Affectivity in Its Relation to Memory

It seems obvious that various feelings (various kinds of affectivity) are memorized, forgotten, and recollected to various degrees. Some of them are forgotten. Some of those forgotten can be recollected, while others are lost forever. For example, short and long-lasting feelings and shallow and deep feelings are memorized and remembered in different ways. In this paper I analyse from a conceptual point of view several categories of memory-of-feelings and offer a comprehensive map of them. In the end, the richness of categories in the realm of memory is interpreted as a proof of the intricacy of affectivity.     

An examination of the response styles theory of depression in third- and seventh-grade children: a short-term longitudinal study

The goal of this study was to test the response styles theory of depression in a sample of 3rd- and 7th-grade children. In addition, we examined whether the relationship between rumination and increases in depressive symptoms is mediated by hopelessness and low self-esteem. The procedure involved an initial assessment in which depressive symptoms, response styles, hopelessness, and self-esteem were assessed. The procedure also involved a follow-up assessment, 6 weeks later, in which depressive symptoms, hopelessness, and self-esteem were reassessed. Children with a ruminative response style exhibited increases in depressive symptoms over the 6-week period. In addition, the relationship between rumination and increases in depressive symptoms was mediated by both hopelessness and low self-esteem. Last, contrary to our hypotheses, neither distraction nor problem-solving response styles predicted decreases in depressive symptoms over the course of the study.     

Bigger than a breadbox? Attention to distractors may not enhance negative priming

In several recent studies, P. A. MacDonald and colleagues (e.g., P. A. MacDonald & S. Joordens, 2000) reported unusually large negative priming effects and claimed that attention to distractors, counter to expectations, served to enhance the magnitude of the effect. In 3 experiments using their novel comparative judgment task, negative priming was assessed using both a control condition based on that of P. A. MacDonald, S. Joordens, and K. N. Seergobin (1999) and one in which control probe items exactly matched those on ignored repetition trials. In MacDonald et al.'s unmatched control condition, participants were faster than on ignored repetition trials, but this difference was reduced or absent when control items were matched. This result led to the conclusion that the apparently large negative priming effect reported by MacDonald and colleagues may be an artifact arising because judgments for a subset of their control trials were relatively easier than for ignored repetition trials.