Policy evaluation: Design and utilization

In the 1960s when evaluation research came into fashion in the US, the assumption was that it would be used by public policymakers in an instrumental way for purposes of problem solving. This entailed a linear, knowledge-driven model for research utilization in which a direct relationship exists between knowing and doing (i.e., knowledge leads to action). The model combined the “rational” paradigm of organizational theory and the “scientific” paradigm of positivist philosophy of science into a consistent model of how evaluation research should be conducted and would be utilized. Both with respect to its normative and its empirical dimensions, original evaluation research model failed. Today evaluation research and its utilization are seen in quite a different perspective. However, though a parallel paradigm revolution or shift has taken place both with respect to the organization theory of evaluation research and its methodological basis, no new comprehensive and coherent evaluation research model has emerged to replace the original linear one. Erik Albaek is an associate professor of public administration at the University of Aarhus, Denmark. One of his main research areas is the utilization of social science in public policymaking.     

The gnosis of knowledge navigation on the Net

A set of activities developed to expose liberal arts undergraduates to global networking software and resources is detailed. Using a suite of Internet software tools and Macintosh computers, teams of students collaborated with faculty searching the World-Wide Web for on-line resources. Detailed student logs provide insights into the challenges of searching for Internet resources. Project shortcomings include difficulty in accessing information sites and poor organization of the final written reports. Ideas for improving the project in the future include allowing more time for the search process and replacing the written report with a WWW home page. The class project enhances the utilization of technology in the curriculum while equipping the students with computer skills to enhance their education.     

Creative reasoning in formal discussion

Systems of formal dialectics articulate methods of conflict resolution. To this end they provide norms to regulate verbal exchanges between the Proponent of a thesis and an Opponent. These regulated exchanges constitute what are known as formal discussions.One may ask what moves, if any, in formal discusions correspond to arguing for or against the thesis. It is claimed that certain moves of the Proponent's are properly designated as arguing for the thesis, and that certain moves of the Opponent purport to criticize the tenability or the relevance of the reasons advanced. Thus the usefulness of formal dialectic systems as models for reasonable argument is vindicated.It is then proposed to make these systems more realistic by incorporating in them a norm of Creative Reasoning that removes the severe restrictions to which the Proponent's arguing was hitherto subject. As a consequence, a certain type of irrelevant reason is no longer automatically excluded. Therefore, it is proposed to extend the Opponent's rights to exert relevance criticism. The new dialectic systems are shown to be strategically equivalent to the original ones. Finally, it is stressed that the Opponent's criticism should not be designated as arguing against the thesis. The Opponent criticizes, but does not argue.     

A procedure for obtaining young children’s reports of olfactory stimuli

Young children (ages 2 to 5) have proved to be difficult subjects for obtaining valid reports of their ratings of olfactory stimuli. Thirty-six preschoolers were tested on benzaldehyde (a pleasant odor) and on dimethyl disulfide (an unpleasant odor) using a smiling or frowning face as a response format. The results showed the ability of young children to discriminate between pleasant and unpleasant odors.     

Loss of negative priming following sleep deprivation

It has been argued that one night of sleep loss in young healthy adults produces changes similar to that associated with normal, healthy ageing—in particular, that young sleep-deprived adults perform similarly to 60-year-old sleep-satiated adults on some tasks of frontal lobe function. This proposition was examined using a protocol viewed by many to be a direct probe of nonvolitional attention mechanisms associated with frontal lobe function. A negative priming (NP) procedure was used to compare performance between non-sleep-deprived (NSD) and sleep-deprived (SD, 34 hr) young, healthy adults. This protocol allowed for exploration of two theories of the NP effect based on inhibitory or memorial processes. Under conditions believed to facilitate inhibitory processes a normal NP effect was found for NSD(16 ms) and SD (9 ms) participants. Under conditions believed to rely on memorial processes there was no NPeffect following SD, compared with a normal NP effect for NSD participants (11 ms). Distractor interference was also greater following SD. These findings do not suggest a similar pattern of change following sleep loss in healthy young adults to that of normal, healthy, non-sleep-deprived aged groups.     

Much ado about nothing? Why going non-semantic is not merely semantics

This paper argues that deciding on whether the cognitive sciences need a Representational Theory of Mind matters. Far from being merely semantic or inconsequential, the answer we give to the RTM-question makes a difference to how we conceive of minds. How we answer determines which theoretical framework the sciences of mind ought to embrace. The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 1 outlines Rowlands’s (2017) argument that the RTM-question is a bad question and that attempts to answer it, one way or another, have neither practical nor theoretical import. Rowlands concludes this because, on his analysis, there is no non-arbitrary fact of the matter about which properties something must possess in order to qualify as a mental representation. By way of reply, we admit that Rowlands’s analysis succeeds in revealing why attempts to answer the RTM-question simpliciter are pointless. Nevertheless, we show that if specific formulations of the RTM-question are stipulated, then it is possible, conduct substantive RTM debates that do not collapse into merely verbal disagreements. Combined, Sections 2 and 3 demonstrate how, by employing specifying stipulations, we can get around Rowlands’s arbitrariness challenge. Section 2 reveals why RTM, as canonically construed in terms of mental states exhibiting intensional (with-an-s) properties, has been deemed a valuable explanatory hypothesis in the cognitive sciences. Targeting the canonical notion of mental representations, Section 3 articulates a rival nonrepresentational hypothesis that, we propose, can do all the relevant explanatory work at much lower theoretical cost. Taken together, Sections 2 and 3 show what can be at stake in the RTM debate when it is framed by appeal to the canonical notion of mental representation and why engaging in it matters. Section 4 extends the argument for thinking that RTM debates matter. It provides reasons for thinking that, far from making no practical or theoretical difference to the sciences of the mind, deciding to abandon RTM would constitute a revolutionary conceptual shift in those sciences.     

Parental Justice and the Kids Pay View

In a just society, who should be liable for the significant costs associated with creating and raising children? Patrick Tomlin has recently argued that children themselves may be liable on the grounds that they benefit from being raised into independent adults. This view, which Tomlin calls ‘Kids Pay’, depends on the more general principle that a beneficiary can incur an obligation to share in the cost of an essential benefit that the benefactor is responsible for her requiring. I argue in this paper that this principle is both generally false and particularly suspect in the kinds of cases that Tomlin needs it to be true, namely, cases in which a benefactor has created the need to be benefitted to satisfy a self-regarding interest in providing the benefit. In a nutshell, I argue that because parents (a) electively put their children into a needy circumstance for the purpose of (b) satisfying a self-regarding interest in meeting their children’s needs, they lack a legitimate claim against their children to share in its associated costs.