Measuring Lay Conceptions of Well-Being: The Beliefs About Well-Being Scale

A number of explicit conceptions of well-being have been provided by philosophers and psychologists, but little is known about laypersons’ conceptions of well-being. Two studies investigating the content and measurement of lay conceptions of well-being are presented. Using exploratory and confirmatory factor analytic procedures, the 16-item Beliefs about Well-Being Scale (BWBS) was developed to measure lay conceptions of well-being along four theoretically-meaningful dimensions: (1) the Experience of Pleasure, (2) Avoidance of Negative Experience, (3) Self-Development, and (4) Contribution to Others. Initial evidence concerning the reliability and validity of the BWBS indicated that this new scale has acceptable psychometric properties. In both studies, associations between each subscale, representing the above four dimensions, and multiple self-report measures of experienced well-being were also examined. Each subscale was significantly associated with well-being, with Self-Development and Contribution to Others indicating stronger associations with measures of well-being than either Experience of Pleasure or Avoidance of Negative Experience. Implications for future research using this economical new scale are discussed.     

Searching for interference effects in learning new face–name associations

In three experiments we attempted to increase interference using experimental manipulations in a face–name learning paradigm. All experiments included young and older adult participants because ageing is associated with increases in both susceptibility to interference and difficulty in learning face–name associations. None of the experiments produced interference for either age group: The inclusion of confusable (i.e., ambiguous) names and occupations, having to learn an additional piece of information in association with each face, and requiring participants to guess when uncertain all failed to negatively impact name learning. Interference does not appear to be the critical mechanism underlying the difficulty of learning proper names, and it cannot account for older adults' disproportionate decline in name-learning ability.