Adolescent Group Psychotherapy: Collaborative Opportunity for Patients,Parents, and Therapist

This brief report examines the uses of an Observation Team with a Parent Support Group. In particular, attention is placed on the idea of the Observation Team acting as a Reflecting Team in the final session of the group's life. Using the Observation Team in this manner has evolved from an amalgamation of ideas from family therapy and group therapy theory.     

Transfer of Motor Learning Engages Specific Neural Substrates During Motor Memory Consolidation Dependent on the Practice Structure

The authors investigated how brain activity during motor-memory consolidation contributes to transfer of learning to novel versions of a motor skill following distinct practice structures. They used 1 Hz repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (rTMS) immediately after constant or variable practice of an arm movement skill to interfere with primary motor cortex (M1) or dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). The effect of interference was assessed through skill performance on two transfer targets: one within and one outside the range of practiced movement parameters for the variable practice group. For the control (no rTMS) group, variable practice benefited delayed transfer performance more than constant practice. The rTMS effect on delayed transfer performance differed for the two transfer targets. For the within-range target, rTMS interference had no significant affect on the delayed transfer after either practice structure. However, for the outside-range target, rTMS interference to DLPFC but not M1 attenuated delayed transfer benefit following variable practice. Additionally, for the outside-range target, rTMS interference to M1 but not DLPFC attenuated delayed transfer following constant practice. This suggests that variable practice may promote reliance on DLPFC for memory consolidation associated with outside-range transfer of learning, whereas constant practice may promote reliance on M1 for consolidation and long-term transfer.     

Context-Dependent Learning in People With Parkinson's Disease

Context-dependent learning is a phenomenon in which people demonstrate superior performance in the context in which they originally learned a skill but perform less well in a novel context. This study investigated context-dependent learning in people with Parkinson's disease (PD) and age-matched nondisabled adults. All participants practiced 3 finger sequences, each embedded within a unique context (colors and locations on a computer screen). One day after practice, the participants were tested either under the sequence-context associations remained the same as during practice, or the sequence-context associations were changed (SWITCH). Compared with nondisabled adults, people with PD demonstrated significantly greater decrement in performance (especially movement time) under the SWITCH condition, suggesting that individuals with PD are more context dependent than nondisabled adults.     

Self-Actualization of “Paranormals”

A sample of 56 Ss nominated by others as paranormals and self-stated as experiencing paranormal (occult) phenomena, were administered measures purportedly reflected dimensions of the self-actualization concept. Ss reported both their interest in, and experience of, 15 areas of paranormal phenomena. Ss were given the Marlowe-Crown Social Desirability Scale (measuring ego-defensiveness), Shostrom's Self-Actualization Test (POI), and an Aphorism test (designed to measure degree of “expanded awareness”). Ss scores were compared with various normative and experimental group scores for the three tests. Although statistically significant differences were rare, there was usually a trend for paranormals to score in the direction of self-actualization on most measures.     

A Muscle Awareness Model for Changes in Rorschach Human Movement Responses

The present series of studies sought to provide evidence that M would increase under any conditions which make an S more aware of his muscles. The studies demonstrated that at least in women, M increased over a variety of conditions involving heightened muscle awareness. Specifically M increased in conditions utilizing muscle activation, deactivation, hypnosis, and focusing thoughts on the body musculature. The muscle awareness model unlike the sensory-tonic model accounts for increases in M following hyperactivity as well as inhibition.     

Sensuality and venality in Bangkok: The dynamics of cross‐cultural mapping of prostitution

The dynamics of cross‐cultural cognitive mapping is examined, from a Schuetzian perspective, on the example of the changing images formed by farangs (white foreigners) of Thai girls engaged in “open‐ended” tourist‐oriented prostitution, a vaguely‐defined, gray area lying between “full‐fledged prostitution” and “straight” sexuality. The newcomer farang, unable to grasp this culture‐specific category, initially tends to refuse to label the girls as “prostitutes,” but, with growing experience, tends to apply that label to them, without, however, thereby resetting the boundaries of his cognitive map. He thus fails to make the transition from strangeness to familiarity with the host culture, as conceived by Schuetz—since he continues to impose the crisp categorizations prevalent in his culture of origin, on a situation which is fuzzily conceived in different categories by the hosts. The case study exemplifies the difficulties of a cross‐cultural definition and identification of prostitution.     

Therapists' perceptions of healthy family functioning

Abstract

For several decades family theorists, researchers, and clinicians have attempted to describe healthy and dysfunctional family functioning. The numerous articles and studies with this focus have been reviewed elsewhere (Riskin & Faunce, 1972; Jacob, 1975). Until recently a disproportionate amount of attention has been given to pathology. Several volumes in the past few years have tried to redress this bias by focusing primarily on healthy family functioning (Kantor & Lehr, 1976; Lewis, Beavers, Gossett & Phillips, 1976).     

Expect the Unexpected? Variations in Question Type Elicit Cues to Deception in Joint Interviewer Contexts

We examined the effect of (i) a second interviewer's demeanour and (ii) asking expected and unexpected questions on cues to deception. We predicted that liars compared with truth tellers would provide more detail to expected questions and less detail to unexpected questions, particularly when the second interviewer is supportive. Liars prepare answers for expected questions, and a supportive interviewer will encourage them to provide more detail. By definition, liars have not prepared answers for unexpected questions, and their answers to such questions will be less detailed. Participants (N = 168) appeared before two interviewers: The first asked all the questions, and the second remained silent. The second interviewer exhibited either a supportive or a neutral demeanour. As predicted, liars provided more detail to expected questions and less detail to unexpected questions, particularly when the second interviewer was supportive. In conclusion, a supportive second interviewer elicits cues to deceit. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Revisions and Regret: The Cost of Changing your Mind

Decision reversals often imply improved decisions. Yet, people show a strong resistance against changing their minds. These are well‐established findings, which suggest that changed decisions carry a subjective cost, perhaps by being more strongly regretted. Three studies were conducted to explore participants' regret when making reversible decisions and to test the hypothesis that changing one's mind will increase post‐outcome regret. The first two studies employed the Ultimatum game and the Trust game. The third study used a variant of the Monty Hall problem. All games were conducted by individual participants playing interactively against a computer. The outcomes were designed to capture a common characteristic of real‐life decisions: they varied from rather negative to fairly positive, and for every outcome, it was possible to imagine both more and less profitable outcomes. In all experiments, those who changed their minds reported much stronger post‐outcome regret than those who did not change, even if the final outcomes were equally good (Experiments 2 and 3) or better (Experiment 1).This finding was not because of individual differences with respect to gender, tendency to regret, or tendency to maximize. Previous studies have found that those who change from a correct to wrong option regret more than those who select a wrong option directly. This study indicates that this finding is a special case of a more general phenomenon: changing one's mind seems to come with a cost, even when one ends up with favorable outcomes. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.