Looking at Body Image: The Organization of Self-Knowledge About Physical Appearance and Its Relation to Disordered Eating

This study examined the organization of self-knowledge, with special attention to beliefs about physical appearance, in three groups of college-aged women: high body dissatisfaction with symptoms of disordered eating; high body dissatisfaction with no symptoms of disorder; and low body dissatisfaction. In the nondisordered, dissatisfied group, negative beliefs about physical appearance were organized in the self-structure in a way that isolated those beliefs and might minimize their impact and importance. This group also displayed adaptive types of self-concept organization (evaluative integration for those with important negative self-beliefs and compartmentalization for those with important positive beliefs) and effective coping strategies. Features of self-structure that characterize the nondisordered,dissatisfied group may provide a useful model for helping individuals with disordered eating cope with their negative physical appearance beliefs.     

Can Bartlett’s repeated reproduction experiments be replicated?

Surprisingly, Bartlett's (1932) famous repeated reproduction experiments, in which he found systematically increasing errors in recall from the same people tested over time, have never been successfully replicated. Several studies have attempted partial replications, which were unsuccessful, and their authors concluded that the original observations might not be replicable. We conducted a study modeled closely after Bartlett's procedures: Subjects studied "The War of the Ghosts," took an initial test 15 min later, and then took a delayed test after 1 week. A follow-up test was conducted 6 months later on as many subjects as could be obtained. We did replicate Bartlett's results, in that (1) subjects forgot the story over delays but (2) introduced rationalization and distortion into their accounts of the story, with increases in the proportion of material distorted as retention interval increased. Subjects also imported new propositions at long delays, further confirming Bartlett's empirical observations and conclusions. Bartlett's repeated reproduction results can be replicated.     

Sweet-cheeks vs. pea-brain: embodiment,valence, and task all influence the emotional salience of language

Previous research has found that more embodied insults (e.g. numbskull) are identified faster and more accurately than less embodied insults (e.g. idiot). The linguistic processing of embodied compliments has not been well explored. In the present study, participants completed two tasks where they identified insults and compliments, respectively. Half of the stimuli were more embodied than the other half. We examined the late positive potential (LPP) component of event-related potentials in early (400–500?ms), middle (500–600?ms), and late (600–700?ms) time windows. Increased embodiment resulted in improved response accuracy to compliments in both tasks, whereas it only improved accuracy for insults in the compliment detection task. More embodied stimuli elicited a larger LPP than less embodied stimuli in the early time window. Insults generated a larger LPP in the late time window in the insult task; compliments generated a larger LPP in the early window in the compliment task. These results indicate that electrophysiological correlates of emotional language perception are sensitive to both top-down and bottom-up processes.     

Splitting a Difference of Opinion: The Shift to Negotiation

Negotiation is not only used to settle differences of interest but also to settle differences of opinion. Discussants who are unable to resolve their difference about the objective worth of a policy or action proposal may be willing to abandon their attempts to convince the other and search instead for a compromise that would, for each of them, though only a second choice yet be preferable to a lasting conflict. Our questions are: First, when is it sensible to enter into negotiations and when would this be unwarranted or even fallacious? Second, what is the nature of a compromise? What does it mean to settle instead of resolve a difference of opinion, and what might be the dialectical consequences of mistaking a compromise for a substantial resolution? Our main aim is to contribute to the theory of argumentation within the context of negotiation and compromise formation and to show how arguing disputants can shift to negotiation in a dialectically virtuous way.     

Why and when peer prediction is superior to self-prediction: the weight given to future aspiration versus past achievement

Peer predictions of future behavior and achievement are often more accurate than those furnished by the self. Although both self- and peer predictions correlate equally with future outcomes, peers tend to avoid the degree of overoptimism so often seen in self-predictions. In 3 studies, the authors tested whether this differential accuracy arises because people give more weight to past behavior when predicting others, but emphasize agentic information, in particular data about their aspiration level, when predicting the self. Studies 1 and 3 showed that the exact same participants rated past behavior more diagnostic of future performance when predicting another person but viewed aspiration-level data as more valuable when someone else was trying to predict them. In Studies 2 and 3 (predicting an upcoming exam score and performance in a lab task, respectively), participants gave greater weight in self-predictions to aspiration-level data than did a yoked peer, who instead gave greater weight to evidence of past achievement. This differential weighting explained why peer predictions tended to be less optimistic and, thus, more accurate. Discussion centers on strategies for predicting future behavior and why people may remain ignorant of their own incompetence despite feedback.