Applying a logic of appropriateness to understand behavioral differences between common resource dilemmas and public good dilemmas

Common resource dilemmas (CRDs) and public good dilemmas (PGDs) are distinct types of social dilemmas, yet they model the same underlying conflict between the collective interest and one's self-interest. Here, we study and interpret behavioral differences between these two main types of social dilemmas by applying a logic of appropriateness. In two experiments, we argue and demonstrate that CRDs, relative to PGDs, evoke higher levels of cooperation, because taking from collective property (in CRDs) is generally considered less appropriate than not giving from personal property (in PGDs). Importantly, these differential considerations of appropriateness are reflected not only in the willingness to cooperate but also in the willingness to punish and reward others' (non)cooperative behavior. Taken together, the findings reveal that CRDs and PGDs elicit different norms of appropriateness.     

How is Self‐Forgiveness Possible?

The idea of self‐forgiveness poses a serious challenge to any philosopher interested in giving a general account of forgiveness. On the one hand, it is an uncontroversial part of our common psychological and moral discourse. On the other, any account of self‐forgiveness is inconsistent with any general account of forgiveness which implies that only the victim of an offense can forgive. To avoid this conclusion, one must either challenge the particular claims that preclude self‐forgiveness or offer an independently plausible account of self‐forgiveness. I deploy both strategies in this article, explaining what self‐forgiveness is and how it is possible.     

Relapse as a model of nonadherence to dietary treatment of diabetes

The generality of Marlatt and Gordon's (1980, 1985) model of relapse to dietary treatment of diabetes was tested. Forty-six adults with insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus (IDDM) and 43 obese adults with non-insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus were interviewed regarding their most recent dietary violations, and the results were coded using the schema developed by Marlatt and Gordon. As the model would predict, most nonadherence episodes occurred in a limited range of high-risk situations. Although the two diagnostic groups lapsed in remarkably similar situations, there was a tendency for the IDDM adults to report a larger proportion of lapses in situations characterized by negative emotions. Approximately 27% of the dietary lapses occurred when the person was busy with a competing activity or had no choice, and these lapses did not fit into Marlatt and Gordon's coding schema. These violations consistently differed from those studied by Marlatt and Gordon in that they were errors of omission rather than errors of commission. Evidence for the abstinence violation effect was not found in this sample. Overall, the results suggest that most nonadherence to dietary treatment of diabetes may be best understood as intermittent lapses that typically do not develop into full-blown relapses.     

The Importance of Definitional and Temporal Issues in the Study of Resilience

Despite recent interest in the topic of resilience in organisations, much work is still needed to advance our understanding of this important area of inquiry. With this in mind, the authors argue that the study of resilience would benefit from (1) greater definitional clarity and (2) explicit inclusion of temporal issues in theoretical conceptualisations of resilience. Based on a systematic review of the literature, we advocate for a concise definition of resilience, along with a heuristic framework intended to meaningfully categorise the various elements, features, and experiences implicated by the concept of resilience, including (a) adversity triggers, (b) resilience outcomes, (c) resilience mechanisms, and (d) resilience promoting factors. This is followed by a discussion of temporal issues in relation to each of the four categories above. Various propositions and recommendations for future research are also presented.     

Quine’s Behaviorism and Linguistic Meaning: Why Quine’s Behaviorism is not Illicit

Some of Quine’s critics charge that he arrives at a behavioristic account of linguistic meaning by starting from inappropriately behavioristic assumptions (Kripke 1982, 14; Searle 1987, 123). Quine has even written that this account of linguistic meaning is a consequence of his behaviorism (Quine 1992, 37). I take it that the above charges amount to the assertion that Quine assumes the denial of one or more of the following claims: (1) Language-users associate mental ideas with their linguistic expressions. (2) A language-user can have a private theory of linguistic meaning which guides his or her use of language. (3) Language learning relies on innate mechanisms. Call an antecedent denial of one or more of these claims illicit behaviorism. In this paper I show that Quine is prepared to grant, if only for the sake of argument, all three of the above claims. I argue that his claim that “there is nothing in linguistic meaning beyond what is to be gleaned from overt behavior in observable circumstances” is unscathed by these allowances (Quine 1992, 38). And I show that the behaviorism which Quine does assume should be viewed as a largely uncontroversial aspect of his evidential empiricism. I conclude that if one sets out to dismiss Quine’s arguments for internal-meaning skepticism, this dismissal should not be motivated by the charge that his conclusions rely on the illicitly behavioristic assumptions that some have suggested that they do.