Knowing about People and Naming Them: Can Alzheimer's Disease Patients Do One without the Other?

It has recently been suggested that patients with semantic breakdown may show the phenomenon of so-called 'naming without semantics'. If substantiated, this finding would clearly have a major impact on theories of face and object processing, all of which assume that access to semantic knowledge is a prerequisite for successful naming. In order to investigate this issue, we studied recognition, identification (the ability to provide accurate information), and naming of 50 famous faces by 24 patients with mild to moderate dementia of Alzheimer type (DA T) and 30 age-matched controls. The DA T group was impaired in all three conditions. An analysis of the concordance between identification and naming by each patient, for each stimulus item, established that naming a famous face was possible only with semantic knowledge sufficient to identify the person. Our data support the hypothesis that naming is not possible unless semantic information associated with the target is available. Naming without semantics, therefore, did not occur in patients with DAT. By contrast, there were 206 instances (17% of the total responses) in which the patients were able to provide detailed, accurate identifying information yet were unable to name the person represented. The implication of these findings for models of face identification and naming are discussed.     

Recency and suffix effects in serial recall of musical stimuli

Auditory presentation of verbal items leads to larger recency effects in recall than visual presentation. This enhanced recency can be eliminated if a stimulus suffix (an irrelevant sound) follows the last item. Four experiments tested the hypothesis that recency and suffix effects in serial recall result from a speech-specific process. It was demonstrated that serial recall of musical notes played on a piano exhibited substantial recency effects. These recency effects were reduced when the list items were followed by either a piano chord or the word start. However, a white-noise suffix had no effect on recency. This pattern of data is consistent with current work on auditory perception and places constraints on theories of recency and suffix effects.     

Recency effects in delayed recall of mouthed stimuli

Auditory presentation leads to greater recency effects in recall than does visual presentation. This phenomenon (the modality effect) is found in both free and serial recall and in both immediate and delayed recall. Silent mouthing of visually presented stimuli also leads to enhanced recency effects in immediate serial recall. Two experiments reported here extend the generality of the mouthing effect by demonstrating that enhanced recency effects of mouthed stimuli occur in delayed serial and free recall. These results are inconsistent with theories that attribute the modality effect to a purely auditory sensory memory.     

A BEHAVIORAL SYSTEM FOR ASSESSING AND TRAINING CARDIOPULMONARY RESUSCITATION SKILLS AMONG EMERGENCY MEDICAL TECHNICIANS

Many deaths from cardiopulmonary arrest can be prevented by the prompt and effective administration of cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). In this study, we examined the standard training program for teaching CPR to emergency medical technicians (EMTs). We developed an alternative experimental program whereby the behaviors involved in CPR were assessed easily and in greater detail. This assessment provided the basis for a system in which effective CPR skills were reinforced and problems were corrected. Subjects who were trained in CPR according to this experimental program performed more effectively than subjects in the standard program. In addition, retention (maintenance) measures indicated that experimental subjects continued to perform well, often more effectively than professionally employed EMTs.     

Multiple explanations for multiply quantified sentences: are multiple models necessary?

Johnson-Laird, Byrne, and Tabossi (1989) presented a theory of deductive reasoning for inference problems using multiply quantified premises (e.g., "All of the squares are connected to some of the circles"). Their theory classifies such problems into those that require subjects to construct only 1 mental model and those that require multiple models. They presented data that corroborate the theory. This article shows that Johnson-Laird et al.'s major results can be explained without invoking mental models or, in fact, deductive reasoning at all. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that, contrary to the assumption of these authors, reversing the order of the quantifiers in a multiply quantified sentence may produce a sentence that is both more difficult to comprehend and more ambiguous. Finally, some implications for theories of how people understand multiply quantified sentences are noted.