How similar are recognition memory and inductive reasoning?

Conventionally, memory and reasoning are seen as different types of cognitive activities driven by different processes. In two experiments, we challenged this view by examining the relationship between recognition memory and inductive reasoning involving multiple forms of similarity. A common study set (members of a conjunctive category) was followed by a test set containing old and new category members, as well as items that matched the study set on only one dimension. The study and test sets were presented under recognition or induction instructions. In Experiments 1 and 2, the inductive property being generalized was varied in order to direct attention to different dimensions of similarity. When there was no time pressure on decisions, patterns of positive responding were strongly affected by property type, indicating that different types of similarity were driving recognition and induction. By comparison, speeded judgments showed weaker property effects and could be explained by generalization based on overall similarity. An exemplar model, GEN-EX (GENeralization from EXamples), could account for both the induction and recognition data. These findings show that induction and recognition share core component processes, even when the tasks involve flexible forms of similarity.     

Context specificity of inhibitory control in dogs

Across three experiments, we explored whether a dog’s capacity for inhibitory control is stable or variable across decision-making contexts. In the social task, dogs were first exposed to the reputations of a stingy experimenter that never shared food and a generous experimenter who always shared food. In subsequent test trials, dogs were required to avoid approaching the stingy experimenter when this individual offered (but withheld) a higher-value reward than the generous experimenter did. In the A-not-B task, dogs were required to inhibit searching for food in a previously rewarded location after witnessing the food being moved from this location to a novel hiding place. In the cylinder task, dogs were required to resist approaching visible food directly (because it was behind a transparent barrier), in favor of a detour reaching response. Overall, dogs exhibited inhibitory control in all three tasks. However, individual scores were not correlated between tasks, suggesting that context has a large effect on dogs’ behavior. This result mirrors studies of humans, which have highlighted intra-individual variation in inhibitory control as a function of the decision-making context. Lastly, we observed a correlation between a subject’s age and performance on the cylinder task, corroborating previous observations of age-related decline in dogs’ executive function.     

The Influence of Anticipatory Processing on Attentional Biases in Social Anxiety

Research on cognitive theories of social anxiety disorder (SAD) has identified individual processes that influence this condition (e.g., cognitive biases, repetitive negative thinking), but few studies have attempted to examine the interaction between these processes. For example, attentional biases and anticipatory processing are theoretically related and have been found to influence symptoms of SAD, but they rarely have been studied together (i.e., Clark & Wells, 1995). Therefore, the goal of the current study was to examine the effect of anticipatory processing on attentional bias for internal (i.e., heart rate feedback) and external (i.e., emotional faces) threat information. A sample of 59 participants high (HSA) and low (LSA) in social anxiety symptoms engaged in a modified dot-probe task prior to (Time 1) and after (Time 2) an anticipatory processing or distraction task. HSAs who anticipated experienced an increase in attentional bias for internal information from Time 1 to Time 2, whereas HSAs in the distraction condition and LSAs in either condition experienced no changes. No changes in biases were found for HSAs for external biases, but LSAs who engaged in the distraction task became less avoidant of emotional faces from Time 1 to Time 2. This suggests that anticipatory processing results in an activation of attentional biases for physiological information as suggested by Clark and Wells.     

The Dispositional Flow Scale–2 as a Measure of Autotelic Personality: An Examination of Criterion-Related Validity

The Dispositional Flow Scale–2 (DFS–2; Jackson & Eklund, 2002) may be one of the most promising measures for assessing Csikszentmihalyi's (1990) construct of “autotelic personality.” Despite strong internal validity, external validity of the DFS–2 remains open. We used 2 methods to provide evidence for external validity: (1) multiple-time assessments of experience sampling (1,856 entries generated over 7 days) to derive aggregate indices of criterion validity; and (2) single-time assessments of flow and personality for additional criterion-related validity. For single-time assessments of flow, we used a modified version of the Flow Questionnaire (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1984). To assess personality, we included a measure of the Five-factor traits using the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992). A path model of NEO domains, DFS–2 global scores, and experience sampling aggregates fit the data well.