The moral reasoning of juvenile delinquents: A meta-analysis

To test the hypothesized immaturity of juvenile delinquents' moral reasoning, the results of 15 studies of the moral reasoning of juvenile delinquents were integrated quantitatively using meta-analysis. Hedges and Olkin (1985) methods were used to (a) compute effect sizes, (b) test the homogeneity of the obtained effect sizes, and (c) test the statistical significance of the pooled mean effect size. The results supported the hypothesis that the moral reasoning of juvenile delinquents is immature. It was concluded that several other issues are in need of investigation.     

Psychological adjustment and experiences with peers during early adolescence: Reciprocal,incidental, or unidirectional relationships?

This study examined the relationship over time involving three types of experiences with peers (amount of contact with friends, intimacy with best friend, rejection by peers) and two indices of psychological adjustment (self-perceived social acceptance and depressive affect) using longitudinal and causal analytic procedures developed within the life stress paradigm. Data were collected twice on a sample of 73 young adolescents, with a 6-month interval between measurements. The results provide partial support for a model of reciprocal influences between experiences with peers and adaptation, since adaptation was predictive of change over time in peer experiences in several instances as well as vice versa. Implications for intervention and further research are presented.     

Cognition and metacognition at extreme altitudes on Mount Everest

The FACTRETRIEVAL2 test battery, which assesses both retrieval of general information from memory and metacognition about that retrieval, was administered to people before and after a recent expedition to Mount Everest and at extreme altitudes above 6,400 m (higher than any mountain in North America or Europe). The major findings were as follows: First, the same extreme altitudes already known to impair learning did not affect either accuracy or latency of retrieval, and this robustness of retrieval occurred for both recall and forced-choice recognition. Second, extreme altitude did affect metacognition: The climbers showed a decline in their feeling of knowing both while at extreme altitude and after returning to Kathmandu (i.e., both an effect and an aftereffect of extreme altitude). Third, extreme altitude had different effects than alcohol intoxication (previously assessed by Nelson. McSpadden, Fromme, & Marlatt, 1986). Alcohol intoxication affected retrieval without affecting metacognition, whereas extreme altitude affected metacognition without affecting retrieval; this different pattern for extreme altitude versus alcohol intoxication implies that (a) hypoxia does not always yield the same outcome as alcohol intoxication and (b) neither retrieval nor metacognition is strictly more sensitive than the other for detecting changes in independent variables.     

The lateralization of language comprehension using event-related potentials

Event-Related Potentials were recorded over occipital and parietal scalp from left- and right-handed adults presented with a language and a non-language visual stimulus using a divided field, "oddball" paradigm. The major finding of interest was that the P300 component was larger over the left than the right hemisphere of the right-handers when the language stimulus was presented to the left hemisphere; there were no hemispheric differences for the left-handers, regardless of field of presentation. These results are discussed in the context of developing noninvasive measures to lateralize language function.     

Do different metamemory judgments tap the same underlying aspects of memory?

We compared the predictions from several kinds of metamemory judgments (on the same set of items), both in terms of their predictive accuracy and in terms of the commonality of predictions. Undergraduates made judgments about the ease with which they could learn each item in a list (ease-of-learning judgments); then they learned every item, either to a minimal criterion of learning or with overlearning, and made judgments about how well they knew each item (judgments of knowing); finally, they returned 4 weeks later for a retention session and made feeling-of-knowing judgments on every time they could not recall, after which a recognition test assessed predictive accuracy. Ease-of-learning judgments had the least predictive accuracy. Surprisingly, however, the recognition of nonrecalled items was predicted equally well by judgments of knowing (made 4 weeks earlier) as by feeling-of-knowing judgments (made immediately prior to recognition). Moreover, those two kinds of judgments were only weakly correlated with each other, which implies that they do not tap memory in the same way.     

Is there implicit memory without attention? A reexamination of task demands in Eich’s (1984) procedure

The relation between memory and attention has been of long-standing interest. Eich (1984) made an important discovery of implicit but not explicit memory for contextually determined homophones (e.g., taxi-FARE) presented in a channel to be ignored within a selective listening procedure. However, his slow rate of presentation of shadowing task materials may have allowed frequent attention shifts to the allegedly ignored channel. With a direct replication of Eich’s timing parameters, we reproduced his results, but when the attended channel was presented twice as fast as Eich’s, implicit memory for the to-be-ignored words vanished. Our results contradict claims of extensive semantic processing of unattended auditory information in this task.     

THE CASE FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHEMISTRY

The philosophy of chemistry has been sadly neglected by most contempory literature in the philosophy of science. This paper argues that this neglect has been unfortunate and that there is much to be learned from paying greater philosophical attention to the set of issues defined by the philosophy of chemistry. The potential contribution of this field to such current topics as reduction, laws, explanation, and supervenience is explored, as are possible applications of insights gained by such study to the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of social science.     

Evaluating the decay gradient for collinearity bias with lateral displacement from the axis of induction

The misperception of alignment which is found in many geometric illusions can be quantified using relatively simple stimulus configurations. Perceived collinearity of one segment (designated as the test segment) is biased by a second segment (designated as the induction segment), with the size of effect being a function of the relative angle between the two segments. The process can be described as angular induction. The strength of bias is greatest when the induction segment is centered at the tip of the test segment. Tong and Weintraub have reported that lateral displacement from the tip, i.e., at right angles to the axis of the induction segment, produces a sharp drop in the strength of effect. This decline is described as a decay gradient for the angular induction. One experiment replicates and provides better quantification of this decay gradient. Two other experiments examine the decay gradient using a pair of induction segments, one on each side of the tip of the test segment. Displacement of the segments (either in the same direction or in opposite directions) produces substantially the same gradient of effect. Therefore, previous evidence of tandem boosting of effect for segment pairs does not depend on collinearity among the stimulus components. Finally, a fourth experiment finds that an induction segment which is at a fixed position and orientation differentially affects the influence of a variable induction segment. At some angles the influence of the variable segment is augmented, and at others it is suppressed. These findings are discussed in a neuroreductionist context, and a simple model for angular induction is presented.