Farewell to the luck (and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Mind</Emphasis>) argument

In this paper I seek to defend libertarianism about free will and moral responsibility against two well-known arguments: the luck argument and the Mind argument. Both of these arguments purport to show that indeterminism is incompatible with the degree of control necessary for free will and moral responsibility. I begin the discussion by elaborating these arguments, clarifying important features of my preferred version of libertarianism—features that will be central to an adequate response to the arguments—and showing why a strategy of reconciliation (often referred to as “deliberative libertarianism”) will not work. I then consider four formulations of the luck argument and find them all wanting. This discussion will place us in a favorable position to understand why the Mind argument also fails.     

Fruitful plans: adding targeted mental imagery to implementation intentions increases fruit consumption

Forming implementation intentions ('If I encounter situation X, then I will perform behaviour Y!') increases the probability of carrying out goals. This study tested the hypothesis that mental imagery targeting key elements of implementation intentions further increases goal achievement. The residents of a student residence were assigned the goal of consuming extra portions of fruit every day for 7 days and randomly assigned to one of four conditions: control (active rehearsal), implementation intentions, goal intention mental imagery or mental imagery targeted to the implementation intentions. Among low fruit consumers, but not high fruit consumers, fruit consumption at follow-up was higher in the targeted mental imagery group than in the other group, with the lowest fruit consumption in the control group. The findings suggest that it may be beneficial to use targeted mental imagery when forming implementation intentions.     

Don't You Know Me Well Enough Yet? Comparing Reactions of Internal and External Candidates to Employment Testing

Employment tests, once primarily focused on screening external applicants, are increasingly used for decisions involving internal candidates (e.g., promotions or lateral transfers). The current study examines differences between internal and external candidates in reactions to an online selection test. Results indicate that internal candidates perceived a general lack of advance information regarding the assessment. However, they were considerably more likely to recommend the organization to others as compared with external candidates. Candidate status also moderated several reactions–outcomes relationships. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for organizations and directions for future research on internal candidate reactions are proposed.     

Variance-sensitive choice in lemurs: constancy trumps quantity

Numerous studies have demonstrated that animals’ tolerance for risk when foraging can be affected by changes in metabolic state. Specifically, animals on a negative energy budget increase their preferences for risk, while animals on a positive energy budget are typically risk-averse. The malleability of these preferences may be evolutionarily advantageous, and important for maximizing chances of survival during brief periods of energetic stress. However, animals adapted to living in unpredictable conditions are unlikely to benefit from risk-seeking strategies, and instead are expected to reduce energetic demands while maintaining risk-aversion. We measured risk preferences in lemurs, a group of primates restricted to the island of Madagascar. Lemurs have evolved diverse anatomical and behavioral traits for survival in a harsh and unpredictable ecology, and these traits have been explained as forms of anatomical and behavioral risk reduction. We therefore predicted that lemurs would also be risk-averse in a behavioral task that offered subjects a choice between a small certain reward, and an uncertain but potentially large reward. In Experiment 1, the average rewards associated with the constant and variable options were equal and lemurs exhibited high levels of risk-aversion, replicating a phenomenon that has been demonstrated in dozens of taxa. In Experiment 2, we gradually increased the average value of the variable option relative to the constant option. Lemurs’ preferences tracked these changes and subjects became more risk-seeking as the risk premium increased. However, many subjects maintained high levels of risk-aversion even when the average payout of the variable option yielded double that of the constant option. These results are consistent with the notion that lemur cognition has evolved to minimize risk in an unpredictable island environment.     

Context specificity of inhibitory control in dogs

Across three experiments, we explored whether a dog’s capacity for inhibitory control is stable or variable across decision-making contexts. In the social task, dogs were first exposed to the reputations of a stingy experimenter that never shared food and a generous experimenter who always shared food. In subsequent test trials, dogs were required to avoid approaching the stingy experimenter when this individual offered (but withheld) a higher-value reward than the generous experimenter did. In the A-not-B task, dogs were required to inhibit searching for food in a previously rewarded location after witnessing the food being moved from this location to a novel hiding place. In the cylinder task, dogs were required to resist approaching visible food directly (because it was behind a transparent barrier), in favor of a detour reaching response. Overall, dogs exhibited inhibitory control in all three tasks. However, individual scores were not correlated between tasks, suggesting that context has a large effect on dogs’ behavior. This result mirrors studies of humans, which have highlighted intra-individual variation in inhibitory control as a function of the decision-making context. Lastly, we observed a correlation between a subject’s age and performance on the cylinder task, corroborating previous observations of age-related decline in dogs’ executive function.     

