epistemics: in particular, I argue that the notion is better explained by reference to the fact that it would be rational for a hallucinator positively to make a certain type of judgement, were that judgement made on a certain basis. 相似文献
330.
Quantum logic as a dynamic logic 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We address the old question whether a logical understanding of Quantum Mechanics requires abandoning some of the principles
of classical logic. Against Putnam and others (Among whom we may count or not E. W. Beth, depending on how we interpret some
of his statements), our answer is a clear “no”. Philosophically, our argument is based on combining a formal semantic approach, in the spirit of E. W. Beth’s proposal of applying Tarski’s semantical methods to the analysis of physical theories,
with an empirical–experimental approach to Logic, as advocated by both Beth and Putnam, but understood by us in the view of the operational- realistic tradition of Jauch and Piron, i.e. as an investigation of “the logic of yes–no experiments” (or “questions”). Technically, we use the
recently-developed setting of Quantum Dynamic Logic (Baltag and Smets 2005, 2008) to make explicit the operational meaning of quantum-mechanical concepts in our formal semantics. Based on our recent results
(Baltag and Smets 2005), we show that the correct interpretation of quantum-logical connectives is dynamical, rather than purely propositional. We conclude that there is no contradiction between classical logic and (our dynamic reinterpretation
of) quantum logic. Moreover, we argue that the Dynamic-Logical perspective leads to a better and deeper understanding of the
“non-classicality” of quantum behavior than any perspective based on static Propositional Logic. 相似文献