Binocular summation in the perception of form at brief durations

Visual form identification at brief durations was studied under: (a) monocular presentation; (b) dichopic presentation where the same form was presented successively on noncorresponding areas; and (c) dichopic presentation where the same form was presented on corresponding areas simultaneously and successively. Form identification for noncorresponding area dichopic presentation was at the level to be expected from 2independent chances to perceive. Both simultaneous and successive dichopic presentation on corresponding areas gave identification accuracy significantly above the level predicted by the assumption of independence. However, the binocular summation was not complete. When the same amount of energy entering the visual system in a binocular presentation was given in a monocular stimulation, the latter condition gave significantly better identification.     

No attentional bias for pictoral stimuli in spider-fearful subjects

A number of experiments have shown that (spider) fearful subjects direct their attention to fear-relevant words, even when these words are irrelevant to the completion of a target task (e.g., color naming). The present study examined whether subjects with an intense fear of spiders also display such attentional bias for a fear-relevant pictoral stimulus. Female spider-fearful (n=13) and control subjects (n=13) saw neutral patterns (i.e., horizontal and vertical bars). One pattern served as target for a reaction time, while the other pattern served as nontarget. Targets and nontargets were accompanied by either fear-relevant or neutral pictoral material (i.e., a picture of a spider or a picture of a flower, respectively). The fear-relevant picture did not selectively delibate reaction time performance of spider-fearful subjects. Thus, no evidence was found for an attentional bias for fear-relevant pictoral material in subjects with an intense fear of spiders. Instead, fearful subjects exhibited a general inhibition of performance which became stronger over trials. This suggests that the fear-relevant picture induced a state of anxious arousal or defensive withdrawal that interfered with reaction time performance on both fear-relevant and neutral trials.     

How much processing do nonattended stimuli receive? Apparently very little, but...

The early versus late selection issue in attention models was examined by means of a new methodology. Through cues or precues, attention was directed to one location of a multistimulus visual display and, while attention was so engaged, the identity of a stimulus located at a different position in the display was changed. By varying the time after display onset before the stimulus was changed, we controlled the preview time that the original stimulus was represented on the retina. Then, using a marker cue, we directed the subject's attention to the location of the changed stimulus. The subject's response was a timed discrimination between two possible target letters. The data of main interest was the effect of preview time upon the subject's latency in identifying the new target that appeared in the changed location. We found that the preview time of the original stimulus, before RT was affected to the new target, depended upon whether the original stimulus was a neutral (noise) letter or whether it was the alternative target. When the original stimulus was a noise letter, RTs to the new target were just as fast as those obtained in the control condition in which the target was present throughout the preview interval and did not change its identity. Significant effects upon RT were obtained at preview times of 83 msec when the original stimulus was one of the targets that changed to the alternative target. Preview times also varied as a function of precuing. Preview times were correspondingly shortened when the first cue occurred 50 msec before display onset, thus providing an extra 50 msec for attention to be directed to the first display location. The results were interpreted in terms of two separate information-processing systems in the human: an automatic system and an attentional system. Even though a stimulus may have been automatically processed, when the attention system is directed to that stimulus, processing starts at the beginning again.     

The judgment-choice discrepancy: Noncompatibility or restructuring?

The study examines the relative merits of a noncompatibility and a restructuring explanation of the recurrent empirical finding that a prominent attribute looms larger in choices than in judgments. Pairs of equally attractive options were presented to 72 undergraduates who were assigned to six conditions in which they performed (1) only preference judgments or choices, (2) preference judgments or choices preceded by judgments of attractiveness of attribute levels, or (3) preference judgments or choices accompanied by think-aloud reports. The results replicated the prominence effect for choices, but a prominence effect was also found for preference judgments. In accordance with the restructuring explanation, the think-aloud protocols indicated that options were more often restructured in choices than in preference judgments. However, restructuring could not explain the prominence effect observed for preference judgments. A modified compatibility hypothesis is offered as an alternative explanation.     

Who is Afraid of Figure of Speech?

Aristotle's illustrations of the fallacy of Figure of Speech (or Form of Expression) are none too convincing. They are tied to Aristotle's theory of categories and to peculiarities of Greek grammar that fail to hold appeal for a contemporary readership. Yet, upon closer inspection, Figure of Speech shows many points of contact with views and problems that inhabit 20th-century analytical philosophy. In the paper, some Aristotelian examples will be analyzed to gain a better understanding of this fallacy. The case of the Third Man argument and some modern cases lend plausibility to the claim that Figure of Speech is of more interest as a type of fallacy than has generally been assumed. Finally, a case is made for the view that Figure of Speech, though listed among the fallacies dependent upon language, is not properly classified as a fallacy of ambiguity. More likely, it should be looked upon as a type of non sequitur. This has important consequences for the profile of dialogue associated with this fallacy.     

The intuitive personologist revisited: A critique of dialectical person perception

A critical examination of dialectical person perception as advanced by Lamiell, Foss, Trierweiler, and Leffel, (1983) reveals some important problems both in its empirical basis and in the underlying model of the intuitive personologist. The present article discusses these problems and suggests some alternative conceptions of the intuitive personologist.     

Response competition effects insame-different judgments

An account ofsame-different discriminations that is based upon a continuous-flow model of visual information processing (C. W. Eriksen & Schultz, 1979) and response competition and inhibition between the responses by which the subject signifies his judgment is presented. We show that a response signifyingsame will on the average be executed faster due to less priming or incipient activation of the competing response,different. In the experiment, the subjects matched letters on the basis of physical identity. The degree of priming ofdifferent responses on same trials and ofsame responses ondifferent trials was manipulated by an extraneous noise letter placed in the display. Latency for judgments onsame trials increased as the feature overlap of noise and target letters decreased. Latencies were shorter ondifferent trials when the noise letter was dissimilar to either target letter than when the noise letter was the same as one of the targets. These results were consistent with the response-competition interpretation.     

Situated anticipation

In cognitive science, long-term anticipation, such as when planning to do something next year, is typically seen as a form of ‘higher’ cognition, requiring a different account than the more basic activities that can be understood in terms of responsiveness to ‘affordances,’ i.e. to possibilities for action. Starting from architects that anticipate the possibility to make an architectural installation over the course of many months, in this paper we develop a process-based account of affordances that includes long-term anticipation within its scope. We present a framework in which situations and their affordances unfold, and can be thought of as continuing a history of practices into a current situational activity. In this activity affordances invite skilled participants to act further. Via these invitations one situation develops into the other; an unfolding process that sets up the conditions for its own continuation. Central to our process account of affordances is the idea that engaged individuals can be responsive to the direction of the process to which their actions contribute. Anticipation, at any temporal scale, is then part and parcel of keeping attuned to the movement of the unfolding situations to which an individual contributes. We concretize our account by returning to the example of anticipation observed in architectural practice. This account of anticipation opens the door to considering a wide array of human activities traditionally characterized as ‘higher’ cognition in terms of engaging with affordances.