Can Bartlett’s repeated reproduction experiments be replicated?

Surprisingly, Bartlett's (1932) famous repeated reproduction experiments, in which he found systematically increasing errors in recall from the same people tested over time, have never been successfully replicated. Several studies have attempted partial replications, which were unsuccessful, and their authors concluded that the original observations might not be replicable. We conducted a study modeled closely after Bartlett's procedures: Subjects studied "The War of the Ghosts," took an initial test 15 min later, and then took a delayed test after 1 week. A follow-up test was conducted 6 months later on as many subjects as could be obtained. We did replicate Bartlett's results, in that (1) subjects forgot the story over delays but (2) introduced rationalization and distortion into their accounts of the story, with increases in the proportion of material distorted as retention interval increased. Subjects also imported new propositions at long delays, further confirming Bartlett's empirical observations and conclusions. Bartlett's repeated reproduction results can be replicated.     

Vienna Indeterminism: Mach,Boltzmann, Exner

The present paper studies a specific way of addressing the question whether the laws involving the basic constituents of nature are statistical. While most German physicists, above all Planck, treated the issues of determinism and causality within a Kantian framework, the tradition which I call Vienna Indeterminism began from Mach’s reinterpretation of causality as functional dependence. This severed the bond between causality and realism because one could no longer avail oneself of a priori categories as a criterion for empirical reality. Hence, an independent reality criterion had to be sought, a problem which all three physicists to be studied solved in different ways that were mainly conditioned by their different concepts of probability. In order to prevent a dissipation of intuited facts, Mach had to resort to a principle of unique determination as his reality criterion, especially when discussing the Principle of Least Action. Giving theories more independence, Boltzmann understood atomism as property reduction to precisely defined theoretical entities and their interactions. While this served as a relative reality criterion, he also advocated a constructivist one because atomism was already implied by our finitary reasoning power. Finally, Exner contemplated the idea that all apparently deterministic laws are only a macroscopic limit of an irreducible indeterminism, because by adopting the frequency interpretation, observable collectives could be considered as the real basic entities. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Sweet-cheeks vs. pea-brain: embodiment,valence, and task all influence the emotional salience of language

Previous research has found that more embodied insults (e.g. numbskull) are identified faster and more accurately than less embodied insults (e.g. idiot). The linguistic processing of embodied compliments has not been well explored. In the present study, participants completed two tasks where they identified insults and compliments, respectively. Half of the stimuli were more embodied than the other half. We examined the late positive potential (LPP) component of event-related potentials in early (400–500?ms), middle (500–600?ms), and late (600–700?ms) time windows. Increased embodiment resulted in improved response accuracy to compliments in both tasks, whereas it only improved accuracy for insults in the compliment detection task. More embodied stimuli elicited a larger LPP than less embodied stimuli in the early time window. Insults generated a larger LPP in the late time window in the insult task; compliments generated a larger LPP in the early window in the compliment task. These results indicate that electrophysiological correlates of emotional language perception are sensitive to both top-down and bottom-up processes.     

Splitting a Difference of Opinion: The Shift to Negotiation

Negotiation is not only used to settle differences of interest but also to settle differences of opinion. Discussants who are unable to resolve their difference about the objective worth of a policy or action proposal may be willing to abandon their attempts to convince the other and search instead for a compromise that would, for each of them, though only a second choice yet be preferable to a lasting conflict. Our questions are: First, when is it sensible to enter into negotiations and when would this be unwarranted or even fallacious? Second, what is the nature of a compromise? What does it mean to settle instead of resolve a difference of opinion, and what might be the dialectical consequences of mistaking a compromise for a substantial resolution? Our main aim is to contribute to the theory of argumentation within the context of negotiation and compromise formation and to show how arguing disputants can shift to negotiation in a dialectically virtuous way.     

Scientific Writing Between Tabloid Storytelling,Arcane Formulaic Hermetism,and Narrative Knowledge

The present discussion contribution argues that O. Müller not only suppresses Goethe’s declared intentions with regard to the latter’s Theory of Colors and ignores his place in what in any case is a different scientific culture than his (Müller’s) own or Newton’s, namely a premodern culture of “narrative knowledge” in the sense specified by Lyotard. Moreover, Müller entangles himself in the paradox of wanting on the one hand to back up Goethe on the level of fact when the latter opposes the militant selfrighteousness of the Newtonian school, but doing so on the other hand by constructing an epic-heroic narrative of Newtonian militance, not to say eristic belligerence contradictory to Goethe’s own “tolerant enlightenment” in Lakatos’ sense. Thus, we are confronted with one of those cases where, as Paul de Man puts it, a multidimensional critical reading on the semiological as well as rhetorical levels shows “that the text does not practice what it preaches” (1979, 5).     

Electrophysiological evidence for age effects on sensory memory processing of tonal patterns

In older adults, difficulties processing complex auditory scenes, such as speech comprehension in noisy environments, might be due to a specific impairment of temporal processing at early, automatic processing stages involving auditory sensory memory (ASM). Even though age effects on auditory temporal processing have been well-documented, there is a paucity of research on how ASM processing of more complex tone-patterns is altered by age. In the current study, age effects on ASM processing of temporal and frequency aspects of two-tone patterns were investigated using a passive listening protocol. The P1 component, the mismatch negativity (MMN) and the P3a component of event-related brain potentials (ERPs) to tone frequency and temporal pattern deviants were recorded in younger and older adults as a measure of auditory event detection, ASM processing, and attention switching, respectively. MMN was elicited with smaller amplitude to both frequency and temporal deviants in older adults. Furthermore, P3a was elicited only in the younger adults. In conclusion, the smaller MMN amplitude indicates that automatic processing of both frequency and temporal aspects of two-tone patterns is impaired in older adults. The failure to initiate an attention switch, suggested by the absence of P3a, indicates that impaired ASM processing of patterns may lead to less distractibility in older adults. Our results suggest age-related changes in ASM processing of patterns that cannot be explained by an inhibitory deficit.     

Normal aging increases discriminal dispersion in visuospatial short-term memory

Computational models of cognitive aging propose that age-related decrements in cognitive performance, including short-term memory (STM), result from less distinct stimulus representations. When applied to visual STM, these models predict higher discriminal dispersion (L. L. Thurstone, 1927, Psychophysical analysis, The American Journal of Psychology, 38, 368-389.) in older adults than in younger adults. To test this prediction, we used a change-detection paradigm for visuospatial locations, with different levels of cognitive load (one, three, or five items) and retention interval (100 or 1,000 ms). Adult age differences were not reliable at Load 1, but were substantial at Loads 3 and 5. Effects of retention time did not differ across age groups, suggesting that age-related differences originated mainly from early processing stages. Applying a mixture model to the data revealed age-related increases in discriminal dispersion and decreases in asymptotic discrimination performance (indexing STM capacity). We concluded that age-related declines in discriminal dispersion, in addition to increasing capacity limitations, impair visual STM performance with advancing adult age. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).