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251.
Anxiety has wide-reaching and complex effects on cognitive performance. Although it can intrude on cognition and interfere with performance, it can also facilitate information processing and behavioural responses. In a previous study, we showed that anxiety induced by threat of shock facilitates performance on the Sustained Attention to Response Task, a vigilance test, which probes response inhibition to infrequent nogo stimuli. The present study sought to identify factors that may have contributed to such improved performance, including on- and off-task thinking (assessed with thought probes) and individual differences in attention control, as measured with the Attention Control Scale. Replicating our prior finding, we showed that shock threat significantly reduced errors of commission on the nogo trials. However, we extended this finding in demonstrating that this effect was driven by subjects with low attention control. We therefore confirm that anxiety increases inhibitory control of prepotent responses—a mechanism which is adaptive under threat—and show that this effect is greater in those who rely more upon such prepotent responding, i.e., those with low attentional control.  相似文献   
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This paper argues for the way in which the hermeneutics of human action (in particular the technical dimension of action) and the capabilities approach are to be coordinated in judgements regarding the happy life or well-being. To ensure that this hypothesis is not only philosophically plausible but practically reasonable, I apply it throughout to practical examples, namely practices related to the arrangement of space. I argue that judgement regarding happiness or well-being requires two distinct forms of reflection: (1) a hermeneutics (here derived from Ric?ur) that can do justice to the thickness (in Geertz's sense) of human living and (2) a thin standard (in Walzer's sense) of universal human functional capabilities, by which to point out which insufficient conditions for action undermine human well-being (here presented according to Nussbaum's version of the capabilities approach). These two forms of reflection, it will be argued, are theoretically compatible, yet remain – in practice – in tension. Recognition of this tension has to accompany responsible judgement.  相似文献   
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The Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT; Lykken, 1959) assesses whether suspects conceal information about a crime ( “guilty knowledge”). Previous studies have demonstrated larger physiological reactions to guilty knowledge compared to unknown information. In three experiments, we investigated whether guilty knowledge also demands attention. During an alleged polygraph examination, participants were presented with to‐be‐detected pictures ( “guilty knowledge”), nonsignificant, familiar pictures ( “mere knowledge”), and previously unseen pictures ( “neutral information”) for 250 ms in a modified dot probe task. In all three experiments, probe responses were slower on guilty knowledge trials as compared to the neutral trials. Results are discussed in terms of an information‐processing view on orienting to guilty knowledge.  相似文献   
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