Possible barnum effect in the five factor model: do respondents accept random neo personality inventory-revised scores as their actual trait profile?

This study investigated a possible Barnum effect in personality traits, i.e., that persons accept a false trait profile as correct. Having answered the Norwegian translation of the NEO Personality Inventory-Revised, a group of 75 students, 56 (five women military aviation cadets and 19 (10 women) graduate students, received a random T-score profile and were asked to rate their agreement on a 7-point scale. For all personality traits, i.e., facets and domains measured by the NEO Personality Inventory-Revised, positive correlations ranging from .08 to .64 were found between the agreement ratings and the similarity between the random false scores and the actual scores. The respondents identified and rejected random T scores that deviated far from their actual scores, which works against the Barnum effect. Correct identification correlated negatively with Neuroticism r = -.41) and positively (r = .53) with Conscientiousness.     

Necessity of spatial pooling for the perception of heading in nonrigid environments

This study examined whether the perception of heading is determined by spatially pooling velocity information. Observers were presented displays simulating observer motion through a volume of 3-D objects. To test the importance of spatial pooling, the authors systematically varied the nonrigidity of the flow field using two types of object motion: adding a unique rotation or translation to each object. Calculations of the signal-to-noise (observer velocity-to-object motion) ratio indicated no decrements in performance when the ratio was .39 for object rotation and .45 for object translation. Performance also increased with the number of objects in the scene. These results suggest that heading is determined by mechanisms that use spatial pooling over large regions.     

Cognitive efficiency on a match to sample task decreases at the onset of puberty in children

Electrocortical evidence indicates that a wave of synaptic proliferation occurs in the frontal lobes around the age of puberty onset. To study its potential influence on cognition, we examined 246 children (10-17 years) and 49 young adults (18-22 years) using a match-to-sample type of task to measure reaction times to assess emotionally related information. Based upon the instruction set, subjects made a yes/no decision about the emotion expressed in a face, a word, or a face/word combination presented tachistoscopically for 100 ms. The faces were images of a single individual with a happy, angry, sad or neutral expression. The words were 'happy,' 'angry,' 'sad,' or 'neutral,' In the combined stimulus condition, subjects were asked to decide if the face and word matched for the same emotion. Results showed that compared to the previous year, reaction times were significantly slower for making a correct decision at 11 and 12 years of age in girls and boys, the approximate ages of puberty onset. The peripubertal rise in reaction time declined slowly over the following 2-3 years and stabilized by 15 years of age. Analyses of the performance of 15-17 year olds revealed significantly longer reaction times in females to process both faces and words compared to males. However, this sex difference in late puberty appeared to be transient since it was not present in 18-22 year olds. Given the match-to-sample nature of the task employed, the puberty related increases in reaction time may reflect a relative inefficiency in frontal circuitry prior to the pruning of excess synaptic contacts.     

Perceived depth of 3-D objects in 3-D scenes

Effects of information specifying the position of an object in a 3-D scene were investigated in two experiments with twelve observers. To separate the effects of the change in scene position from the changes in the projection that occur with increased distance from the observer, the same projections were produced by simulating (a) a constant object at different scene positions and (b) different objects at the same scene position. The simulated scene consisted of a ground plane, a ceiling plane, and a cylinder on a pole attached to both planes. Motion-parallax scenes were studied in one experiment; texture-gradient scenes were studied in the other. Observers adjusted a line to match the perceived internal depth of the cylinder. Judged depth for objects matched in simulated size decreased as simulated distance from the observer increased. Judged depth decreased at a faster rate for the same projections shown at a constant scene position. Adding object-centered depth information (object rotation) increased judged depth for the motion-parallax displays. These results demonstrate that the judged internal depth of an object is reduced by the change in projection that occurs with increased distance, but this effect is diminished if information for change in scene position accompanies the change in projection.     