The Dispositional Flow Scale–2 as a Measure of Autotelic Personality: An Examination of Criterion-Related Validity

The Dispositional Flow Scale–2 (DFS–2; Jackson & Eklund, 2002) may be one of the most promising measures for assessing Csikszentmihalyi's (1990) construct of “autotelic personality.” Despite strong internal validity, external validity of the DFS–2 remains open. We used 2 methods to provide evidence for external validity: (1) multiple-time assessments of experience sampling (1,856 entries generated over 7 days) to derive aggregate indices of criterion validity; and (2) single-time assessments of flow and personality for additional criterion-related validity. For single-time assessments of flow, we used a modified version of the Flow Questionnaire (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1984). To assess personality, we included a measure of the Five-factor traits using the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992). A path model of NEO domains, DFS–2 global scores, and experience sampling aggregates fit the data well.     

Who self-initiates gratitude interventions in daily life? An examination of intentions,curiosity, depressive symptoms,and life satisfaction

Despite a variety of interventions to increase well-being, little is known about who is interested in and initiates exercises on their own. We explored individual differences that predict who is most likely to participate in a voluntary gratitude intervention. College students (n = 226) completed measures of curiosity, depressive symptoms, life satisfaction, and intentions to change their lifestyle. Afterwards, participants received a personalized invitation to take part in a web-based intervention to enhance their well-being (anonymous and strictly voluntary). Results suggested that 11.5% of participants started the gratitude intervention. Individuals endorsing strong intentions to change their lifestyle (+1 SD above mean) were 2.2 times more likely than their peers to start the gratitude intervention. People with greater trait curiosity endorsed greater intentions to start this intervention; people with greater depressive symptoms endorsed weaker intentions. Both curiosity and depressive symptoms indirectly influenced initiation of the gratitude intervention via intentions. These findings provide support for particular paths that lead to the initial behavioral effort towards healthy change. We discuss the implications for attempting to increase and sustain people’s well-being.     

How Kantian Must Kantian Constructivists Be?

Kantian constructivists locate the source of normativity in the rational nature of valuing agents. Some further argue that accepting this premise thereby commits one to accepting the intrinsic or unconditioned value of rational nature itself. Whereas much of the critical literature on this “regress on conditions” argument has focused either on the cogency of the inference from the value‐conferring capacity of the will to the unconditional value of that capacity itself or on the plausibility of the initial constructivist premise, my aim is to press the argument from a different direction by asking just how Kantian the constructivist needs to be in order to support a regress on conditions argument. Specifically, I maintain that the argument succeeds only given a full‐fledged Kantian moral psychology, including a presupposition of transcendental freedom. If correct, this could have implications regarding the compatibility of Kantian ethics and philosophic naturalism.     

How similar are recognition memory and inductive reasoning?

Conventionally, memory and reasoning are seen as different types of cognitive activities driven by different processes. In two experiments, we challenged this view by examining the relationship between recognition memory and inductive reasoning involving multiple forms of similarity. A common study set (members of a conjunctive category) was followed by a test set containing old and new category members, as well as items that matched the study set on only one dimension. The study and test sets were presented under recognition or induction instructions. In Experiments 1 and 2, the inductive property being generalized was varied in order to direct attention to different dimensions of similarity. When there was no time pressure on decisions, patterns of positive responding were strongly affected by property type, indicating that different types of similarity were driving recognition and induction. By comparison, speeded judgments showed weaker property effects and could be explained by generalization based on overall similarity. An exemplar model, GEN-EX (GENeralization from EXamples), could account for both the induction and recognition data. These findings show that induction and recognition share core component processes, even when the tasks involve flexible forms of similarity.