Adolescent adjustment and well-being: effects of parental divorce and distress

This study investigates the long-term effects of parental divorce on adolescent psychological adjustment and well-being, and to what extent the effects are accounted for by parental psychological distress. Data were collected among 8,984 Norwegian adolescents (13-19 years) and their parents. Outcome variables were symptoms of anxiety and depression, subjective well-being, and three areas of school problems. Parental divorce was found to be associated with both higher mean levels and larger variances in adolescent problems. Divorce and parental distress contributed independently to adolescent distress, supporting the notion of "double exposure" effects. The prevalence of adolescents with substantial distress symptoms was 14% among those with non-distressed non-divorced parents and 30% among those with divorced and distressed parents. In general effects remained when controlling for demographic factors. Long-term effects of divorce on symptoms of anxiety and depression were stronger among girls than among boys.     

What is so important about completing lives? A critique of the modified youngest first principle of scarce resource allocation

Ruth Tallman has recently offered a defense of the modified youngest first principle of scarce resource allocation [1]. According to Tallman, this principle calls for prioritizing adolescents and young adults between 15–40 years of age. In this article, I argue that Tallman’s defense of the modified youngest first principle is vulnerable to important objections, and that it is thus unsuitable as a basis for allocating resources. Moreover, Tallman makes claims about the badness of death for individuals at different ages, but she lacks an account of the loss involved in dying to support her claims. To fill this gap in Tallman’s account, I propose a view on the badness of death that I call ‘Deprivationism’. I argue that this view explains why death is bad for those who die, and that it has some advantages over Tallman’s complete lives view in the context of scarce resource allocation. Finally, I consider some objections to the relevance of Deprivationism to resource allocation, and offer my responses.     

Beginning,ending and remembering

Wittgenstein famously opens his Philosophical Investigations with a quotation in which Augustine recounts how he acquired language. Instead of going into the widely discussed question of how Wittgenstein relates to Augustine's picture of language, this article inquires into what else might be at stake in invoking Confessions at the very beginning of his work. At the very least, such a gesture seems to suggest that Wittgenstein wants to inscribe himself into the Augustinian legacy. More specifically, this article argues that Philosophical Investigations centres on three problems that Wittgenstein has inherited from Augustine – namely what one might call the problem of beginning, the problem of ending and finally the problem of memory. The problem of beginning not only points to the local problem of how to start writing confessional philosophy, but also what authorizes such philosophy in the first place. The problem of ending concerns the direction of such philosophy and the problematic stance of its goal, while the problem of memory turns on the task of progressing from beginning to ending.     

Attention in Williams syndrome and Down's syndrome: Performance on the new early childhood attention battery

Attentional problems are commonly reported as a feature of the behavioural profile in both Williams syndrome (WS) and Down's syndrome (DS). Recent studies have begun to investigate these impairments empirically, acknowledging the need for an approach that considers cross‐syndrome comparisons and developmental changes across the different component functions of attention. The present study assessed children with WS and DS using a new preschool attention battery (ECAB: early childhood attention battery), designed to be suitable for mental age 3–6 years including groups with developmental disorders. The ECAB has the advantage of giving an individual profile of attentional abilities for each child, covering different components of attention. In relation to test norms for their mental age, both groups showed a profile of strengths and weaknesses in the attention domain. Both syndrome groups performed relatively well on tests of sustained attention and poorly on aspects of selective attention and attentional control (executive function). The DS group showed a specific strength in auditory sustained attention, whilst the WS group showed a particular deficit in visuo‐spatial response control. There was also evidence for considerable differences in the developmental trajectory of these abilities across the two groups. The results provide evidence for syndrome‐specific patterns of impairment, and distinct profiles of strengths and weaknesses that may be useful in understanding the nature of everyday attention difficulties in these groups and tailoring interventions to meet these needs.     

Toward an integrative model of suicide attempt: a cognitive psychological approach.

Applying a cognitive approach, the purpose of the present study was to expand previous research on stress-vulnerability models of depression and problem-solving deficits, as it relates to suicide attempt. Structural equation modelling, involving latent variables, was used to evaluate (a) whether low self-esteem, a low sense of self-efficacy, loneliness, and divorce constituted vulnerability factors for the development of depression; (b) whether hopelessness and suicidal ideation mediated the relationship between depression and suicide attempt; and (c) whether problem-solving deficits mediated the relationship between the vulnerability factors and suicide attempt, separate from depression/hopelessness. A total of 123 individuals, aged 18-75 years, participated in the study (72 suicide attempters and 51 psychiatric outpatients with no history of suicidal behavior). The results indicated a two path model of suicide attempt. The first path began with low self-esteem, loneliness, and separation or divorce, which advanced to depression, and was further mediated by hopelessness and suicidal ideation which led to suicide attempt. The second path developed from low self-esteem and a low sense of self-efficacy and advanced to suicide attempt, mediated by a negative appraisal of one's own problem-solving capacity, and poor interpersonal problem-solving skills. The importance of addressing both depression/hopelessness, and problem-solving deficits when working with suicide attempters is noted.