Aggressive Behavior and Peer Social Status of Elementary School Children

The relation between aggression and peer social status was investigated in a group of 238 third-through fifth-grade children. Peer social status refers to the degree to which a child is accepted by his or her peer group. By asking children to nominate peers they “like most” and “like least,” one can identify children who are popular, rejected, neglected, or viewed as average within their peer group. Results indicated low to moderate correlations between peer-nominated aggression and global indices of social acceptance. More specifically, it was found that aggressive children largely comprised the rejected and average social status groups, but not the popular or neglected groups. Furthermore, analyses indicated that according to both peers and teachers, aggressive/rejected children showed academic and social-skill deficits, whereas aggressive children of average peer status exhibited adequate adjustment similar to that of nonaggressive/average-status children. These results suggest the importance of considering peer social status when identifying aggressive children in need of intervention and in determining which skill deficits to address. In addition, knowledge of an aggressive child's peer status might be useful in enhancing the predictability of adult adjustment.     

How Experts Adapt Their Gaze Behavior When Modeling a Task to Novices

Domain experts regularly teach novice students how to perform a task. This often requires them to adjust their behavior to the less knowledgeable audience and, hence, to behave in a more didactic manner. Eye movement modeling examples (EMMEs) are a contemporary educational tool for displaying experts’ (natural or didactic) problem-solving behavior as well as their eye movements to learners. While research on expert-novice communication mainly focused on experts’ changes in explicit, verbal communication behavior, it is as yet unclear whether and how exactly experts adjust their nonverbal behavior. This study first investigated whether and how experts change their eye movements and mouse clicks (that are displayed in EMMEs) when they perform a task naturally versus teach a task didactically. Programming experts and novices initially debugged short computer codes in a natural manner. We first characterized experts’ natural problem-solving behavior by contrasting it with that of novices. Then, we explored the changes in experts’ behavior when being subsequently instructed to model their task solution didactically. Experts became more similar to novices on measures associated with experts’ automatized processes (i.e., shorter fixation durations, fewer transitions between code and output per click on the run button when behaving didactically). This adaptation might make it easier for novices to follow or imitate the expert behavior. In contrast, experts became less similar to novices for measures associated with more strategic behavior (i.e., code reading linearity, clicks on run button) when behaving didactically.     

COVID-19 and Religious Ethics

The editors of the JRE solicited short essays on the COVID-19 pandemic from a group of scholars of religious ethics that reflected on how the field might help them make sense of the complex religious, cultural, ethical, and political implications of the pandemic, and on how the pandemic might shape the future of religious ethics.     

Examples,practice problems,or both? Effects on motivation and learning in shorter and longer sequences

Research suggests some sequences of examples and problems (i.e., EE, EP) are more effective (higher test performance) and efficient (attained with equal/less mental effort) than others (PP, sometimes also PE). Recent findings suggest this is due to motivational variables (i.e., self-efficacy), but did not test this during the training phase. Moreover, prior research used only short task sequences. Therefore, we investigated effects on motivational variables, effectiveness, and efficiency in a short (Experiment 1; four learning tasks; n = 157) and longer task sequence (Experiment 2; eight learning tasks; n = 105). With short sequences, all example conditions were more effective, efficient, and motivating than PP. With longer sequences, all example conditions were more motivating and efficient than PP, but only EE was more effective than PP. Moreover, EE was most efficient during training, regardless of sequence length. These results suggest that example study (only) is more effective, efficient, and more motivating than PP.     

How do we judge our confidence? Differential effects of meta-memory feedback on eyewitness accuracy and confidence

According to the cue–belief model, we assess confidence in our memories using self-credibility cues that reflect beliefs about our memory faculties. We tested the influence of meta-memory feedback on self-credibility cues in the context of eyewitness testimony, when feedback was provided prior to “testifying” via a memory questionnaire (Experiment 1) and after an initial memory questionnaire but before participants had to retake it (Experiment 2). Participants received feedback (good score, bad score, or none) on a fictitious scale purported to predict eyewitness memory ability. Those given good score feedback before testifying were more confident (but no more accurate) than those given bad score feedback. Feedback also affected confidence (good increased and bad decreased) and accuracy (good increased) after testifying but only on leading questions. These differential effects of meta-memory feedback on confidence for normal and leading questions are not explained by the cue–belief model. Implications for our confidence judgments are discussed.     

Correction to: Towards a Better Understanding of Cognitive Deficits in Absence Epilepsy: a Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis

Neuropsychology Review - Due to an error during the editorial phase, a correction regarding Fig. 2 is added to the original article: “Towards a Better Understanding of Cognitive...     

Moderating Loss Aversion: Loss Aversion Has Moderators,But Reports of its Death are Greatly Exaggerated

Loss aversion, the principle that losses impact decision making more than equivalent gains, is a fundamental idea in consumer behavior and decision making, though its existence has recently been called into question. Across five unique samples (N_total = 17,720), we tested several moderators of loss aversion, which supported a preference construction account. Across studies, more domain knowledge and experience were associated with lower loss aversion, though people of all knowledge and experience levels were loss averse. Among car buyers, those who knew more about a particular car attribute (e.g., fuel economy) were less loss averse for that attribute but not other attributes (e.g., comfort), consistent with the idea that people with less attribute knowledge are more likely to construct preferences, thereby increasing loss aversion. Additionally, older consumers were more loss averse across different loss aversion measures and studies. We discuss implications for several accounts of loss aversion, including accounts rooted in status quo bias, emotion, or ownership. In addition to discovering loss aversion moderators, we cast doubt on recent claims that loss aversion is a fallacy or is fully explained by status quo bias, risk aversion, or the educated laboratory samples often used to study loss aversion.     

Exploring Human Values in the Design of a Web-Based QoL-Instrument for People with Mental Health Problems: A Value Sensitive Design Approach

Science and Engineering Ethics - Quality of life (QoL) is an important outcome measure in mental health care. Currently, QoL is mainly measured with paper and pencil questionnaires. To contribute...