Pursuit compensation during self-motion

The pattern of motion in the retinal image during self-motion contains information about the person's movement. Pursuit eye movements perturb the pattern of retinal-image motion, complicating the problem of self-motion perception. A question of considerable current interest is the relative importance of retinal and extra-retinal signals in compensating for these effects of pursuit on the retinal image. We addressed this question by examining the effect of prior motion stimuli on self-motion judgments during pursuit. Observers viewed 300 ms random-dot displays simulating forward self-motion during pursuit to the right or to the left; at the end of each display a probe appeared and observers judged whether they would pass left or right of it. The display was preceded by a 300 ms dot pattern that was either stationary or moved in the same direction as, or opposite to, the eye movement. This prior motion stimulus had a large effect on self-motion judgments when the simulated scene was a frontoparallel wall (experiment 1), but not when it was a three-dimensional (3-D) scene (experiment 2). Corresponding simulated-pursuit conditions controlled for purely retinal motion aftereffects, implying that the effect in experiment 1 is mediated by an interaction between retinal and extra-retinal signals. In experiment 3, we examined self-motion judgments with respect to a 3-D scene with mixtures of real and simulated pursuit. When real and simulated pursuits were in opposite directions, performance was determined by the total amount of pursuit-related retinal motion, consistent with an extra-retinal 'trigger' signal that facilitates the action of a retinally based pursuit-compensation mechanism. However, results of experiment 1 without a prior motion stimulus imply that extra-retinal signals are more informative when retinal information is lacking. We conclude that the relative importance of retinal and extra-retinal signals for pursuit compensation varies with the informativeness of the retinal motion pattern, at least for short durations. Our results provide partial explanations for a number of findings in the literature on perception of self-motion and motion in the frontal plane.     

Water Mist Punishment for Two Classes of Problem Behaviour

A study with multiple baseline design across situations and response-classes was used to evaluate the effects of a water mist procedure used for punishment of two classes of problem behaviour in a 50-year-old woman with severe mental retardation. Problem behaviour was reduced to less than 5% of baseline. After 19 months the problem behaviour was still reduced, and had stabilized at a level below 10% of baseline. Due to financial economies the local community authorities terminated the treatment, which resulted in a marked increase in the rate of problem behaviour.     

Do computer simulations support the Argument from Disagreement?

According to the Argument from Disagreement (AD) widespread and persistent disagreement on ethical issues indicates that our moral opinions are not influenced by moral facts, either because there are no such facts or because there are such facts but they fail to influence our moral opinions. In an innovative paper, Gustafsson and Peterson (Synthese, published online 16 October, 2010) study the argument by means of computer simulation of opinion dynamics, relying on the well-known model of Hegselmann and Krause (J Artif Soc Soc Simul 5(3):1–33, 2002; J Artif Soc Soc Simul 9(3):1–28, 2006). Their simulations indicate that if our moral opinions were influenced at least slightly by moral facts, we would quickly have reached consensus, even if our moral opinions were also affected by additional factors such as false authorities, external political shifts and random processes. Gustafsson and Peterson conclude that since no such consensus has been reached in real life, the simulation gives us increased reason to take seriously the AD. Our main claim in this paper is that these results are not as robust as Gustafsson and Peterson seem to think they are. If we run similar simulations in the alternative Laputa simulation environment developed by Angere and Olsson (Angere, Synthese, forthcoming and Olsson, Episteme 8(2):127–143, 2011) considerably less support for the AD is forthcoming.     

Religiously Conservative Citizens and the Ideal of Conscientious Engagement: A Comment on Wolterstorff and Eberle

Nicholas Wolterstorff and Christopher J. Eberle have defended the view that the ethics of liberal citizenship allows citizens to publicly support the passage of coercive laws based solely on their religious convictions. They also develop positive conceptions of virtuous citizenship that place moral limits on how citizens may appeal to their religion. The question I address in this essay is whether the limits they impose on citizens’ appeals to their religion are adequate. Since Eberle’s “ideal of conscientious engagement” provides us with the most extensive statement of these limits, it is the primary focus of my attention here. My conclusion is that in its current form, Eberle’s ideal is not constraining enough. In the first section, I argue that Eberle’s ideal does not require citizens to be self-critical enough about their religious and political commitments. In the second section, I highlight a conflict between Eberle’s ideal and the need for citizens to respect the religious freedom of their fellow citizens. I argue that the way to resolve this conflict is to adopt a more fine-grained conception of religious reasons and to hold that citizens should not rely on religious reasons of certain kinds. In the final section, I argue that laws punishing or discouraging homosexual conduct (which Eberle’s ideal would apparently allow) violate what Wolterstorff calls “the Idea of liberal democracy” and so are not the kind of proposal that virtuous citizens can defend.