When timing the mind one should also mind the timing: biases in the measurement of voluntary actions

Trevena and Miller (2002, this issue) provide further evidence that readiness potentials occur in the brain prior to the time that participants claim to have initiated a voluntary movement, a contention originally forwarded by Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl (1983). In their examination of this issue, though, aspects of their data lead them to question whether their measurement of the initiation of a voluntary movement was accurate. The current article addresses this concern by providing a direct analysis of biases in this task. This was done by asking participants to make subjective timing decisions regarding a stimulus that could be measured objectively. Our findings suggest that their timing task was indeed biased such that participants' tend to report events as happening approximately 70 ms later than they actually happened. Implications for the original Libet et al. claims are discussed.     

Physical,neural, and mental timing

The conclusions drawn by Benjamin Libet from his work with colleagues on the timing of somatosensorial conscious experiences has met with a lot of praise and criticism. In this issue we find three examples of the latter. Here I attempt to place the divide between the two opponent camps in a broader perspective by analyzing the question of the relation between physical timing, neural timing, and experiential (mental) timing. The nervous system does a sophisticated job of recombining and recoding messages from the sensorial surfaces and if these processes are slighted in a theory, it might become necessary to postulate weird operations, including subjective back-referral. Neuroscientifically inspired theories are of necessity still based on guesses, extrapolations, and philosophically dubious manners of speech. They often assume some neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) as a part of the nervous system that transforms neural activity in reportable experiences. The majority of neuroscientists appear to assume that the NCC can compare and bind activity patterns only if they arrive simultaneously at the NCC. This leads to a search for synchrony or to theories in terms of the compensation of differences in neural delays (latencies). This is the main dimension of the Libet discussion. Examples from vision research, such as "temporal-binding-by-synchrony" and the "flash-lag" effect, are then used to illustrate these reasoning patterns in more detail. Alternatively one could assume symbolic representations of time and space (symbolic "tags") that are not coded in their own dimension (not time in time and space in space). Unless such tags are multiplexed with the quality message (tickle, color, or motion), one gets a binding problem for tags. One of the hidden aspects of the discussion between Libet and opponents appears to be the following. Is the NCC smarter than the rest of the nervous system, so that it can solve the problems of local sign (e.g., "where is the event"?) and timing (e.g., "when did it occur?" and "how long did it last?") on its own, or are these pieces of information coded symbolically early on in the system? A supersmart NCC appears to be the assumption of Libet's camp (which includes Descartes, but also mystics). The wish to distribute the smartness evenly across all stages of processing in the nervous system (smart recodings) appears to motivate the opponents. I argue that there are reasons to side with the latter group.     

Influence of probe-trial selection on the location negative priming effect.

Using the location variant of the typical negative priming procedure, participants were cued (100% reliable) before (Experiment 1) or after (Experiment 2) the prime trial as to whether a distractor would or would not accompany the target on the probe trial. The crucial results were that on cued trials, the predictable absence, produced the removal of the negative priming effect (disengagement), and that this disengagement of the priming process, motivated by the predictable absence of a probe-trial distractor, could take place on-line. These findings demonstrated the "selection-state" dependency (probe trial) of the location negative priming process, supporting inhibition-based and episodic retrieval models in their contention that the ultimate function of this process is to enhance the efficiency of future distractor processing, and hence selection. The disengagement results revealed an adaptive feature of a process that can be detrimental or irrelevant to upcoming processing.     

A computational account of altered error processing in older age: Dopamine and the error-related negativity

When participants commit errors or receive feedback signaling that they have made an error, a negative brain potential is elicited. According to Holroyd and Coles’s (in press) neurocomputational model of error processing, this error-related negativity (ERN) is elicited when the brain first detects that the consequences of an action are worse than expected. To study age-related changes in error processing, we obtained performance and ERN measures of younger and high-functioning older adults. Experiment 1 demonstrated reduced ERN amplitudes in older adults in the context of otherwise intact brain potentials. This result could not be attributed to uncertainty about the required response in older adults. Experiment 2 revealed impaired performance and reduced response- and feedback-related ERNs of older adults in a probabilistic learning task. These age changes could be simulated by manipulation of a single parameter of the neurocomputational model, this manipulation corresponding to weakened phasic activity of the mesencephalic dopamine system.     

Phonological sensitivity and the acquisition of new words in children

Two studies are reported which aimed to examine the relationship between phonological sensitivity and the acquisition of new words that systematically differed in the familiarity of their sound structures. In the first study measures of phonological sensitivity, phonological short-term memory, vocabulary, and nonverbal ability were administered to forty-one 5-year-old children. Phonological sensitivity was related to the paired-associate learning of phonologically unfamiliar words, but not to the learning of familiar words. In the second study a group of 14 nonreading 5-year-old children received phonological sensitivity training. A control group was trained in semantic categorization. After the training, the phonological sensitivity group did perform better on measures of letter knowledge and phonological sensitivity (rhyme and first-sound categorization) and appeared to learn phonologically unfamiliar words more easily. The findings of both studies suggest that phonological sensitivity can support the acquisition of novel words.     

A sociohistorical view of group psychotherapy in the United States: the ideology of individualism and self-liberation

A deep strain of individualism permeates American culture, rooted in the political-economic ideology of capitalism. The ideal of a self-governing individual is promoted, independent from social, historical, and cultural forces, whose thoughts and emotions are located within the construct of a masterful self, ready to be filled and expanded. This article traces the influence of self-liberatory ideology in American group psychotherapy through the religious revivalist and Mental Hygiene movements. The "progressivism" of pioneering group theorists is examined in terms of revisionist psychology and self-liberatory practice. Psychodrama and T-groups are demonstrated to be precursors to the encounter group movement in which the belief in self-liberation reached its zenith. Early group analytic approaches are seen to eschew transpersonal and group dynamic processes.     

Tamara Dembo's European years: working with Lewin and Buytendijk

In this paper early work of the American rehabilitation psychologist Tamara Dembo (1902-1993) is brought to light. She was highly influenced by the concepts of Kurt Lewin's topological psychology, and she used the framework of topological psychology to analyze her investigations on animal behavior carried out with the Dutch zoopsychologist Frederik J. J. Buytendijk. These investigations have so far been ignored and are being described for the first time making use of archival materials.     

Effects of noncontingent reinforcement on problem behavior and stimulus engagement: the role of satiation, extinction, and alternative reinforcement

This study examined the effects of noncontingent reinforcement (NCR) with and without extinction on problem behavior and stimulus engagement (consumption of reinforcement) of 4 participants. Reductions in problem behavior using NCR have frequently been attributed to both satiation of the reinforcer and extinction. In the current study, aspects of the NCR treatment effects were difficult to explain based solely on either a satiation or an extinction account. Specifically, it was found that stimulus engagement remained high throughout the NCR treatment analysis, and that problem behavior was reduced to near-zero levels during NCR without extinction. The implications of these findings are discussed with respect to the satiation and extinction hypotheses frequently described in the applied literature. Findings from basic studies examining the effects of response-independent schedules are presented, and are used as the basis for a matching theory account of NCR-related effects. It is proposed that reductions in problem behavior observed during NCR interventions may be a function of the availability of alternative sources of reinforcement.