Wallas’ Four-Stage Model of the Creative Process: More Than Meets the Eye?

Based on a detailed reading of Graham Wallas’ Art of Thought (1926 Wallas, G. (1926). The art of thought. London, UK: Jonathan Cape. [Google Scholar]) it is argued that his four-stage model of the creative process (Preparation, Incubation, Illumination, Verification), in spite of holding sway as a conceptual anchor for many creativity researchers, does not reflect accurately Wallas’ full account of the creative process. Instead, it is suggested that a four-stage model that gives due recognition to the detailed treatment Wallas gave to the Intimation stage is a more authentic representation of his explanation of creativity. A version of this model with three levels of proximity to consciousness (nonconsciousness; fringe consciousness; consciousness) and five stages (Preparation; Incubation; Intimation; Illumination; Verification) is presented as a general conceptual architecture within which relevant concepts and theories from more recent creativity research, including neuroscience and intuition, are positioned and from which a number of implications are drawn.     

Thinking Outside the Square: Business Students' Conceptions of Creativity

Creativity is an important attribute of a successful graduate of higher education, recognised by universities and employers alike. In this paper, we investigate ideas about creativity that were discussed during interviews by a group of business students at a university in Sydney, Australia. Using a phenomenographic approach, we identified three levels of conceptions of creativity, labeled Definition, Attribute, and Comprehensive, from the narrowest and most limited to the broadest and most inclusive. We discuss the characteristics of these different ways of viewing creativity and the pedagogical implications of our findings for business education (and higher education generally).     

From theory to practice: The integration of goal perspective theory and life development approaches within an injury-specific goal-setting program

Abstract

The psychology of sport injury rehabilitation is an awa of increasing research and practical interest (Heil, 1993: Pugman, 1993). However. there has been little exploration of how contemporary motivation theory might provide a theoretical basis for sport psychology interventions within the sports injury context. The present paper suggests that goal perspective theory and life development intervention (LDI) provide a conceptual base from which an injury-specific goal-setting program could be designed. The notion that goal-setting can empower the injured athlete with skills that encourage a stronger task orientation. create an enhanced sense of control during a life crisis, and improve lifestyle management is discussed. Opportunities for these skills to be used across different rehabilitation phases and through changing rehabilitation contexts are also explored. Finally. guidelines for the implementation of a rehabilitation-specific, task-oriented goal-setting program are suggested.     

Practical Computer Ethics (Book)

Do continuing education (CE) mandates increase participation in ethics programs and enhance their perceived outcomes? In a study of 5,198 North American psychologists, significant differences were found between mandated and nonmandated psychologists in relation to their participation in ethics programs but not in the perceived outcomes associated with those trainings. Although 64.3% of those psychologists operating under ethics mandates reported completing at least one ethics training within the previous year, only 40.7% of those without such mandates reported doing likewise. Overall, both groups tended to view their ethics training quite favorably in relation to its perceived outcomes, though they differed in relation to their endorsement of CE mandates. Results are discussed in relation to the ongoing development of evidence-based CE and its role in developing critical professional competencies.     

First Persons: On Richard Moran's Authority and Estrangement

Richard Moran's Authority and Estrangement offers a subtle and innovative account of self-knowledge that lifts the problem out of the narrow confines of epistemology and into the broader context of practical reasoning and moral psychology. Moran argues convincingly that fundamental self/other asymmetries are essential to our concept of persons. Moreover, the first- and the third-person points of view are systematically interconnected, so that the expression or avowal of one's attitudes constitutes a substantive form of self-knowledge. But while Moran's argument is wide-ranging and compelling, he relies throughout on an overly intellectualized conception of first-person attitudes as attitudes of reflection or deliberation. That conception is at once implausible and unnecessary to the main current of his argument, whose goal is to demonstrate that our self-conception as persons depends on both the distinctness and the interconnectedness of our first- and third-person perspectives on ourselves.     

The Effect of Perceived Locomotor Constraints on Distance Estimation

Two experiments were conducted to examine the ways in which the visual estimation of distance to a target is affected by constraints perceived to be placed on the subsequent locomotion to the target without vision. We hypothesized that an appraisal of impending effort would play a role in ascertaining the distance to be walked. In Experiment 1, the amount of resistance to walking was variable and unpredictable. One group of subjects performed against relatively low resistance, whereas another group performed against substantially greater resistance. In the low-resistance condition, no significant differences in CE, VE, time to target, or number of steps to target were found between any of the eight combinations of predictable or unpredictable resistances during walking. In the high-resistance condition, however, significant differences were found for CE and number of strides to target when resistance varied unpredictably during walking. Experiment 2 was similar in design but required subjects to walk with combinations of normal or short steps after they had viewed the target knowing only the gait type that would be used to begin locomotion. No differences in CE, VE, or time to target were found between four different combinations of gait type and predictability, under subjectively controlled conditions. When the step constraints were externally imposed, however, differences were found for CE. None of the results from either experiment, in which the number of strides needed to reach the target or the predictability of gait did not change from normal, supported the hypothesis that motor output requirements are necessary in forming a mental representation of the target position that can be used to walk to the target with eyes closed. Whichever locomotor technique was used to walk the estimated distance in these cases, the representation was able to be used independently. When walking mechanics were altered by externally imposed constraints, however, the success at reaching the estimated target position was reduced. These latter results are consistent with those obtained using up, down, and level walking and support the premise that mental representations used in blind walking are linked to the locomotor mechanics afforded by environmental conditions.