Unlikely allies: credibility transfer during a corporate crisis

A company that faces a crisis can reestablish trust with stakeholders by announcing an independent investigation by a third party. Announcing an independent investigation, without knowing its outcome, significantly restored attitudes toward the company while an internal investigation was ineffective. Liberals responded most positively to a company that invited an independent investigation by a consumer advocacy group (Study 1). Experimentally activating liberal values using an implicit priming procedure likewise enhanced credibility transfer from a consumer advocacy group's investigation to a company in crisis (Study 2).     

Task structure,need for structure,and creativity

Although creativity is often seen as requiring spontaneity and flexibility, recent work suggests that there is creative potential in a structured and systematic approach as well. In a series of four experiments, we show that when Personal Need for Structure (PNS) is high, either chronic (Study 1) or situationally induced (Study 2), creative performance benefits from high task structure. Further, in line with earlier work on cognitive fixation effects, we show that when high task structure contains an example of noncreative task execution, creative performance is impaired, regardless of individuals' PNS. Nevertheless, participants high in PNS react relatively favorably to high task structure (Study 3) and are more likely to adopt a structured task approach when given the choice (Study 4). In sum, our results show that task structure can both stimulate and inhibit creative performance, particularly for people high in need for structure. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Emotional Rescue: How Affect Helps Partisans Overcome Collective Action Problems

Why does party identification motivate citizens to participate in politics? From a theoretical standpoint, it is in a partisan's self‐interest to free ride on the efforts of others. Yet, mere identification with a party is enough to motivate many people to overcome this structural hurdle. We theorize that, by virtue of aligning one's self with a party, individuals become more likely to react to their political environment with anger and enthusiasm rather than fear. Anger and enthusiasm are associated with approach and continuation of current behavior, while fear triggers behavior reconsideration. In short, party identification stimulates participation via anger and enthusiasm. On the other hand, fear produces thought but not much action. We find support for our model using data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) and an original laboratory experiment.     

Identifying the Effects of Unjustified Confidence versus Overconfidence: Lessons Learned from Two Analytic Methods

One of the most common findings in behavioral decision research is that people have unrealistic beliefs about how much they know. However, demonstrating that misplaced confidence exists does not necessarily mean that there are costs to it. This paper contrasts two approaches toward answering whether misplaced confidence is good or bad, which we have labeled the overconfidence and unjustified confidence approach. We first consider conceptual and analytic issues distinguishing these approaches. Then, we provide findings from a set of simulations designed to determine when the approaches produce different conclusions across a range of possible confidence–knowledge–outcome relationships. Finally, we illustrate the main findings from the simulations with three empirical examples drawn from our own data. We conclude that the unjustified confidence approach is typically the preferred approach, both because it is appropriate for testing a larger set of psychological mechanisms as well as for methodological reasons. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

THE ‘EXTENDEDNESS’ OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE

In recent years, the idea has been gaining ground that our traditional conceptions of knowledge and cognition are unduly limiting, in that they privilege what goes on inside the ‘skin and skull’ (Clark 1997: 82) of an individual reasoner. Instead, it has been argued, knowledge and cognition need to be understood as embodied (involving both mind and body), situated (being dependent on the complex interplay between the individual and its environment), and extended (that is, continuous with, rather than separate from, the world ‘outside’). Whether these various interrelations and dependencies are ‘merely’ causal, or are in a more fundamental sense constitutive of knowledge and cognition, is as much a matter of controversy as the degree to which they pose a challenge to ‘traditional’ conceptions of cognition, knowledge and the mind. In this paper we argue that when the idea of ‘extendedness’ is applied to a core concept in epistemology and the philosophy of science—namely, scientific evidence—things appear to be on a much surer footing. The evidential status of data gathered through extended processes—including its utility as justification or warrant—do not seem to be weakened by virtue of being extended, but instead are often strengthened because of it. Indeed, it is often precisely by virtue of this extendedness that scientific evidence grounds knowledge claims, which individuals may subsequently ascribe to themselves. The functional equivalence between machine‐based gathering, filtering, and processing of data and human interpretation and assessment is the crucial factor in deciding whether evidence has been gathered, rather than the distinction between intra‐ and extracranial processes or individual and social processes (or combinations thereof). To prioritize biological processes here, and to assert the superiority of human cognitive capacities seems both arbitrary and unwarranted with respect to gathering evidence, and ultimately would lead to an unattractive skepticism about many of the methods used in science to gather evidence. In other words, conceiving of scientific evidence as ‘impersonal’ (or at least not necessarily personal) not only better captures the character of evidence‐gathering in practice, but also makes sense of a large amount of evidence‐gathering that ‘personal’ accounts fail to either acknowledge or accurately describe. Whilst we suggest it is likely that all internally‐distributed evidence‐gathering processes are merely contingently internal processes, a significant number of externally‐distributed evidence‐gathering processes are necessarily externally‐distributed. Some evidence can only be gathered by extended epistemic agents.     

Inter-word eye behaviour during reading is not invariant to character size: Evidence against systematic saccadic range error in reading

The present study re-investigated the effect of character size on eye behaviour during reading, in order to test McConkie, Kerr, Reddix, and Zola's (1988 McConkie, G. W., Kerr, P. W., Reddix, M. D., & Zola, D. (1988). Eye movement control during reading: I. The location of initial eye fixations on words. Vision Research, 28(10), 1107–1118. doi:10.1016/0042-6989(88)90137-X[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) Saccadic Range Error (SRE) hypothesis. This assumes that saccades are biased to move the eyes a constant, optimal distance in the task (i.e., range error), while aiming at the centre of peripherally selected target words. Results showed in contradiction with this hypothesis, (1) that the linear relationship between the eye launch site and the mean landing sites in words is not invariant to character size, and (2) that the optimal launch-site distance to the centre of words varies depending on the spatial extent of the words, and differs from the mean length of saccades in the task. We propose an alternative, Center-of-Gravity hypothesis, which a priori accounts for the launch-site effect and its variations with character size, and suggests that research in reading may benefit from reconsidering the role of character size.