Building a Bridge of Trust: Collaborative Assessment With a Person With Serious Mental Illness

Collaborative assessment utilizes psychological testing to help people make positive changes in their lives. Limited research has evaluated the utility of collaborative assessment for persons with serious mental illness. This case example uses the Personality Assessment Inventory to illustrate the usefulness of collaborative assessment with a person with serious mental illness. This approach informed not only diagnostic considerations but also revealed the client's current level of distress, contributed to enhanced therapeutic alliance, and directly pointed to psychiatric rehabilitation strategies.     

A New Measure of Life Satisfaction: The Riverside Life Satisfaction Scale

The Satisfaction With Life Scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) has been the dominant measure of life satisfaction since its creation more than 30 years ago. We sought to develop an improved measure that includes indirect indicators of life satisfaction (e.g., wishing to change one's life) to increase the bandwidth of the measure and account for acquiescence bias. In 3 studies, we developed a 6-item measure of life satisfaction, the Riverside Life Satisfaction Scale, and obtained reliability and validity evidence. Importantly, the Riverside Life Satisfaction Scale retained the high internal consistency, test–retest stability, and unidimensionality of the Satisfaction With Life Scale. In addition, the Riverside Life Satisfaction Scale correlated with other well-being measures, Big Five personality traits, values, and demographic information in expected ways. Although the Riverside Life Satisfaction Scale correlated highly with the Satisfaction With Life Scale, we believe it improves the Satisfaction With Life Scale by appropriately increasing construct breadth and reducing the potential for bias.     

Mother-blaming in family therapy: An empirical investigation

Abstract

This study tested two hypotheses derived from the feminist critique of family therapy in a sample of AAMFT members. The stimulus was a brief vignette of an initial therapy session with a family presenting a teen-aged child as the identified patient. It was hypothesized that family therapists would rate the mothers in the vignette as more dysfunctional than fathers. It was also hypothesized that mothers would be asked to bear more of the burden of change in treatment plans written by subjects. Neither hypothesis was supported. However, respondents did rate the concerned parent, regardless of sex, as more dysfunctional. Since this is a role often occupied by women, this finding may indicate some gender bias.     

The Effects of Time Pressure on Controlling Reactions to Persons With Mental Illness

Population surveys suggest that the general public stigmatizes persons with mental illness less than in the past. However, implicit attitude measures find that immediate reactions to mentally ill persons are still negative among both the general public and people diagnosed with mental illness. Time-course data suggest that these reactions may be dynamic, with immediate negative reactions becoming less prejudicial over time. We manipulated time pressures imposed upon social judgments about a mentally ill person. Participants perceived a mentally ill person as dangerous when forced to respond quickly; participants given ample time to respond were less likely to have this perception.     

Dimensions of “uniquely” and “non‐uniquely” human emotions

Emotion scientists often distinguish those emotions that are encountered universally, even among animals ( “primary emotions”), from those experienced by human beings ( “secondary emotions”). No attempt, however, has ever been made to capture the lay conception about this distinction and to find the criteria on which the distinction is based. The first study presented in this paper was conducted in three countries involving four languages, so as to allow for cross‐cultural comparisons. Results showed a remarkable convergence. People from all samples not only differentiated between “uniquely human” and “non‐uniquely human” emotions on a continuum, but they did so on the same basis as the one used by emotion scientists to distinguish between “primary” and “secondary” emotions. Study 2 focused on the implicit use of such a distinction. When confronted with a human (animal) context, participants reacted faster to secondary (vs primary) emotions. The implications of the human uniqueness of some emotions within the social and interpersonal contexts are discussed.     

Knowing That P without Believing That P

Most epistemologists hold that knowledge entails belief. However, proponents of this claim rarely offer a positive argument in support of it. Rather, they tend to treat the view as obvious and assert that there are no convincing counterexamples. We find this strategy to be problematic. We do not find the standard view obvious, and moreover, we think there are cases in which it is intuitively plausible that a subject knows some proposition P without—or at least without determinately—believing that P. Accordingly, we present five plausible examples of knowledge without (determinate) belief, and we present empirical evidence suggesting that our intuitions about these scenarios are not atypical.