The duration of response inhibition in the stop-signal paradigm varies with response force

In a previous study, we have found that the speed of stopping a response is delayed when response readiness is reduced by cuing the probability of no-go trials [Acta Psychol. 111 (2002) 155]. Other investigators observed that responses are more forceful when the probability to respond is low than when it is high (e.g. [Quart. J. Exp. Psychol. A 50 (1997) 405]). In this study, the hypothesis was tested that low probability responses are more forceful than high probability responses and that these responses are more difficult to stop. Subjects performed on a choice reaction task and on three tasks with respectively 100%, 80%, and 50% response probabilities. Stop signals were presented on 30% of the trials, instructing subjects to withhold their response. Response force on non-signal (go) trials and the duration of response inhibition on signal (stop) trials increased as response probability decreased. This pattern of findings was interpreted to support the hypothesis predicting that stopping is more difficult when response readiness is low than when it is high.     

The multiple meanings of secondary gain

The historical development of the concept of secondary gain is described in this article. Freud introduced this concept as a complement to primary gain. Freud modified the scope of both concepts during his career, but they remained within the boundary of an intrapsychological mechanism. Outside psychoanalysis, the concept of secondary gain has acquired further meaning with higher emphasis on interpersonal and social aspects. Consequently, it is often unclear what a writer or speaker means when he uses the term secondary gain. The different meanings of secondary gain in and outside psychoanalysis are illustrated with reference to literature and case reports.     

The paradoxical effects of suppressing anxious thoughts during imminent threat

In line with the ironic processing theory of Wegner (Psychol. Rev. 101 (1994) 34), it is often argued that the suppression of anxiety-related thoughts results in a paradoxical increase of anxiety and thought intrusions, both after and during the thought suppression. In a sample of undergraduate students (14 men, 18 women), we investigated the effects of suppressing anxious thoughts about an imminent painful electrocutaneous stimulus. During thought suppression, self-reported anxiety and frequency of anxious thoughts did not increase, and duration of anxious thoughts decreased. After thought suppression, participants experienced an increase in self-reported anxiety and the frequency of anxious thoughts. There was no effect upon thought duration. The results support the idea that suppression of anxiety-related thoughts may result in a paradoxical increase in anxiety, and may cause and/or maintain anxiety problems.     

Suppressing unwanted memories: where there is a will,there is a way?

Research suggests that suppressing unwanted thoughts, generally, is an ineffective thought control strategy, because suppression attempts oftentimes fail, and, furthermore, result in a paradoxical increase of unwanted thoughts, later on. The present study sought to investigate whether manipulated expectations about suppression efficacy determine actual effects of suppression attempts. To test this hypothesis, participants listened to an audiotaped story, and were subsequently appointed to one of four conditions: a no-instruction-control (n = 20), suppression (n = 20), suppression-works (n = 20; participants were told that suppression generally is a fruitful strategy), or suppression-does-not-work (n = 25; participants were told that suppression primarily has paradoxical effects) condition. Two hours later, participants' memories of the story were tested, and several metamemory questions were answered. Induced expectations actually determined the perceived efficacy of suppression attempts, as well as thought frequency, although perceived or actual accuracy of recollections was not affected by the instructions.     

An experimental test of the effect of weight-loss dieting on bulimic pathology: tipping the scales in a different direction

Although it is widely accepted that dieting increases the risk for bulimic pathology, this hypothesis has not been tested in a randomized experiment. Accordingly, the authors conducted an experimental test of the dietary restraint model by randomly assigning nonobese women (N = 82) to either a 6-week, low-calorie diet or a waitlist control condition. The diet intervention resulted in significant weight loss, confirming that dieting was successfully manipulated. Contrary to the restraint model, dieting resulted in significant decreases in bulimic symptoms relative to the control condition. Results converge with past findings from randomized obesity prevention and treatment trials and provide evidence that dieting does not promote bulimic pathology; rather, effective decreases in caloric intake appear to reduce bulimic symptoms.     

Interidentity amnesia for neutral,episodic information in dissociative identity disorder

Interidentity amnesia is considered a hallmark of dissociative identity disorder (DID) in clinical practice. In this study, objective methods of testing episodic memory transfer between identities were used. Tests of both recall (interference paradigm) and recognition were used. A sample of 31 DID patients was included. Additionally, 50 control subjects participated, half functioning as normal controls and the other half simulating interidentity amnesia. Twenty-one patients subjectively reported complete one-way amnesia for the learning episode. However, objectively, neither recall nor recognition scores of patients were different from those of normal controls. It is suggested that clinical models of amnesia in DID may be specified to exclude episodic memory impairments for emotionally neutral material.     

What response times tell of children's behavior on the balance scale task

Analysis of accuracy of responses to balance scale problems gives a global idea of the cognitive processes that underlie problem-solving behavior on this task. We show that response times (RTs) provide additional detailed information about the kind and duration of these processes. We derive predictions about the RTs from Siegler's (1981) model for the balance scale task, including the counterintuitive prediction that young adults are slower than children in solving particular balance scale problems. The predictions were tested in a study in which 191 6- to 22-year-old participants were presented with a computerized balance scale task. RTs were analyzed with regression models. In addition to qualitative differences between items, we also modeled quantitative differences between items in the regression models. Analyses supported the predictions and provided additional knowledge on the rules. Rule II was reformulated as a rule that always involves the encoding, but not always the correct application of the distance cue. RTs provided evidence for the use of a buggy-rule and not an addition-rule. Finally, a relation between rule inconsistency and increased RT was found.     

Do people still report dreaming in black and white? An attempt to replicate a questionnaire from 1942

In the 1940s and 1950s many people in the United States appear to have thought they dreamed in black and white. For example, Middleton (1942) found that 70.7% of 277 college sophomores reported "rarely" or "never" seeing colors in their dreams. The present study replicated Middleton's questionnaire and found that a sample of 124 students in 2001 reported a significantly greater rate of colored dreaming than the earlier sample, with only 17.7% saying that they "rarely" or "never" see colors in their dreams. Assuming that dreams themselves have not changed over this time period, it appears that one or the other (or both) groups of respondents must be profoundly mistaken about a basic feature of their dream experiences.     

Using response times to detect aberrant responses in computerized adaptive testing

A lognormal model for response times is used to check response times for aberrances in examinee behavior on computerized adaptive tests. Both classical procedures and Bayesian posterior predictive checks are presented. For a fixed examinee, responses and response times are independent; checks based on response times offer thus information independent of the results of checks on response patterns. Empirical examples of the use of classical and Bayesian checks for detecting two different types of aberrances in response times are presented. The detection rates for the Bayesian checks outperformed those for the classical checks, but at the cost of higher false-alarm rates. A guideline for the choice between the two types of checks is offered.This study received funding from the Law School Admission Council (LSAC). The opinions and conclusions contained in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the policy and position of LSAC. The authors are most indebted to Wim M. M. Tielen for his computational assistance and to the US Defense Manpower Data Center for the permission to use the ASVAB data set in the empirical examples.     

When stereotypes get in the way: stereotypes obstruct stereotype-inconsistent trait inferences

There is a growing body of evidence indicating that people spontaneously make trait inferences while observing the behavior of others. The present article reports a series of 5 experiments that examined the influence of stereotypes on the spontaneous inference of traits. Results consistently showed weaker spontaneous trait inferences for stereotype-inconsistent behavioral information than for stereotype-consistent and stereotype-neutral information. Taken together, the current results suggest that specific spontaneous trait inferences become obstructed by inhibitory processes when behavior is inconsistent with an already activated stereotype. These findings are discussed in relation to stereotype maintenance processes and recent models of attribution in social judgment.