Magical thinking in judgments of causation: Can anomalous phenomena affect ontological causal beliefs in children and adults?

In four experiments, 4‐, 5‐, 6‐ and 9‐year‐old children and adults were tested on the entrenchment of their magical beliefs and their beliefs in the universal power of physical causality. In Experiment 1, even 4‐year‐olds showed some understanding of the difference between ordinary and anomalous (magical) causal events, but only 6‐year‐olds and older participants denied that magic could occur in real life. When shown an anomalous causal event (a transformation of a physical object in an apparently empty box after a magic spell was cast on the box), 4‐ and 6‐year‐olds accepted magical explanations of the event, whereas 9‐year‐olds and adults did not. In Experiment 2, the same patterns of behaviour as above were shown by 6‐ and 9‐year‐olds who demonstrated an understanding of the difference between genuine magical events and similarly looking tricks. Testing the entrenchment of magical beliefs in this experiment showed that 5‐year‐olds tended to retain their magical explanations of the anomalous event, even after the mechanism of the trick had been explained to them, whereas 6‐ and 9‐year‐olds did not. In Experiment 3, adult participants refused to accept magical explanations of the anomalous event and interpreted it as a trick or an illusion, even after this event was repeated 4 times. Yet, when in Experiment 4 similar anomalous causal events were demonstrated without reference to magic, most adults acknowledged, both in their verbal judgments and in their actions, that the anomalous effects were not a fiction but had really occurred. The data of this study suggest that in the modern industrialized world, magical beliefs persist but are disguised to fit the dominant scientific paradigm.     

A Survey of Patients’ Experiences with the Cancer Genetic Counseling Process: Recommendations for Cancer Genetics Programs

In order to promote ongoing quality improvement of not only the Penn State Cancer Genetics Program, but also other cancer risk assessment programs throughout the country, we developed, piloted and conducted a survey to explore patient expectations, experiences, and satisfaction with the cancer genetic counseling process. The comprehensive survey was mailed to 340 eligible patients, 156 (45.9%) of whom returned the completed survey within the allotted time. Responses to closed-ended questions were tallied and open-ended questions were content analyzed. Major findings show that: (1) Patients were seeking cancer-related information and support throughout the cancer risk assessment process and were interested in participating in available research studies; (2) The setting in which patients are seen for cancer risk assessment may pose potential emotional ramifications; (3) Misperceptions regarding insurance discrimination and lack of insurance coverage persist; (4) Patients view the genetic counselor as responsible for updating them about new discoveries. Specific recommendations for cancer genetics programs are included.     

Is young children’s recognition of pretense metarepresentational or merely behavioral? Evidence from 2- and 3-year-olds’ understanding of pretend sounds and speech

When young children observe pretend-play, do they interpret it simply as a type of behavior, or do they infer the underlying mental state that gives the behavior meaning? This is a long-standing question with deep implications for how “theory on mind” develops. The two leading accounts of shared pretense give opposing answers. The behavioral theory proposes that children represent pretense as a form of behavior (behaving in a way that would be appropriate if P); the metarepresentational theory argues that children instead represent pretense via the early concept PRETEND. A test between these accounts is provided by children’s understanding of pretend sounds and speech. We report the first experiments directly investigating this understanding. In three experiments, 2- and 3-year-olds’ listened to requests that were either spoken normally, or with the pretense that a teddy bear was uttering them. To correctly fulfill the requests, children had to represent the normal utterance as the experimenter’s, and the pretend utterances as the bear’s. Children succeeded at both ages, suggesting that they can represent pretend speech (the requests) as coming from counterfactual sources (the bear rather than the experimenter). We argue that this is readily explained by the metarepresentational theory, but harder to explain if children are behaviorists about pretense.     

Book Review

Abstract

ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR Myocardial infarction and its influence on male sexual function, by C. B. Dhabuwala, A. Kumar,&;J. M. Pierce, 1986, 15(6), 499-504

BEHAVIOR THERAPY Parental perception and treatment outcome in families of aggressive children: A causal model, by Jean E. Duman, 1986, 17, 420-432

PSYCHOTHERAPY Counseling violent couples using Walker's model, by J. Harris, 1986, 23(4), 613-621