The Net in the Park

Ubiquitous Computing, Pervasive Computing, Physical Computing, Everyware, Tangible User Interface, and the Internet of Things all share the same viewpoint—a viewpoint that sees computers, phones, and game consoles as no longer being the only devices in our environment deemed worthy to embody computation and be connected. Each of these approaches focuses on slightly different aspects of the features and potentialities of the enabling technologies (i.e., Physical Computing focuses on the growing power of microcontrollers; IOT on the increasing influence of tagging systems; Everyware on the pervasiveness of the web through wired and wireless connections, etc.) We understand and place more emphasis on the similarities then the differences among these approaches, and at the same time, we try to address specific human activity issues by exploiting these new enabling technologies and visions. In the paper, we present a project, Wi-roni, that addresses two issues: in-person communication and the added value of being in a given location when accessing a given content. To this end, we considered in some detail the possibilities of three of these enabling technologies: ultrasound sensors, MEMS, and mash-up of Internet application. These technologies were chosen based on the nature of the human activity, and not vice versa. In Wi-roni, an Urban Architecture project located in the La Gora public park in Monteroni d'Arbia, a small village in the province of Siena (Italy), we developed two interconnect solutions: Wi-wave, a column for accessing web audio content in public spaces, and Wi-swing, a children’s swing that tells stories while swinging. These devices represent both the concrete grounds from which to begin to address the abovementioned human activity issues and the playground in which to explore the new, emerging interaction modalities that the enabling technologies could allow.     

European norms and equations for a two dimensional presentation of values as measured with Schwartz's 21‐item portrait values questionnaire

The present study utilizes European Social Survey (ESS) data to introduce European norms and equations for computation of the Self‐Transcendence—Self‐Enhancement and Conservation—Openness to Change value dimensions, as measured with the 21‐item Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ). Our analysis of ESS round 1 and 2 data suggest that the two‐dimensional structure and the equations based on this structure are extremely robust. Presenting the two value dimensions besides the 10 basic values offers the advantages of (a) heightened reliability, (b) control of response tendency, and (c) possibility to present results in two‐dimensional space. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Self‐esteem and values

The purpose of the present study was to connect personal values to self‐esteem in 14 samples (N = 3612) of pre‐professionals, high school students, and adults, from Finland, Russia, Switzerland, Italy, and Estonia. Self‐enhancement values (power, achievement) and openness to change values (self‐direction, stimulation) were positively, and self‐transcendence values (universalism, benevolence) and conservation values (tradition) were negatively related to self‐esteem. These direct relations between values and self‐esteem were only partly consistent with predictions derived from Maslow's theory of growth and deficiency needs. In samples of pre‐professionals, self‐esteem was correlated with congruence between personal values and the prevailing values environment. On the group‐level, endorsement of achievement and universalism values was more strongly and positively related to self‐esteem in samples where these values were considered more important. In contrast, endorsement of self‐direction and hedonism values was more strongly and positively related to self‐esteem in samples where these values were considered less important. These group‐level results are interpreted as suggesting that attainment of culturally significant goals may raise self‐esteem, but that high self‐esteem may be required for the pursuit of less socially desirable goals. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Childhood and adolescent predictors of early adult career pathways

Individual and contextual factors in childhood and adolescence that were hypothesized to contribute to career pathways were examined in a prospective study. Four career pathway groups were distinguished in a sample of 202 at-risk men (23-24 years of age); namely, young men with long-term unemployment, short-term unemployment, full employment, or a college education. Measures of educational attainment, family and peer characteristics, and personal adjustment during childhood and adolescence were used to determine if they would predict early adult career pathways. Findings indicated that the long-term unemployed young men, overall, showed the poorest levels of educational attainment, family and peer characteristics, and personal adjustment during childhood and adolescence.The most important predictors of differing career pathways were educational attainment, arrests, and mental health problems. Implications of the findings for conceptualizing the school-to-work transition within an integrative framework are discussed.     

Belief Revision,Rational Choice and the Unity of Reason

Hans Rott has argued, most recently in his book Change, Choice and Inference, that certain formal correspondences between belief revision and rational choice have important philosophical implications, claiming that the former strongly indicate the unity of practical and theoretical reason as well as the primacy of practical reason. In this paper, I confront Rott's argument with three serious challenges. My conclusion is that, while Rott's work is indisputable as a formal achievement, the philosophical consequences he wants to draw are not forthcoming. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Avoiding Epistemic Hell: Levi on Pragmatism and Inconsistency

Isaac Levi has claimed that our reliance on the testimony of others, and on the testimony of the senses, commonly produces inconsistency in our set of full beliefs. This happens if what is reported is inconsistent with what we believe to be the case. Drawing on a conception of the role of beliefs in inquiry going back to Dewey, Levi has maintained that the inconsistent belief corpus is a state of ``epistemic hell'': it is useless as a basis for inquiry and deliberation. As he has also noticed, the compatibility of these two elements of his pragmatist epistemology could be called into question. For if inconsistency means hell, how can it ever be rational to enter that state, and on what basis could we attempt to regain consistency? Levi, nonetheless, has tried to show that the conflict is only apparent and that no changes of his theory are necessary. In the main part of the paper I argue, by contrast, that his attempts to reconcile these components of his view are unsuccessful.The conflict is real andthus presents a genuine threat to Deweyan pragmatism, as understood by Levi. After an attempt to pinpoint exactly where the source of the problem lies, I explore some possibilities for how to come to grips with it. I conclude that Levi can keep his fundamental thesis concerning the role of beliefs in inquiry and deliberation, provided that he (i) gives up the view that the agent can legitimately escape from inconsistency, and (ii) modifies his account of prediction alias deliberate expansion by acknowledging a third desideratum, besides probability and informational value, namely, not to cause permanent breakdown further down the line of inquiry. The result is a position which is more similar to Peter Gärdenfors's than is Levi's original theory, while retaining the basic insights of the latter.     

How to Be an Alethically Rational Naturalist

Alvin Plantinga has famously argued that naturalism is self-defeating. Plantinga's argument is, at its heart, an argument from analogy. Plantinga presents various epistemic situations and claims of each that (i) a person in such a situation has an undefeated defeater for each of his beliefs, and (ii) a reflective naturalist is in a relevantly similar situation. I present various epistemic situations and claim of each that a person in such a situation does not have an undefeated defeater for each of his beliefs. I further claim that at least some of these situations are more relevantly like the situation faced by the reflective naturalist than any of the situations Plantinga describes. Therefore, Plantinga's argument fails to establish that the reflective naturalist has an undefeated defeater for each of his beliefs and hence fails to establish that naturalism is self-defeating.