An application of the prototype willingness model to drivers' speeding behaviour

We tested the prototype willingness model (PWM). The participants (N = 198) completed online questionnaire measures of PWM constructs (Time 1) and subsequent speeding behaviour (Time 2). Path analyses showed that the PWM accounted for 89% of the variance in subsequent (self‐reported) speeding behaviour. This significantly exceeded the variance accounted for by the theory of planned behaviour. In line with the PWM, both behavioural intention and behavioural willingness had direct effects on behaviour. Behavioural willingness had a significantly larger effect. Attitude and subjective norm both had indirect effects on behaviour through both behavioural intention and behavioural willingness. Prototype (similarity) perceptions had indirect effects on behaviour through behavioural willingness only. The findings support the notion that driving is governed by reactive decision‐making (willingness), underpinned by prototype perceptions, attitudes and subjective norms, to a greater extent than it is deliberative decision‐making (intentions), underpinned by attitudes and subjective norms. The implications for safety interventions are discussed.     

Motivations for emotional expression and emotion regulation strategies in Chinese school-aged children

Motivation and Emotion - This mixed-methods study investigated cognitive appraisal, emotional experience, motivations for showing and hiding emotions, and strategies for emotional regulation in...     

Recognition of posed and genuine facial expressions of emotion in paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenia

Most previous research reporting emotion-recognition deficits in schizophrenia has used posed facial expressions of emotion and chronic-schizophrenia patients. In contrast, the present research examined the ability of patients with acute paranoid and nonparanoid (disorganized) schizophrenia to recognize genuine as well as posed facial expressions of emotion. Evidence of an emotion-recognition deficit in schizophrenia was replicated, but only when posed facial expressions were used. For genuine expressions of emotion, the paranoid-schizophrenia group was more accurate than controls, nonparanoid-schizophrenia patients, and depressed patients. Future research clearly needs to consider the posed versus genuine nature of the emotional stimuli used and the type of schizophrenia patients examined.     

Compound fracture: the role of semantic transparency and morphological headedness

This paper explores the role of semantic transparency in the representation and processing of English compounds. We focus on the question of whether semantic transparency is best viewed as a property of the entire multimorphemic string or as a property of constituent morphemes. Accordingly, we investigated the processing of English compound nouns that were categorized in terms of the semantic transparency of each of their constituents. Fully transparent such as bedroom are those in which the meanings of each of the constituents are transparently represented in the meaning of the compound as a whole. These compounds were contrasted with compounds such as strawberry, in which only the second constituent is semantically transparent, jailbird, in which only the first constituent is transparent, and hogwash, in which neither constituent is semantically transparent. We propose that significant insights can be achieved through such analysis of the transparency of individual morphemes. The two experiments that we report present evidence that both semantically transparent compounds and semantically opaque compounds show morphological constituency. The semantic transparency of the morphological head (the second constituent in a morphologically right-headed language such as English) was found to play a significant role in overall lexical decision latencies, in patterns of decomposition, and in the effects of stimulus repetition within the experiment.     

Contrasting role morality and professional morality: implications for practice

Abstract The notion of role morality suggests individuals may adopt a different morality depending on the roles they undertake. Investigating role morality is important, since the mentality of role morality may allow agents to believe they can abdicate moral responsibility when acting in a role. This is particularly significant in the literature dealing with professional morality where professionals, because of their special status, may find themselves at odds with their best moral judgments. Here I tell four stories and draw out some distinctions. I conclude that role morality is a genuine and useful distinction. However, I suggest that the purported distinction between role morality and professional morality is over-determined. Therefore, alleged conflicts between the demands of role and profession (such as the different pressures on Pinto designers as employees and as engineers) are not conflicts between different kinds of demands, but rather conflicts arising from divergent roles that most workers will encounter regularly. Another analytical perspective is to look at moral choices at work in terms of power and the ability to bring about change. Finally, I draw the implication that we should stress moral awareness at a fairly abstract level for all employees and reinforce the moral primacy of individual choice.     

Priming guesses on a forced-recall test

The forced-recall paradigm requires participants to fill all spaces on the memory test even if they cannot remember all the list words. In the present study, the authors used that paradigm to examine the influence of implicit memory on guessing--when participants fill remaining spaces after they cannot remember list items. They measured explicit memory as the percentage of targets that participants designated as remembered from the list and implicit memory as the percentage of targets they wrote but did not designate as remembered (beyond chance level). The authors examined implicit memory on guessing with forced recall (Experiment 1), forced cued recall with younger and older adults (Experiment 2), and forced free and cued recall under a depth-of-processing manipulation (Experiment 3). They conclude that implicit memory influences guesses of targets in the forced-recall paradigm.