What you see is what you set: sustained inattentional blindness and the capture of awareness

This article reports a theoretical and experimental attempt to relate and contrast 2 traditionally separate research programs: inattentional blindness and attention capture. Inattentional blindness refers to failures to notice unexpected objects and events when attention is otherwise engaged. Attention capture research has traditionally used implicit indices (e.g., response times) to investigate automatic shifts of attention. Because attention capture usually measures performance whereas inattentional blindness measures awareness, the 2 fields have existed side by side with no shared theoretical framework. Here, the authors propose a theoretical unification, adapting several important effects from the attention capture literature to the context of sustained inattentional blindness. Although some stimulus properties can influence noticing of unexpected objects, the most influential factor affecting noticing is a person's own attentional goals. The authors conclude that many--but not all--aspects of attention capture apply to inattentional blindness but that these 2 classes of phenomena remain importantly distinct.     

Psychosocial adaptation to spinal cord injury: a dimensional perspective

From 313 individuals who sustained spinal cord injuries self-reported responses were examined on their psychosocial adaptation to disability and perceived quality of life. A multidimensional scaling analysis yielded a 2-dimensional structure of adaptation. The first dimension indicated adaptive versus nonadaptive reactions. The second dimension was suggestive of denial versus realization of the affect related to the medical impairment.     

Multiple-object tracking is based on scene, not retinal, coordinates

This study tested whether multiple-object tracking-the ability to visually index objects on the basis of their spatiotemporal history-is scene based or image based. Initial experiments showed equivalent tracking accuracy for objects in 2-D and 3-D motion. Subsequent experiments manipulated the speeds of objects independent of the speed of the scene as a whole. Results showed that tracking accuracy was influenced by object speed but not by scene speed. This held true whether the scene underwent translation, zoom, rotation, or even combinations of all 3 motions. A final series of experiments interfered with observers' ability to see a coherent scene by moving objects at different speeds from one another and by distorting the perception of 3-D space. These reductions in scene coherence led to reduced tracking accuracy, confirming that tracking is accomplished using a scene-based, or allocentric, frame of reference.     

Psychological closure as a memory phenomenon

A theory is proposed that life events are remembered with a satisfying sense of closure when there is decreased emotional detail in the constructed autobiographical memory representation. The first three studies show that, although properties of the experienced event (such as valence and recency) accounted for some variance in participants' sense of closure, the amount of emotional detail in the memory was also a significant predictor. The third study shows that emotion-focused biased retelling of the experience increased emotional detail and decreased the sense of closure participants reported. Related approaches and implications for psychological adjustment are discussed.     

Individual Accountability in Cooperative Learning Groups at the College Level: Differential Effects on High,Average, and Low Exam Performers

Over a three-semester period in a large undergraduate human development course, students were assigned to 5–7 member groups to work together in preparing for an exam in one of the five content units in the course. Their exam performance was tracked over three units: a baseline unit in which students worked only individually, a unit in which they worked in cooperative teams, and a follow-up unit in which the formal cooperative team structure was removed. Three different bonus-credit contingencies were used in the cooperative learning unit across the three semesters: (a) awarding full bonus credit to each individual in the group if the group as a whole improved its exam performance by the specified amount, (b) awarding partial bonus credit to each individual in the group if the group as a whole improved it exam performance by the specified amount and full bonus credit to each individual who also improved by the specified amount, and (c) awarding full bonus credit to an individual in the group if both the group and the individual improved exam performance by the specified amount. The three contingencies produced somewhat similar patterns of change for low and average performers, but the high performers fared better under the last two contingencies than under the group-only contingency.     

IQ decline following early unilateral brain injury: a longitudinal study

We examine whether children with early unilateral brain injury show an IQ decline over the course of development. Fifteen brain injured children were administered an IQ test once before age 7 and again several years later. Post-7 IQ scores were significantly lower than pre-7 IQ scores. In addition, pre-7 IQ scores were lower for children with larger lesions, but children with smaller lesions and higher pre-7 IQ scores showed a greater IQ decline over time. These findings suggest that the cognitive outcomes of children with early lesions, particularly those with relatively small lesions, change over the course of development.     

Describing suicidality: an investigation of qualitative SSF responses

Given the incidence and seriousness of suicidality in clinical practice, the need for new and better ways to assess suicide risk is clear. While there are many published assessment instruments in the literature, survey data suggest that these measure are not widely used. One possible explanation is that current quantitatively developed assessment instruments may fail to capture something essential about the suicidal patient's experience. The current exploratory study examined a range of open ended qualitative written responses made by suicidal outpatients to five assessment prompts from the Suicide Status Form (SSF)--psychological pain, press, perturbation, hopelessness, and self-hate. Two different samples of suicidal outpatients seeking treatment, including suicidal college students (n = 119) and active duty U.S. Air Force personnel (n = 33), provided a wide range of written responses to the five SSF prompts. A qualitative coding manual was developed through a step-by-step methodology; two naive coders were trained to use the coding system and were able to sort all the patients' written responses into the content categories with very high interrater reliability (Kappa > .80). Certain written qualitative responses of the patients were more frequent than others, both within and across the five SSF constructs. Among a range of specific exploratory findings, one general finding was that two thirds of the 636 obtained written responses could be reliably categorized under four major content headings: relational (22%), role responsibilities (20%), self (15%), and unpleasant internal states (10%). Theoretical, research, and clinical implications of the methodology and data are discussed.     

Why is it difficult to see in the fog? How stimulus contrast affects visual perception and visual memory

Processing visually degraded stimuli is a common experience. We struggle to find house keys on dim front porches, to decipher slides projected in overly bright seminar rooms, and to read 10th-generation photocopies. In this research, we focus specifically on stimuli that are degraded via reduction of stimuluscontrast and address two questions. First, why is it difficult to process low-contrast, as compared with high-contrast, stimuli? Second, is the effect of contrastfundamental in that its effect is independent of the stimulus being processed and the reason for processing the stimulus? We formally address and answer these questions within the context of a series of nested theories, each providing a successively stronger definition of what it means for contrast to affect perception and memory. To evaluate the theories, we carried out six experiments. Experiments 1 and 2 involved simple stimuli (randomly generated forms and digit strings), whereas Experiments 3–6 involved naturalistic pictures (faces, houses, and cityscapes). The stimuli were presented at two contrast levels and at varying exposure durations. The data from all the experiments allow the conclusion that some function of stimulus contrast combines multiplicatively with stimulus duration at a stage prior to that at which the nature of the stimulus and the reason for processing it are determined, and it is the result of this multiplicative combination that determines eventual memory performance. We describe a stronger version of this theory— the sensory response, information acquisition theory—which has at its core, the strong Bloch’s-law-like assumption of a fundamental visual system response that is proportional to the product of stimulus contrast and stimulus duration. This theory was, as it has been in the past, highly successful in accounting for memory for simple stimuli shown at short (i.e., shorter than an eye fixation) durations. However, it was less successful in accounting for data from short-duration naturalistic pictures and was entirely unsuccessful in accounting for data from naturalistic pictures shown at longer durations. We discuss (1) processing differences between short- and long-duration stimuli, (2) processing differences between simple stimuli, such as digits, and complex stimuli, such as pictures, (3) processing differences between biluminant stimuli (such as line drawings with only two luminance levels) and multiluminant stimuli (such as grayscale pictures with multiple luminance levels), and (4) Bloch’s law and a proposed generalization of the concept ofmetamers.