Relations among categorization, induction, recognition, and similarity: comment on Sloutsky and Fisher (2004)

V. M. Sloutsky and A. V. Fisher reported 5 experiments documenting relations among categorization, induction, recognition, and similarity in children as well as adults and proposed a new model of induction, SINC (similarity, induction, categorization). Those authors concluded that induction depends on perceptual similarity rather than conceptual knowledge. Despite the useful contributions of this work, there are some important limitations. The experimental designs examined a limited range of phenomena that are not the most revealing about the use of nonperceptual information. The main results involved a simple triad task, for which the SINC model's predictions are equivalent to the predictions of previous models of inductive reasoning. It is also unclear whether the SINC model can account for the observed relations between similarity and recognition. Implications for future work on induction and related cognitive activities are discussed.     

Relations between premise similarity and inductive strength

According to the diversity principle, diverse evidence is strong evidence. There has been considerable evidence that people respect this principle in inductive reasoning. However, exceptions may be particularly informative. Medin, Coley, Storms, and Hayes (2003) introduced a relevance theory of inductive reasoning and used this theory to predict exceptions, including the nondiversity-by-propertyreinforcement effect. A new experiment in which this phenomenon was investigated is reported here. Subjects made inductive strength judgments and similarity judgments for stimuli from Medin et al. (2003). The inductive strength judgments showed the same pattern as that in Medin et al. (2003); however, the similarity judgments suggested that the pattern should be interpreted as a diversity effect, rather than as a nondiversity effect. It is concluded that the evidence regarding the predicted nondiversity-byproperty-reinforcement effect does not give distinctive support for relevance theory, although this theory does address other results.     

A dissociation between causal judgement and the ease with which a cause is categorized with its effect

The associative view of human causal learning argues that causation is attributed to the extent that the putative cause activates, via an association, a mental representation of the effect. That is, causal learning is a human analogue of animal conditioning. We tested this associative theory using a task in which a fictitious character suffered from two allergic reactions, rash (O₁) and headache (O₂). In a conditioned inhibition design with each of these two outcomes (A-O₁/AX- and B-O₂/BY-), participants were trained that one herbal remedy (X) prevented O₁ and that the other (Y) prevented O₂. These inhibitory properties were revealed in a causal judgement summation test. In a subsequent categorization task, X was most easily categorized with O_1, and Y with O₂. Thus, the categorization data indicated an excitatory X-O₁ and Y-O₂ association, the reverse of the inhibitory relationship observed on the causal judgement measure. A second experiment showed that this pattern of excitation and inhibition is dependent on intermixed A-O₁ and AX- trials. These results are problematic for the standard application of associative activation theories to causal judgement. We argue instead that the inhibition revealed in the causal judgement task reflects inferential reasoning, which relies, in part, on the ability of the cue in question to excite a representation of the outcome, as revealed in the categorization test.     

Shallow processing of ambiguous pronouns: evidence for delay

Two self-paced reading-time experiments examined how ambiguous pronouns are interpreted under conditions that encourage shallow processing. In Experiment 1 we show that sentences containing ambiguous pronouns are processed at the same speed as those containing unambiguous pronouns under shallow processing, but more slowly under deep processing. We outline three possible models to account for the shallow processing of ambiguous pronouns. Two involve an initial commitment followed by possible revision, and the other involves a delay in interpretation. In Experiment 2 we provide evidence that supports the delayed model of ambiguous pronoun resolution under shallow processing. We found no evidence to support a processing system that makes an initial commitment to an interpretation of the pronoun when it is encountered. We extend the account of pronoun resolution proposed by Rigalleau, Caplan, and Baudiffier (2004) to include the treatment of ambiguous pronouns under shallow processing.     

English-speaking children's comprehension of relative clauses: evidence for general-cognitive and language-specific constraints on development

Children must possess some ability to process input in a meaningful manner to acquire language. The present study reports on data from an experiment investigating 3- to 5-year-old English-speaking children's understanding of restrictive relative clauses manipulated for embeddedness and focus. The results of the study showed that English-speaking children acquire right-branching before center-embedded structures. Comparisons made with data from Portuguese-speaking children suggest general-cognitive and language-specific constraints on development, and with respect to English, a clause expansion approach to processing in development.