First Year Post-Katrina: Changes in Occupational Performance and Emotional Responses

The purpose of this retrospective study was to determine whether Hurricane Katrina affected the occupational performance and emotional states of New Orleans area residents affected by the hurricane over the first year post-Katrina. A purposeful sample of 143 adults who lived in the New Orleans area just prior to Katrina completed a questionnaire one year after Katrina. Participants were asked to rate their satisfaction with their occupational performance and emotional states at four time periods: August 2005, before Katrina; September 2005, one month after Katrina; March 2006, six months post-Katrina; and September 2006, one year post-Katrina. The most notable findings were that both satisfaction with occupational performance and emotional states showed marked declines during the month immediately following Katrina, with some recovery six months post-Katrina, and further recovery a year after Katrina. At one year post-Katrina however, the recovery of satisfaction with occupational performance and emotional states approached, but did not quite reach pre-Katrina baseline responses. Further, women did not fare as well as men post-Katrina, on both variables. Limitations of the study, implications of findings for the theory and practice of occupational therapy in the area of disaster responses, and possible future research are discussed.     

The neural correlates of reward-related trial-and-error learning: an fMRI study with a probabilistic learning task

This fMRI study investigated the neural correlates of reward-related trial-and-error learning in association with changing degrees of stimulus-outcome predictabilities. We found that decreasing predictability was associated with increasing activation in a frontoparietal network. Only maximum predictability was associated with signal decreases across the learning process. The receipt of monetary reward revealed activation in the striatum and associated frontoparietal regions. Present data indicate that during reward-related learning, high uncertainty forces areas relevant for cognitive control to remain activated. In contrast, learning on the basis of predictable stimulus-outcome associations enables the brain to reduce resources in association with the processes of prediction.     

Caffeine cravings impair memory and metacognition

Cravings for food and other substances can impair cognition. We extended previous research by testing the effects of caffeine cravings on cued-recall and recognition memory tasks, and on the accuracy of judgements of learning (JOLs; predicted future recall) and feeling-of-knowing (FOK; predicted future recognition for items that cannot be recalled). Participants (N?=?55) studied word pairs (POND-BOOK) and completed a cued-recall test and a recognition test. Participants made JOLs prior to the cued-recall test and FOK judgements prior to the recognition test. Participants were randomly allocated to a craving or control condition; we manipulated caffeine cravings via a combination of abstinence, cue exposure, and imagery. Cravings impaired memory performance on the cued-recall and recognition tasks. Cravings also impaired resolution (the ability to distinguish items that would be remembered from those that would not) for FOK judgements but not JOLs, and reduced calibration (correspondence between predicted and actual accuracy) for JOLs but not FOK judgements. Additional analysis of the cued-recall data suggested that cravings also reduced participants’ ability to monitor the likely accuracy of answers during the cued-recall test. These findings add to prior research demonstrating that memory strength manipulations have systematically different effects on different types of metacognitive judgements.     

Deceived and distorted: game outcome retrospectively determines the reported time of action

Previous work suggested the association between intentionality and the reported time of action was exclusive, with intentionality as the primary facilitator to the mental time compression between the reported time of action and its effect (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). In three experiments, we examined whether mental time compression could also be observed in an unintended action. Participants performed an externally cued key press task that elicited one of two possible tones. The reported time of action shifted closer to the tone when the tone was used to indicate the winner of a race (Exp.2) compared to when the tone was meaningless and did not indicate winning (Exp.1). This suggests that reported time of an unintended action could shift toward the effect in some contexts. Furthermore, the results from Exp.2 and Exp.3 (tones were substituted with verbal feedback) showed that a presumed winning action was judged to occur earlier whereas a presumed losing action was judged to be later. These findings therefore support the view that the reported time of action is reconstructed from known temporal information rather than determined by intentionality.     

The Cost of Consequentialization

Consequentializers suggest that for all non‐consequentialist moral theories, one can come up with a consequentialist counterpart that generates exactly the same deontic output as the original theory. Thus, all moral theories can be “consequentialized.” This paper argues that this procedure, though technically feasible, deprives consequentialism of its potential for normative justification. By allowing purported counterexamples to any given consequentialist moral theory to be accommodated within that theory’s account of value, consequentializers achieve a hollow victory. The resulting deontically equivalent consequentalist counterpart that results from absorbing originally non‐consequentialist moral intuitions can now no longer explain, in a theoretically illuminating way, why certain actions are wrong and others right. The paper explains why traditional consequentialist theories did not embrace the procedure, and sketches how consequentialism can consequentialize without incurring the same cost.     

Forgiveness and the Holocaust

This paper considers whether we have any reason to forgive the perpetrators of the most terrible atrocities, such as the Holocaust. On the face of it, we do not have reason to forgive in such cases. But on examination, the principal arguments against forgiveness do not turn out to be persuasive. Two considerations in favour of forgiveness are canvassed: the presence of rational agency in the perpetrators, and the common human nature which they share with us. It is argued that the presence of rational agency does not generate a reason to forgive. However, our common human nature may be sufficient to provide such a reason, and evidence for its general reason-giving power can be seen in phenomena such as vicarious shame, and the moral significance which we attach to the notion of crimes against humanity. A reason for forgiveness based on common human nature will not be a strong one, but a weak reason still has some force.     

How language acquisition builds on cognitive development

When children acquire a first language, they build on what they know--conceptual information that discriminates and helps create categories for the objects, relations and events they experience. This provides the starting point for language from the age of 12 months on. So children first set up conceptual representations, then add linguistic representations for talking about experience. Do they then discard earlier conceptual representations in favour of linguistic ones, or do they retain them? Recent research on the coping strategies that young children (and adults) rely on when they are unable to draw on language suggest that they retain both types of representations for use as needed.     

Converted patients and clinic patients as control cases: a comparison with implications for psychoanalytic training

All twenty-eight respondents to a recent poll of the thirty institutes affiliated with the American Psychoanalytic Association reported that they now accept cases converted from psychotherapy to psychoanalysis as control cases. This study was designed to compare converted cases to clinic cases systematically with respect to patient characteristics, treatment, and the educational experience of the treating candidate. The study followed twenty-four candidates entering analytic training between 1992 and 1995, who treated thirty-four clinic cases and forty-three converted cases between February 1993 and July 2000. Clinic and converted patients were comparable with regard to demographics, prior treatment histories, structural diagnoses, and Axis I diagnoses. In addition, the two groups of cases were indistinguishable with respect to the rate at which candidates received credit toward graduation requirements. Candidates treating converted cases earned approximately dollars 7,600 per patient per year, compared to candidates treating clinic cases, who earned nothing. Eighty-four percent of converted patients diagnosed with a mood disorder by the treating candidate were on medication, in contrast to only 20% of clinic patients with the same diagnosis. Similar differences were seen in the case of anxiety disorders. Given the prevalence of affective and anxiety disorders in control cases and the availability of a variety of medications and psychotherapies with documented efficacy in treating these disorders, candidates should be trained to discuss treatment options with patients who present with Axis I disorders.