Out of sight, out of mind: the presence of forensic evidence counts more than its absence

Recent evidence suggests that decision makers in criminal procedures are susceptible to biases. We previously found support for the presence of a feature positive effect (FPE, i.e., people attach more meaning to present than to absent information) in legal-decision making. In this study, we tried to uncover the mechanisms behind the FPE. Taking a cue from the literature on situation models in language comprehension, we investigated whether a FPE manifests itself in the memorization and use of forensic evidence. Students read a case file about a fistfight as well as additional evidence. The forensic evidence was manipulated such that a FPE on guilt estimation and conviction rate could be assessed. While subjects read additional forensic evidence, their eye movements were recorded to explore the presence of FPE in online processing. Afterwards, subjects were asked to decide on the suspect's guilt. They had to recall all information they remembered from the case file and indicate which parts of information they considered relevant to this decision. The results provided evidence for the occurrence of FPE in memorization and use of information and can be explained by the theoretical construct of situation models.     

The time course of argument reactivation revealed: using the visual world paradigm

Previous research has found that the single argument of unaccusative verbs (such as fall) is reactivated during sentence processing, but the argument of agentive verbs (such as jump) is not (Bever & Sanz, 1997; Friedmann, Taranto, Shapiro, & Swinney, 2008). An open question so far was whether this difference in processing is caused by a difference in thematic roles the verbs assign, or a difference in the underlying syntactic structure. In the present study we tease apart these two potential sources. In order to achieve this, we included a set of verbs (like sparkle) which are equal to unaccusative verbs in the thematic role they assign to their argument, but equal to agentive verbs in the syntactic status of their argument (henceforth mixed verbs). As a method we used the visual world paradigm as this enables us to measure processing of the sentences continuously. This method also allowed us to test another hypothesis, namely the hypothesis that not only the argument of unaccusative verbs is reactivated during processing, but also the argument of agentive verbs. This reactivation is expected as the result of integrating the verb and its argument into one representation. In our experiment, participants listened to sentences including one of the three types of verbs. While listening, they viewed a visual display in which one of four objects was strongly related to the argument of the verb (wood-saw). The gaze record showed that the eyes moved to the related object (saw) upon presentation of the argument (wood). More interestingly, the eyes moved back to the related object upon presentation of the verb (fell). We found that looks to the related object increase only late after verb offset for unaccusative verbs, replicating the findings of previous research. We also found a rise in looks to the related object in agentive verbs, but this rise took place much earlier, starting slightly after verb onset. Finally, we found that mixed verbs pattern in processing with agentive verbs. We conclude that the argument of the verb is always reactivated, independent of verb type. In addition, the timing of integration differs per verb type and depends on the syntactic status of the argument and not on the thematic role that is assigned to the argument.     

Causal imprinting in causal structure learning

Suppose one observes a correlation between two events, B and C, and infers that B causes C. Later one discovers that event A explains away the correlation between B and C. Normatively, one should now dismiss or weaken the belief that B causes C. Nonetheless, participants in the current study who observed a positive contingency between B and C followed by evidence that B and C were independent given A, persisted in believing that B causes C. The authors term this difficulty in revising initially learned causal structures "causal imprinting." Throughout four experiments, causal imprinting was obtained using multiple dependent measures and control conditions. A Bayesian analysis showed that causal imprinting may be normative under some conditions, but causal imprinting also occurred in the current study when it was clearly non-normative. It is suggested that causal imprinting occurs due to the influence of prior knowledge on how reasoners interpret later evidence. Consistent with this view, when participants first viewed the evidence showing that B and C are independent given A, later evidence with only B and C did not lead to the belief that B causes C.     

Moral signals, public outrage, and immaterial harms

Public outrage is often triggered by “immaterially” harmful acts (i.e., acts with relatively negligible consequences). A well-known example involves corporate salaries and perks: they generate public outrage yet their financial cost is relatively minor. The present research explains this paradox by appealing to a person-centered approach to moral judgment. Strong moral reactions can occur when relatively harmless acts provide highly diagnostic information about moral character. Studies 1a and 1b first demonstrate dissociation between moral evaluations of persons and their actions—although violence toward a human was viewed as a more blameworthy act than violence toward an animal, the latter was viewed as more revealing of bad moral character. Study 2 then shows that person-centered cues directly influence moral judgments—participants preferred to hire a more expensive CEO when the alternative candidate requested a frivolous perk as part of his compensation package, an effect mediated by the informativeness of his request.     

Multiple group membership influences face-recognition: Recall and neurological evidence

The limited face-recognition research involving targets categorizable on multiple dimensions has provided contradictory evidence as to how partial-ingroup members are processed and recognized. This research demonstrates that partial-ingroup members are recognized in a manner distinct from double-ingroup and double-outgroup targets. Specifically, when race and university-affiliation are crossed, university-affiliation does not influence recognition for own-race targets, but does for other-race targets, in that other-race/own-university targets are recalled more accurately than other-race/other-university targets. The neurological mechanisms involved in the effect are explored through the inclusion of electroencephalography.     

What You Feel Influences What You See: The Role of Affective Feelings in Resolving Binocular Rivalry

It seems obvious that what you see influences what you feel, but what if the opposite were also true? What if how you feel can shape your visual experience? In this experiment, we demonstrate that the affective state of a perceiver influences the contents of visual awareness. Participants received positive, negative, and neutral affect inductions and then completed a series of binocular rivalry trials in which a face (smiling, scowling, or neutral) was presented to one eye and a house to the other. The percepts “competed” for dominance in visual consciousness. We found, as predicted, that all faces (smiling, scowling, and neutral) were dominant for longer when perceivers experienced unpleasant affect compared to when they were in a neutral state (a social vigilance effect), although scowling faces increased their dominance when perceivers felt unpleasant (a relative negative congruence effect). Relatively speaking, smiling faces increased their dominance more when perceivers were experiencing pleasant affect (a positive congruence effect). These findings illustrate that the affective state of a perceiver serves as a context that influences the contents of consciousness.     

Psychopathic personality traits in relational aggression among young adults

Psychopathy is a robust predictor of overt physical aggression that may also be relevant to relational aggression (RA). This study was conducted to investigate the utility of psychopathic personality traits in the prediction of RA in a sample of 291 college students. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses indicated that both primary and secondary psychopathic traits explained additional variance in general/peer and romantic RA beyond physical aggressiveness. Consistent with previous research, no gender differences were found on either form of RA, challenging the popular stereotype of RA as a female behavior. Moreover, psychopathic traits were not differentially predictive of RA by gender or level of physical aggressiveness. Implications of these findings for research and clinical practice are discussed.     

Students Reported for Cheating Explain What They Think Would Have Stopped Them

I analyzed 298 open-ended responses of undergraduate students who have been reported for cheating to the question, “What, if anything, would have stopped you from committing your act of academic dishonesty?” These responses included a few major themes: students pled ignorance of what constitutes academic dishonesty and the consequences/seriousness associated with violations; students tended to deflect blame, usually by saying that their professor could have done something differently (neutralization); students did not feel they had enough time, resources, and/or skills to get the desired result without taking responsibility for this lack of time, resources, and/or skills (strain); students felt they did not manage their time well with accepting the blame for the poor time management; and that a bad grade was not an option. These data and results are discussed in relation to the extant literature on the topic.